China’s Opening-Up Has Entered a New Stage

By Zhao Jinping*

On 10 April 2018, President Xi Jinping, in his keynote speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the 2018 Annual Conference of the Boao Forum for Asia, emphasized that China’s door of opening-up will not be closed and will only open even wider. Opening-up was key to China’s economic growth over the past 40 years and in the same vein, high-quality development of China’s economy in the future can only be achieved with greater openness. It is a strategic decision made by China based on its need for pursuing development and also a concrete action taken by China to move economic globalization forward in a way that benefits people across the world.

Standing on such a strategic height, President Xi announced at the conference four major measures that China will pursue to open up wider. These measures are now under implementation across the board, and as a

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result, China’s opening-up has entered a new stage.

I. Opening-up is an essential requirement for China’s development and will bring new opportunities for countries around the world

The year 2018 marks the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening-up. Remarkable achievements have been made in China’s opening-up over the past 40 years, which has played a highly important role in promoting reform and development. However, we must be clearly aware that there still exists a certain gap between the current status of China’s opening-up and the need to adapt to complex changes in the external environment, foster new strengths for participating in and steering international competition and cooperation and boost the high-quality development of China’s economy. The inadequacy and imbalances in the width, depth and intensity of opening-up remain the major contradiction for the current stage. Therefore, to open up wider is first and foremost a strategic need for China’s own development. Second, in the international environment, the United States has been wantonly engaged in unilateralism and trade protectionism and willfully trampled on WTO rules to hit its trading partners, seriously undermining the development environment and cooperation foundation for economic globalization. China’s real actions to keep opening up wider will fully demonstrate its firm determination and confidence in participating in and advancing economic globalization and create new drivers for promoting development of globalization that is open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all with win-win outcomes. This is a pressing need to better cope with changes in the international landscape and improve the global environment for development. Third, to realize the goal put forward by President
Xi Jinping of promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, it is necessary to establish international cooperative relationships on the basis of mutual benefits and win-win progress. As the second largest economy and one of the top trading and investment nations in the world, when China opens up wider across the board, it will create more opportunities for other countries to share the dividend of China’s development by expanding their trade with and investment in China. This is an important manifestation that China proactively shoulders its responsibility of an emerging major country.

II. Substantially broadening market access in important areas such as finance and automobiles will become a new highlight in China’s opening-up

To put into action the major measures proposed in the report of the 19th CPC National Congress on making new ground in pursuing opening-up at all fronts, it is crucial to open up across the board and focus on breaking new ground. In particular, how to realize opening-up of market access in key areas such as modern service sectors and general manufacturing has caught wide attention with raised expectation. Among the four major measures announced by President Xi Jinping in his keynote speech in Boao, the first involves the significant broadening of market access in relevant areas, in which two aspects are most attention-catching. One is the opening-up of financial sectors and the other is the opening-up of the general manufacturing sector including automobiles. China’s financial sectors such as banking, securities and insurance had long had multiple restrictions on investment access with a low level of market opening. As a result, the competition in the financial market was inadequate and so were service capacity and international competitiveness of
financial institutions. As the major measures of raising foreign equity caps in the banking, securities and insurance industries, easing restrictions on the establishment of foreign financial institutions and expanding their business scope are now being implemented, it will domestically create easier and more favorable conditions for foreign financial institutions to enter China’s financial market competition, elevate financial product development and innovation capacity and financial service efficiency, meet consumers’ growing needs for diversified and tailored financial services and alleviate the pressure faced by enterprises due to the difficulty and huge costs in financing. Externally, it will be conducive for Chinese financial institutions to establish cooperation with multinational financial companies and global financial service networks and enhance their capacities of international operation and consolidating factors and resources, thus raise the status of China’s financial sectors in the global value chain. Meanwhile, opening-up of market access certainly will mean more requirements for warding off risks and improvement of financial regulatory capabilities in the orderly opening-up of financial sectors. Opening-up of the automobile sector will help promote market competition and technological innovation, lower costs and offer more choices for consumers. To forestall market monopolies, it is necessary to strengthen and improve the policy system on competition and keep the market competition in order.

To implement the new measures announced by President Xi Jinping on significantly broadening market access, the Chinese government is now intensively revising the latest versions of negative lists. On 31 May, the Ministry of Commerce of China stated that the new version of national negative list and the negative list for FTA pilot zones will be made public before 30 June. Areas where market access will be broadened include the financial and
automobiles sectors as announced before and sectors like energy, infrastructure, transport and logistics for business and trade. Opening-up of market access will enter a new stage where highlights keep emerging.

III. China is committed to creating a more attractive investment environment

The investment environment includes important factors such as tax arrangements, labor resources and costs, industrial competition policies, market rules and the investment administration system, which have major impact on the appeals of such an environment to foreign investments. Over the past 40 years, China has kept introducing measures of reform and opening-up and transformed from mainly relying on preferential tax policies to leveraging labor resources advantages and market growth potential to attract foreign investment. Visible results have been scored in improving the investment environment. This has also been one of the major reasons that China has long been among the top countries concerning scales of attracting international investment. However, as China’s economic growth has continued to moderate and the traditional advantages in labor resources have been weakened, the competition from emerging markets and the return of manufacturing to developed economies have augmented significantly the pressure that China’s economy faces. To create an investment environment featuring internationally accepted trading rules, fair market competition policies and a transparent and stable investment administration system has become the key element for fostering new competitiveness concerning the investment environment.

Based on the strategic need for creating a more attractive
investment environment, President Xi Jinping emphasized that China will enhance alignment with international economic and trading rules, increase transparency, strengthen property rights protection, uphold the rule of law, encourage competition and oppose monopoly. China will provide institutional safeguards to ensure that the market play a decisive role in resources allocation and the government better play its due role. The implementation of these measures will markedly enhance the appeals of the Chinese market to foreign investors.

The development of pilot free trade zones which has been deepened and expanded since 2013 has all along focused on creating an internationalized, regularized and market-based investment environment as a pilot program of institutional innovation. A great amount of successful experience has been gathered and applied in a wider range of areas, playing a leading and exemplary role in China’s endeavors to create a more attractive investment environment. On the third day after the opening ceremony of the 2018 Annual Conference of the Boao Forum, President Xi Jinping announced the important decision that the CPC Central Committee and the State Council support the building of a Pilot Free Trade Zone and exploring the building of a Free Trade Port with Chinese characteristics in Hainan Island. The building of a pilot free trade zone covering an area of 35,000 square kilometers will be unfolded in full swing and a free trade port system with a higher level of opening-up in Hainan will take shape through gradual exploratory efforts. This is of long-term and far-reaching significance for China’s endeavors to create a more attractive investment environment.

On 30 May, the Executive Meeting of the State Council made decisions on canceling or easing access restrictions for foreign
investments in areas such as automobiles, ship-building, aircrafts, finance and bulk energy commodity trading, simplifying procedures for granting working permits to foreign workers and issuing visas within two days to qualified foreign talents recruited by enterprises registered in China. This shows that substantive progress has been made in fully implementing the measures announced by President Xi Jinping for creating a more attractive investment environment.

IV. Strengthening IPR protection has generated tremendous incentives to enhancing the competitiveness of China’s economy

IPR is an important part of property rights held by market players. To strengthen IPR protection is first of all a need to protect the safety of property rights of investors and the legitimate rights and interests of enterprises. In the meantime, intellectual property rights are manifestations of innovation and creative ideas. To protect IPR helps owners of property rights to maximally enjoy their interests of innovation and also help other enterprises share innovative achievements in a reasonable way. What is more important is that it will generate tremendous incentives to new innovative activities. The market competition in today’s world is mainly that of innovativeness as innovation is the source of international competitiveness of enterprises. To protect IPR is to protect innovation, which is desirable for foreign companies and even more so for Chinese companies.

President Xi Jinping underscored in his speech at the Boao Forum for Asia that China will re-institute the State Intellectual Property Office to step up law enforcement. Through these measures, the cost for offenders will be raised and the deterrent
effect of relevant laws will be fully unleashed. This will promote IPR protection in China to a new height and strongly facilitate normal technological exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and foreign companies. On the other hand, as Chinese companies engage in international operations and make more overseas investments, they naturally need strengthened IPR protection from foreign countries as well. The Section 301 investigation by the United States has accused China of infringing on the IPR of US companies and targeted some strategic emerging industries in which companies realize technological progress through normal technical cooperation. Actually, this is an inappropriate practice which turns a blind eye to the legitimacy of re-innovated IPR of Chinese companies. It is therefore fair to say that it is increasingly important to strengthen international cooperation on IPR protection and build multilateral dispute-settlement mechanisms.

China now is taking actions to speed up the implementation of the major measures announced by President Xi Jinping. On 30 May, the Executive Meeting of the State Council made the decision on substantially raising the cap for IPR damage compensation, demonstrating China’s resolve and its power to take actions for strengthening the building of a law-based environment for IPR protection by enhancing law enforcement.

V. China will remain committed to the policy direction of promoting the basic balance of international payments by expanding imports

President Xi Jinping stressed in his keynote speech at Boao Forum for Asia that China does not seek trade surplus and has a sincere desire to increase imports and achieve greater balance
of international payments under the current account. This fully shows China’s approach to opening-up and its policy direction to proactively expand imports. China on the whole has maintained the trend of achieving balance gradually in its foreign trade. Imbalances in certain bilateral trades have mainly resulted from the comparative advantages of different countries against the backdrop of globalization. This conforms to the market rules and requirements of division of industries and all parties to such division have benefited from their economic complementarities. Therefore, when there is significant surplus or deficit in bilateral trade, unilateral restrictions on imports or exports will seriously undermine interests of both sides and affect the overall trade balance. The most effective way for China to reduce the surplus it runs in its trade with other countries is to further increase imports. This is conducive to protecting the legitimate rights and interests of exporting companies and promoting trade balance. It also helps to fully elevate the level of market opening, meet the need for upgrading domestic consumption and increasing domestic demands and bring more opportunities of economic and job growth to trading partners.

The measures announced by President Xi Jinping on holding the Import Exposition annually and further cutting import tariffs on products such as automobiles have been well received by foreign governments and enterprises and met the expectations of domestic companies and consumers. These measures are now being intensively implemented. On 22 May, the Tariff Regulations Committee of the State Council announced that as of 1 July 2018, tariffs on automobiles and auto-parts will be lowered. The tariff on automobiles will be cut from 25% and 20% to 15%, and that on auto-parts from 8-25% to 6%. On this basis, the State Council decided that starting from 1 July 2018, tariff on daily consumer
goods will be lowered substantially. The average tariff rate on clothing, kitchenware and sports and fitness products will be reduced from 15.9% to 7.1% and that on home appliances such as washing machines and refrigerators will be cut from 20.5% to 8%. These measures are bound to exert positive impact on the win-win cooperation between China and its major trading partners.
China and Africa enjoy a time-honored history of friendly exchanges. In this traditional friendship, China and Africa have always supported each other in trying times and shared weal and woe. As President Xi Jinping said, China and Africa are friends tested by adversity. Such a friend must never be forgotten. No matter how the international landscape evolves, strengthening solidarity and cooperation with African countries is always an important pillar of China’s foreign policy. It is a strategic choice of China made with long-term commitment and it will not be changed by any particular incident at any time.

1. Major Diplomatic Achievements in China-Africa Relations Since the 18th CPC National Congress

(1) China’s diplomatic thinking on Africa has been enriched and the cooperation framework

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further improved. President Xi Jinping attaches high importance to developing relations with Africa. In 2013, he chose Africa as the destination of his first foreign trip as President of China, and during the visit, he put forward the policy of upholding justice and friendship while pursuing shared interests and the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity, and good faith. In 2015, when co-chairing the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), President Xi Jinping announced the decision to upgrade the China-Africa relationship to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, win-win economic cooperation, mutually enriching cultural exchanges, mutual assistance in security, and solidarity and coordination in international affairs, charting the course for future development of China-Africa relations. During the Forum, a new document, *China's Africa Policy*, was issued, defining the guiding philosophy, basic principles and key areas of China’s foreign policy related to Africa. In 2016, China proposed that China-Africa cooperation should follow the five-point principle of cooperation, i.e. ensuring common, intensive, green, safe and open development, which has become the new consensus between China and Africa in their efforts for win-win cooperation and common development. These new thoughts, concepts and measures form the pillars of China’s Africa policy. Top-level design and strategic planning of China’s overall relations with Africa have gradually matured with the thinking and theoretical framework ever improved.

(2) **Strategic mutual trust has deepened with high-level exchanges more frequent than ever.** Since the 18th CPC National Congress, President Xi Jinping and other CPC and state leaders have paid over 30 visits to Africa. Over 60 African heads of state or government have paid visits to or attended international conferences
in China. China has intensified its efforts to build a network of partnerships in Africa, with strategic partnerships or comprehensive cooperative partnerships established with over 20 African countries. Over 180 state leaders and leaders of political parties from 52 African countries and Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU) sent congratulatory messages on the successful convening of the 19th CPC National Congress and the re-election of President Xi Jinping as the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Dialogues and interactions have been increasingly frequent between political parties, legislatures and localities of China and Africa, with hundreds of visits at or above the provincial and ministerial level and hundreds of exchanged visits between political party delegations. Various dialogue mechanisms including national bilateral committee meetings, strategic dialogues, consultations between foreign ministries and meetings of joint trade and economic committees are operating smoothly. Communications between China and Africa on governance and development experience are deepening. In June 2017, China and the AU jointly held the China-Africa High-Level Dialogue and Think Tank Forum on Fighting Against Poverty for Common Prosperity, during which participants conducted in-depth discussions on China and Africa joining hands in addressing the poverty challenge. Out of Poverty, a book authored by President Xi Jinping, was well received in many African countries.

(3) Pragmatic cooperation has been expanded with win-win cooperation making new achievements. In 2017, trade volume between China and Africa reached USD 170 billion. China has remained Africa’s largest trading partner for nine consecutive years. Chinese investment in Africa exceeded USD 100 billion, increasing as much as 100 times on the basis of that of 2000. There are over 3,200 Chinese companies in Africa, representing an important force
for local economic and social development. The implementation of the outcomes of the FOCAC Johannesburg Summit has made smooth progress. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway, Hisense South Africa and other projects in such fields as infrastructure, industrial parks, special economic zones, and industrial and production capacity have been completed, put into operation or accelerated. In particular, the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway, as the biggest infrastructure project of Kenya since it gained independence, has created nearly 50,000 jobs, contributed 1.5% of GDP growth in Kenya and cut regional logistics cost by 14% to 40%.

China has always rendered support within its capacity to the efforts made by Africa to improve people’s living standards. China took the lead in helping Africa fight Ebola with assistance worth RMB 750 million. China has sent over 25,000 medical workers to Africa, treating more than 300 million patients, including more than 7,000 cataract patients who have been cured through the China-aided “Brightness Action” program. China has also sent medical teams to some African countries to help prevent and control plague and cholera. Since 2016, China has provided emergency food aid to 18 African countries struck by droughts and floods to help them through difficulties.

(4) With continued development in peace and security cooperation, China makes its contribution to peace in Africa. China’s active engagement in peace and security affairs in Africa has been carried out under the principle of being peaceful, justifiable and constructive. China supports efforts of African countries to solve African problems independently. To support Africa’s collective security mechanisms and capacity building for
independent peace operations, President Xi Jinping pledged USD 100 million of military aid grant to the AU in the next five years at the UN Peacekeeping Summit in September 2015. China has actively participated in mediation for hotspot issues such as the South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi issues, and provided Chinese wisdom for peacefully resolving conflicts on the continent. Among the five permanent members of the Security Council, China is the largest contributor of peacekeepers in Africa and the second biggest contributor of peacekeeping assessment from 2016 to 2018. Over 2,000 Chinese peacekeepers are on active duty in five mission areas in Africa. Since 2009, Chinese navy has operated in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia. By now, 29 Chinese fleets have conducted escort missions for the safe passage of over 6,000 Chinese and foreign ships. In 2017, the Chinese naval hospital ship Peace Ark visited seven African countries, completed its first sail around Africa, and provided high-quality medical services to the local people.

(5) People-to-people and cultural exchanges have become more vibrant, tightening the bond between the Chinese and African peoples. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, China has provided Africa with over 60,000 training opportunities and over 40,000 government scholarships, and trained over 200,000 African technicians and professionals. China and Africa have held over 100 people-to-people exchange activities and carried out over 200 people-to-people exchange programs. China and South Africa held the Year of South Africa and the Year of China in each other’s countries. The China-South Africa High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism became the first regular exchange mechanism between China and Africa. The African people are now more enthusiastic about learning the Chinese language and culture.
There are 54 Confucius Institutes and 27 Confucius Classrooms in 41 African countries. Some Chinese TV series are big hits in Africa, such as *A Beautiful Daughter-in-Law Era*, *A Story of Lala’s Promotion* and *Jin Tailang’s Happy Life*. The number of visits between Chinese and Africans has grown rapidly. In each of the recent years, Chinese tourists made over a million visits to Africa and African tourists over 600,000 visits to China.

(6) **China and Africa worked closely together in international affairs and supported each other on major issues.** On multilateral occasions, especially in the discussions over African issues at the Security Council, China always speaks out for African countries. When it comes to issues involving China’s core interests and major concerns, such as the Taiwan question and the South China Sea issue, African countries always give China their firm support. China and Africa are also collaborating with each other on major international issues such as reform of the UN, climate change and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. China invited African countries to important international conferences it hosted, such as the G20 Hangzhou Summit, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation and the BRICS Xiamen Summit, where China called on the international community to support African development.

Since the 18th CPC National Congress, important achievements have been made in China’s relations with Africa, which has consolidated the traditional friendship, strengthened strategic mutual trust and promoted rapid progress in cooperation in various sectors. These achievements have also enriched the China-Africa comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership and significantly contributed to a closer community with a shared future for China and Africa. Thanks to the robust growth of their
relations, China-Africa cooperation is standing at the forefront of international cooperation with Africa. First, the principles guiding China’s cooperation with Africa have great strength and vitality. China’s commitment to upholding justice and friendship while pursuing shared interests and to sincerity, real results, affinity, and good faith is different from the law of the jungle by which the strong bullies the weak or the zero-sum game in which one’s gain is another’s loss. The commitment is based on sincerity, equality, mutual respect, win-win benefits, openness and inclusiveness. It fully demonstrates China and Africa’s common historic mission and shared goal of pursuing win-win cooperation and common development, and is widely recognized by the international community including African countries. Second, China is committed to delivering on its promise. No matter on what occasion a promise is made on supporting the development of Africa, China will deliver on it with quality and on time, so that the tangible benefits of China-Africa cooperation will be shared by the African people. Third, since its inception in the year 2000, FOCAC has followed the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, focused on practical results and efficiency, and provided strong institutional support for the all-round development of China-Africa cooperation. Now it has become an efficient mechanism for collective dialogue between China and African countries, an important platform for practical cooperation and a pacesetter for international cooperation with Africa.

2. New Development Opportunities for China-Africa Relations

The world is undergoing great development, profound changes and major adjustments. Against the backdrop of a changing
international landscape, the overall strength of developing countries continues to rise and the international governance system is becoming more favorable to emerging markets and developing countries. These developments present precious opportunities and greater space for the growth of China-Africa relations. Meanwhile, rising uncertainties in the international situation and the lingering impact of the international financial crisis pose challenges to China and African countries in their respective development, and put more pressure on their efforts to independently explore the development paths suited to their national conditions. Developing countries, including China and African countries, earnestly hope to forge a new type of international relations that feature mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation and build a community with a shared future for mankind. Such an aspiration speaks volumes of the importance and necessity of greater solidarity and cooperation between China and Africa.

(1) The significant development of China-Africa relations is compatible with the development of China’s major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. The 19th CPC National Congress set the overall goal for this kind of diplomacy, that is, to build a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind. Africa is an indispensable partner for achieving this goal. The 19th CPC National Congress elevated the principle of upholding justice and friendship while pursuing shared interests and the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity, and good faith to the guiding principles for strengthening China’s solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries. This fully demonstrates that China-Africa relations are a fine example of such solidarity and cooperation and, indeed, of South-South cooperation. Africa is the region where the positive spillover of China’s peaceful
development is the most salient, and Africa is a priority in advancing major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. Deepening strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation with Africa is an inherent requirement for China as a developing country, and also a natural step for building a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind.

(2) The significant development of China-Africa relations meets Africa’s urgent need for development. Since the turn of the century, Africa has enjoyed a relatively long period of rapid economic growth, and is now at a key stage for economic takeoff. It is the common aspiration of African countries to explore development paths that suit their respective national conditions, break bottlenecks in infrastructure, capital, human resources and other areas, and accelerate industrialization and economic diversification. China has accumulated comparative advantages in such areas as capital, technology, equipment and human resources after 40 years of reform and opening up, and is willing to share its development experience with Africa. Enhanced win-win cooperation will serve to leverage complementarity between China and Africa, enable Africa to translate advantages in natural resources, demographic dividend and market potential into growth momentum, and help Africa achieve economic independence and self-reliant sustainable development.

(3) The significant development of China-Africa relations receives strong support from the Belt and Road Initiative. The Initiative plays a positive role in making economic globalization a more open, inclusive and balanced process that delivers win-win outcomes to all. African countries are enthusiastic in participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. Leaders from Kenya and Ethiopia came
to China for the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. China has signed cooperation agreements under the Belt and Road Initiative with five African countries. Egypt, Ethiopia and four other African countries became members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Belt and Road Initiative provides a broader vision and stronger momentum for China-Africa cooperation, and brings about new historic opportunities for enhancing policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity between China and Africa.

3. Outlook for the FOCAC Beijing Summit

Under the joint initiative of China and Africa, the FOCAC Beijing Summit will be held this September. Leaders from China and African countries will, after 12 years, gather in Beijing again to renew traditional friendship and discuss cooperation in a new era. This Summit will be another milestone in China-Africa relations, and will play a positive and significant role in further deepening China-Africa comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership and consolidating the community with a shared future for China and Africa.

(1) The Summit will send a positive signal of lasting solidarity and friendship between China and Africa. China and Africa have always been good friends, good partners and good brothers. China-Africa traditional friendship, having stood the test of time and the changing global environment, is full of vitality, strength and new contents. It is a valuable asset shared by our two peoples and should be cherished for generations to come. The FOCAC Beijing Summit will further cement the consensus of renewing China-Africa traditional friendship and working together for a better future, send
a strong message of China-Africa solidarity and cooperation to the world, and inject richer contents and new features consistent with the times into the endeavor of building a community with a shared future for China and Africa. As a new starting point, the Summit will add new momentum to China-Africa friendship and cooperation, and contribute to the steady progress of their win-win cooperation and common development.

(2) The Summit will form synergy between development strategies of China and Africa. This Summit will endeavor to forge a closer community with a shared future for China and Africa, and synergize the Belt and Road Initiative with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and development strategies of African countries. China and African countries will actively explore priorities, key areas and specific ways of future cooperation, focus on areas of greatest interest to African countries, such as infrastructure, industrialization, agriculture, people’s livelihood, peace and security, and explore common ground where the needs, advantages and interests of the two sides converge, so as to deliver more benefits to the two peoples.

(3) The Summit will contribute to the transformation and upgrading of China-Africa cooperation. Such cooperation is on the verge of a breakthrough, shifting from being government-led to market-based, and its priorities changing from trade in goods to production capacity, and from engineering contracts to investment and business operations. The Beijing Summit will focus on strengthening policy guidance for the transformation and upgrading of China-Africa cooperation, foster new growth drivers and highlights in investment, financing, new economy, people-to-people exchanges and other areas, and strive for wider, deeper and better
cooperation.

(4) The Summit will make international relations more democratic. China and Africa have a lot of common language and interests in making international relations more democratic. The two sides will deepen solidarity and coordination in international affairs, strengthen the momentum of South-South cooperation and safeguard the common interests of developing countries through the FOCAC Beijing Summit. Facts have proven that the development of China brings more opportunities to that of Africa, and the development of Africa means greater driving force for China and the whole world. When China and Africa are well developed, the world we live in will be a fairer and more just place. Together, China and Africa will make bigger contribution to the building of a new type of international relations and the community with a shared future for mankind.
Take the Relations between China and Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to a New Height

By Zhao Bentang*

I. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a Rising Force in the Global Landscape, Enjoy Promising Development Prospects

With major development, transformation and adjustment unfolding across the world, the international architecture and balance of power are at a crucial juncture of evolution. Destabilizing and uncertain factors are increasing and many new issues and challenges are cropping up. In this complex and fluid context, developing countries and emerging markets continue to grow stronger. LAC countries, on the whole, enjoy stability and development. By proactively responding to the challenges posed by a changing external environment, they are tapping into their development potential, seeing their overall strength grow steadily, and playing a bigger, constructive role in the transformation of

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international architecture.

1. Political and social development is stable. The political system of Latin America and the Caribbean is relatively stable and the idea of balanced economic and social development has gained strong public support. 2018 is the year of presidential or parliamentary election for over ten countries in the region. General elections in six countries including Cuba and Venezuela have concluded smoothly. Cuba has achieved a transition of power to a new generation of leaders, the first of its kind since the victory of its revolution. The adjustment of the regional political landscape will continue, with general elections starting in countries like Brazil and Mexico. Generally speaking, the political landscape and power dynamics in the region are evolving within the existing systems and legal frameworks. In consistent with the trend of the times, governments of relevant countries are pushing for reforms, improving people’s lives, and pursuing development and revitalization.

2. Economic performance is looking up. Latin America and the Caribbean, richly endowed with natural resources and strategic resources such as oil, gas, minerals, water, farmlands and forests, has a strong foundation for development. In 2017, the regional economy started to grow again, registering a growth rate of 1.2%. It is estimated that the momentum of a moderate recovery will continue, with a growth rate of 2.2% for 2018 and 2.8% for 2019. That said, structural constraints remain for the recovery and Argentina has just seen some drastic fluctuations in its economic and financial environment. All in all, in the near future, regional economy will continue to grow at a certain speed, providing regional countries with the material foundation needed to advance
modernization and improve people’s lives.

3. Pragmatic and diversified diplomacy is carried out. LAC countries, playing a bigger role in international and regional affairs, are actively upholding the common interests of developing countries as well as the interests of their own countries. After the Trump administration took office, countries in the region were disappointed and dissatisfied with the US moves to build a wall along its border with Mexico, its threats to use force against Venezuela, and President Trump’s absence at the Summit of the Americas, adding uncertainties to their relations with the US. Having seen a more diversified pattern in their foreign relations, LAC countries have placed an emphasis on their relations with the European Union, major emerging countries like China, Russia and India and other developing countries.

4. The integration process moves forward despite twists and turns. The LAC region is among the first to embark on a path toward integration, driven by a strong wish from regional countries to seek strength through unity. The year 2011 witnessed the establishment of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an important step forward in regional integration. This process, however, has been somewhat impacted by the different development needs and levels of regional countries and their divided opinions about Venezuela. Regional organizations focusing on political and security integration such as the UNASUR and ALBA have seen their growth slowing down while organizations focusing on economic integration such as the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR continue to grow.
II. Friendly Exchanges and Mutually Beneficial Cooperation between China and LAC Countries Are Deepening on All Fronts

Latin America and the Caribbean, as an important developing region, is an important part of China’s diplomatic agenda. In his report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), General Secretary Xi Jinping called for a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind, and stressed the importance to follow the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests and the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith in China’s pursuit of greater solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries. He has thus identified new goals and opened up new prospects for deepening China-LAC relationship in the new era.

1. High-level exchanges have guided China-LAC relationship to a new height. President Xi Jinping has paid three visits to Latin America and the Caribbean, covering 10 countries in the region. He has met, on bilateral and multilateral occasions, leaders of all LAC countries having diplomatic ties with China, which is unprecedented in China-LAC relations. During his visit to the region in 2013, President Xi called for the establishment of a comprehensive cooperative partnership of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and common development between China and LAC countries that have diplomatic ties with China. At the first China-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit in 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed the building of a new, five-dimensional relationship and a “1+3+6” practical cooperation framework. After the summit, President Xi and the leaders of LAC countries issued the Joint Statement on China-Latin America and the Caribbean
Summit in Brasilia and officially established the comprehensive cooperative partnership of equality, mutual benefit and common development. During his visit to the region in 2016, President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the Congress of Peru to the whole region and called for the building of a China-LAC community with a shared future.

China and LAC countries have continued to offer each other understanding and support on matters concerning each other’s core interests and major concerns. China actively supports LAC countries’ efforts in exploring a development path suited to their national conditions and upholding their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The one-China principle is observed by the vast majority of LAC countries. The Republic of Panama and the Dominican Republic established diplomatic ties with China in June 2017 and May 2018 respectively, raising the total number of LAC countries having diplomatic relations with China to 23. After the convening of the 19th National Congress of the CPC, over 130 messages of congratulations were sent to China from party and government leaders of LAC countries with or without diplomatic relations with China, and from representatives of regional organizations and multilateral institutions. After the opening of the NPC and CPPCC sessions this year, leaders from LAC countries and representatives from regional multilateral institutions sent nearly 60 messages of congratulations to the new Chinese leadership. Within the framework of international organizations and multilateral mechanisms like the UN, APEC, G20, and BRICS, China and LAC countries have enhanced collaboration on such global issues as the UN reform, sustainable development and tackling climate change, and on hotspot issues like the Korean nuclear issue and cyber security, effectively upholding the common
interests of developing countries.

2. Overall China-LAC cooperation has moved forward at full steam with historical breakthroughs. After the first China-LAC summit in 2014, the two sides established the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum). The first ministerial meeting of the Forum was held in Beijing at the beginning of 2015, launching the first cooperation platform between China and all LAC countries. Over the past three years, with the institutional pillars of the Forum gradually put in place, the Forum has set off on a track of sound growth. The foreign ministers of China and the CELAC Quartet have held two rounds of dialogue, while a national coordinators’ meeting was held annually. Dialogue and cooperation platforms have been established in over ten sectors, including infrastructure, agriculture, business, scientific and technological innovation, legal affairs, the environment, local government cooperation and people-to-people exchanges as well as between political parties, youth, and think tanks. These have provided institutional support for implementing political consensus and cooperation plans between the two sides.

In January 2018, the second ministerial meeting of the Forum was held in Santiago, Chile, opening a new chapter in China-LAC cooperation. In his congratulatory message to the Forum, President Xi Jinping commended the development of the Forum in the past three years, and proposed to advance China-LAC relations through Belt and Road cooperation. The two sides shared the view that cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative would add new dimensions and lend fresh impetus to China-LAC comprehensive cooperative partnership, and open up new prospects for it. China
made proposals on deepening cooperation within the “1+3+6” framework, by building a transportation network connecting lands and oceans, fostering a large market open and beneficial to both sides, developing competitive home-grown industries, seizing the opportunity of innovation-driven growth, and carrying out extensive exchanges based on equality and mutual trust. These proposals were well-received by LAC countries. The meeting adopted three outcome documents, i.e. the Declaration of Santiago, Joint Action Plan of China-LAC Cooperation (Priority Areas) (2019-2021), and Special Announcement on the Belt and Road Initiative, reflecting the readiness of both sides to enhance cooperation and pursue common development. Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, Antigua and Barbuda have signed MOUs with China on the Belt and Road Initiative, with a view to enhancing complementarity between their national strategies and the initiative.

3. China-LAC practical cooperation has accelerated. Both as developing nations, China and LAC countries are at the same development stage with similar development tasks. Our cooperation, based on common interests and mutual needs, follows the principles of equality, mutual benefit, openness, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation, representing an important part and a successful example of South-South cooperation. In 2017, the trade between the two sides stood at US$257.85 billion, an increase of 18.8% year-on-year. The trade mix has improved. An increasing number of Latin American and Caribbean quality produce is sold in Chinese market, with Chile becoming the largest source of China’s fresh fruit imports. The building of a China-LAC Free Trade Area is well underway. China has upgraded its Free Trade Agreement with Chile, launched negotiations with Peru to upgrade bilateral
FTA, conducted joint feasibility studies on FTAs with Panama and Colombia, and negotiated with Uruguay on signing an FTA.

Being optimistic about the long-term prospects of Latin America and the Caribbean, over 2,000 Chinese enterprises have established their presence in the region. In 2016, China’s direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean totaled US$27.23 billion, an increase of 115.9% year-on-year. China’s cumulative direct investment stock amounted to US$207.15 billion, taking up 15.3% of China’s total outbound investment. Latin America and the Caribbean has become a major destination for outbound Chinese investment, second only to Asia. In recent years, the booming e-commerce and digital economy has created new opportunities in China-LAC economic and trade relations. The two sides have also engaged in financial cooperation of diverse forms. Over US$17 billion has been delivered as part of China’s US$35 billion financial package toward LAC countries. A US$30 billion China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund has been launched, and a company was set up to manage the fund.

What has happened shows that China-LAC cooperation has responded to the demand of LAC countries for funding, technology and infrastructure and delivered tangible benefits to LAC people by boosting their economic and social development. Chinese enterprises have not only taken part in energy and resources development in Latin America and the Caribbean, but also invested in oil refining, chemical engineering, metallurgy, sea shipping, and other midstream and downstream industries, helping increase the added value of resource products in these countries. The allegation against China’s exploitation of LAC resources simply does not hold water. Chinese enterprises have undertaken a host of infrastructure
projects in LAC countries to build highways, railways, airports, bridges, power stations, and so on. They are also actively engaged in cooperation in industrial capacity and equipment manufacturing. Over 1.8 million job opportunities have been created for local communities.

4. People-to-people exchanges are gaining momentum. On several occasions during his visit to LAC countries, President Xi Jinping stressed that amity among people as the key to sound state-to-state relations. Despite geographic distance, our two sides have maintained frequent exchanges between legislatures, media, and think tanks and at the sub-national level, and conducted robust cooperation in education, culture, and tourism. China has opened 36 Confucius Institutes and 11 Confucius Classrooms in 16 LAC countries, and a China cultural center in Mexico city, the first in the LAC region. Chinese airliners have opened multiple direct flights to Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and Panama. An increasing number of Chinese tourists are visiting LAC countries. Surveys by world-renowned research institutes show that in 2017, the LAC countries, for the first time since 2003, reported a more favorable view of China than of the US.

III. China-LAC Relations Are Facing New, Important Opportunities

Amid continued complex and profound changes in the international and regional landscapes, the strategic importance and global influence of China-LAC relationship are on the rise. Both China and LAC countries hope to expand mutually-beneficial cooperation for common development. The 19th National Congress of the CPC has brought new, important opportunities for China
to deepen friendly relations with LAC countries and all the other countries around the world. It is important for China and LAC countries to earnestly implement the consensus reached between our leaders, seize the opportunities, build on past achievements and open up new prospects for China-LAC relations to the greater benefits of our people.

1. China and LAC countries need to grow relations from a strategic and long-term perspective by fully leveraging the guiding role of high-level exchanges for China-LAC relations, improving existing dialogue and consultation mechanisms, and enhancing overall planning for China-LAC relations. The two sides need to stick to the principle of equality and continue to offer each other understanding and support on issues concerning each other’s core interests and major concerns, with a view to better upholding the common interests of China and LAC countries and the interests of the developing world as a whole. China actively supports Argentina in hosting the G20 Summit in 2018, Chile in hosting the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 2019, and Brazil in hosting the BRICS Summit in 2019. China will stay in close communication and coordination with LAC countries on international and regional issues, enhance the global influence of China-LAC relations, and jointly work for a fairer and more equitable international political and economic order, thus making greater contribution to world peace, stability and development.

2. China and LAC countries need to stay committed to the principles of mutual benefit and common development. Under the Belt and Road framework, China and LAC countries could work together to develop more effective and innovative ways of cooperation, and see to it that it will expand into more areas, with
a better structure, greater momentum and higher quality. China would like to be LAC countries’ active partner in transportation, infrastructure and energy connectivity projects and open more sea routes and direct air links, so as to increase the capacity and density of the transportation networks connecting China and LAC countries. China will facilitate trade and investment with LAC countries. We welcome the participation of LAC countries in the inaugural China International Import Expo to be held this November. China has the equipment, technology, funding and training opportunities that LAC countries need. Our two sides may speed up industrial cooperation so that LAC countries will be able to develop an independent and diversified industrial system at an early date. China hopes to enhance coordination between the Belt and Road Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan and the development strategies of LAC countries, and build a China-LAC online Silk Road and a digital Silk Road. China is ready to help train more researchers from LAC countries through the China-LAC Science and Technology Partnership and the China-LAC Young Scientists Exchange Program. China also supports small- and medium-sized LAC countries in enhancing their capacity to deal with climate change.

3. China and LAC countries need to promote our lasting friendship, mutual understanding and mutual appreciation through continued exchanges and mutual learning, hence working together in pursuit of our respective dreams. Efforts should be made to build stronger public support for China-LAC relations by expanding exchanges between our legislatures, political parties, sub-national entities, media organizations, academic institutions, people’s organizations, cultural and sports groups, and by enhancing dialogue and exchanges on governance, domestic and foreign
policies. By making full use of our rich cultural and tourism resources, the two sides can facilitate cross-border tourism to build closer bond between our people. Efforts should be made to create more opportunities for our younger generation to meet, study and make friends with each other by establishing more culture centers in each other’s countries and more Confucius Institutes in LAC countries, and by increasing the number of exchange students, with a view to carrying forward the friendship between China and LAC countries.

4. China and LAC countries need to work for a comprehensive and balanced cooperation network by ensuring mutual reinforcement between collective cooperation and bilateral cooperation. China will continue to support LAC countries’ pursuit of strength through unity and regional integration. Following the principle of equality, and in an open and inclusive spirit, we will move forward the overall China-LAC cooperation with China-CELAC Forum as the main channel, and work for win-win outcomes in a flexible and result-oriented manner. Guided by the Declaration of Santiago and Joint Action Plan of China-LAC Cooperation (Priority Areas) (2019-2021), China will work with LAC countries to promote cooperation in political, security, trade, finance, energy, resources, manufacturing, agricultural and hi-tech fields. We hope to combine China’s industrial and technological strengths with LAC countries’ advantages in natural and human resources to the greater benefits of our people. China will follow through on such programs as projects on government scholarships for LAC students, personnel training, and exchanges between think tanks and youths to deepen mutual understanding and friendship between our peoples.
It has been nearly 60 years since China-LAC cooperation started with the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Cuba in 1960. Over the decades, our cooperation has yielded rich fruits. With its economy in a transition from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development, and its pursuit of innovation and higher quality of growth, China will create a more powerful and extensive impact, and present more opportunities of cooperation. China will work in concert with LAC countries on this new journey of China-LAC relations toward the goal of building a China-LAC community of shared future, delivering more benefits to our people, and making greater contribution to world peace, stability and prosperity.
Denuclearization Process of Korean Peninsula Started, Mutual Tolerance between US and North Korea Key to Progress

By Liu Ming*

1. The easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula is the result of a combination of positive factors.

The year 2017 was the most unforgettable and exciting one and witnessed the most ups and downs for the Korean Peninsula. On the American side, this is due to the fact that Donald Trump is the most strong-minded, aggressive and straightforward president in American history, often making unfathomable decisions that take people by surprise. In the early days of his presidency, Trump adopted the strategy of “applying maximum pressure” on North Korea: sending two aircraft carriers on two missions to the sea adjacent to North Korea to exert pressure on the country, flying strategic bombers B-1, B-2 and B-52 over the military demarcation lines, and keeping disclosing military strike plans. North Korea, on its part, reached a new height in developing

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integrated nuclear missiles. On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test. In June and September of the same year, it successfully tested Hwasong-10 and Hwasong-12. In November, North Korea launched Hwasong-15, marking its possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range that is capable of reaching the whole of the United States. Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted 10 sanctions on North Korea, among which resolutions 2356, 2371, 2375 and 2397 were passed in 2017.

When the world was anticipating nervously a possible collapse on the Korean Peninsula in 2018, a ray of light shone through the dark clouds hanging over the peninsula, portending a major turnaround. The situation has since embarked on a track of fast and positive development, which defies people’s imagination. Such a shift is, first and foremost, attributed to the changing judgement and policy on the part of North Korea. Secondly, the new South Korean President Moon Jae-in keeps sending signals of peace to the North. He used the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as a platform to create conditions for the North to present its new policy and new image. Thirdly, President Trump, by taking stock of the changing circumstances, responded to Kim Jung-un’s peace gesture. Fourthly, the Chinese leaders are steadfast in their support for North Korea’s strategic decision to denuclearize. With sincerity and warmth, they welcomed two visits by the North Korean leader to Beijing. The two sides exchanged views on the denuclearization plan, the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula, and the friendly relations between the two parties and two countries. This lays an external political foundation for North Korea’s denuclearization talks with the US in the next stage.
2. The Panmunjom Declaration marks a new stage for inter-Korean relations.

The sign of change on the Korean Peninsula first appeared on November 29, 2017 when Kim Jung-un declared that North Korea realized the goal of becoming a missile power and the historic cause of completing the state nuclear force. While he stressed the need to improve the quality of nuclear weapons, the strategic focus of his country will enter a new phase of adjustment and development, as it has achieved, in form, the strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear status alongside nuclear powers such as China, the US and Russia. Undoubtedly, the America’s maximum pressure strategy severely undermined the three lifelines that sustain the North Korean system: funding chain (finance), oil pipeline (energy) and maritime trade. This is also an external reason that compelled North Korea to adjust its policy.

It goes without saying that South Korean leader Moon Jae-in is the man who continued the “sunshine policy” by facilitating North Korea’s efforts to shift its strategic focus and providing the most opportune conditions. After assuming presidency, he proposed to establish a South-North joint team at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and, once again, brought up the “Berlin Initiative” to ease inter-Korean tensions. On the first day of 2018, Kim Jung-un announced in his new year address that North Korea would participate in the Winter Olympics to celebrate the great national event in a splendid manner, demonstrate the dignity and spirit of the nation, and improve the frozen inter-Korean relations.

After the North-South joint team appeared at the Winter Olympics, the North Korean leader Kim Jung-un and South Korean
President Moon Jae-in held a historic meeting at Panmunjom on the North-South border on April 27th. After the meeting, the two sides released the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, which lays out six measures to improve inter-Korean relations: holding high-level dialogue and negotiations in various fields; establishing a joint liaison office with resident representatives of both sides in the Kaesong region; convening the Inter-Korean Red Cross Meeting to discuss and solve various issues including the reunion of separated families and proceeding with reunion program for the separated families; connecting and modernizing the railways and roads on the eastern transportation corridor as well as between Seoul and Sinuiju; completely ceasing all hostile acts against each other that are the source of military tension and conflict, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line, and eliminating their means; holding frequent meetings between military authorities, including the Defense Ministers Meeting.

The declaration is of more symbolism than substance. It is largely within the realms of the North-South Joint Declaration issued during President Kim Dae-jung’s visit to the north in 2000 and the Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity released by President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il in October 2007. The core of the declaration is that the two sides agreed to, during this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice, declare an end to the War, promote the transition from armistice to peace, establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and pursue trilateral meetings involving the two Koreas and the US, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two Koreas,
the US and China. The two Koreas confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, it is of greater historic significance than the June 15th Joint Declaration in 2000 and the October 4th Declaration in 2007, as it is consistent with the spirit of the two resolutions adopted at the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea: *On Proclaiming Great Victory of the Line of Simultaneous Development of Economic Construction and Building of Nuclear Force and On Concentrating All Efforts on Socialist Economic Construction to Meet Requirements of New High Stage of Developing Revolution*. Moreover, Kim Jung-un demonstrated an unusual passion about meeting with Trump, which, from a different angle, shows his sincerity in resolving the nuclear issue and establish normal relations with the US.

Nine hours after Trump announced the cancelation of the Singapore meeting on May 24th, Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea’s First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a mild statement, “we, broad-minded and open all the time, have the willingness to offer the US side time and opportunity”; “We would like to make known to the US side once again that we have the intent to sit with the US side to solve problems regardless of ways at any time”; "We inwardly hoped that what is called the ‘Trump formula’ would truly help solve the problem and would be a wise way of substantial effect for settling the issue.” On the afternoon of the 25th, the Blue House received the request from Kim Jung-un for an inter-Korean summit, another one less than one month after the first Panmunjom meeting on April 27th. Such an urgent meeting request
shows that the North Korean supreme leader took his meeting with Trump very seriously and that he is resolved to end the history of confrontation through the DPRK-US summit. In addition, he recognized Moon Jae-in as an indispensable “intermediary” to bring back to life the DPRK-US summit. Given the mass joint military exercise conducted by South Korea and the US on May 16th, North Korea cancelled the high-level meeting with the South scheduled for that day, and set up barriers for South Korean journalists to attend the dismantling ceremony at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. However, the North’s dissatisfaction about some of South Korea’s actions does not reduce the important value of the latter in making the DPRK-US summit possible.

Throughout the turnaround on the situation of the Peninsula over nearly four months, North Korea is fully aware of the importance of South Korea as a facilitator and the need to use it as a mediator to ensure progress on nuclear negotiations with the US. More importantly, South Korea is much needed as the North shifts its focus onto economic development. Hence Kim Jung-un, in return or for stabilizing relations with the South, agreed to hold the high-level North-South meeting on June 1st. The two sides reached agreement on promoting mil-to-mil and Red Cross talks. In the meantime, he gave South Korea the most-desirable gift, the assurance of positive cooperation to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

3. The back-and-forth on the plan for a Trump-Kim meeting underscores the difficulties in the denuclearization process.

Thanks to the behind-the-scenes efforts by South Korean
leaders and Moon Jae-in’s sincere talks with Kim Jung-un, there have appeared signs of the US and North Korea moving closer. Nuanced changes are also seen in President Trump’s attitude toward the North Korean leader. He instructed State Secretary Pompeo to make two visits to Pyongyang and meet with Kim Jung-un, which speaks to his genuine desire to make substantial results at the Singapore summit scheduled for June 12th.

However, Trump announced the cancellation of the meeting between May 24th and 25th, and declared it would take place as scheduled 59 hours later. This is rarely seen in international politics. It not only casts a shadow on the meeting and its results, but also lays bare the serious differences between the two countries on the path to denuclearization. Although Trump and Kim Jung-un both have high hopes for the result of their meeting, the two sides have entrenched distrust that has built up in the pursuit of a settlement of the nuclear issue over the past 20 years, and have both tried to dominate the approach and process of denuclearization in a tough way.

In an interview on May 13th, John Bolton brought up the denuclearization model, which is tantamount to or transcends the “Libyan model”. Such a comprehensive package of denuclearization includes North Korea abandoning nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, dismantling nuclear and missile facilities, and, more importantly, shipping the dismantled nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee for destruction. At the same time, North Korea must transfer nuclear researchers to other jobs, give up programs that can be used for nuclear development, and turn in biological weapons. Only after
denuclearization is completed will the US offer security assurances and economic assistance.

Obviously, North Korea, a country which has completed the development of nuclear weapons and the test of nuclear launch vehicles and has acquired military power in East Asia, is unlikely to submit itself with humiliation to the Libyan model for denuclearization, because that amounts to giving in to a powerful country. North Korea wants to denuclearize in a dignified way through negotiations based on reciprocity, and adopt a phased approach in exchange for compensation from the US. It is also unlikely to accept examination and verification like the invasion of Iraq. Still less does it want to see the US delays compensating due to the indefinitely prolonged examination and verification.

A neo-conservative hawk in the George W. Bush administration, Bolton set a tone that goes far beyond the commitment made by Pompeo during his visit to Pyongyang. Pompeo made a relatively positive and flexible statement, “If North Korea takes bold action to quickly denuclearize, the US is prepared to work with North Korea to achieve prosperity.” Therefore, North Korea is worried that once negotiation gets started, Bolton will intervene in the talks in a tough way, raise doubts about North Korea’s intention, bring interferences to Trump’s decision-making, and weaken Pompeo as a pragmatist negotiator. If that happens, North Korea would be an ultimate loser.

As such, Kim Kye-gwan made a statement on May 16 to refute Bolton, “If the Trump administration is trying to force our unilateral nuclear abandonment, we will no longer be interested in such dialogue and cannot but reconsider our proceeding to the
DPRK-US summit.” On May 24, Choe Son Hui, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, made another tough statement in response to US Vice President Pence’s inappropriate remarks, “We will neither beg the US for dialogue nor take the trouble to persuade them if they do not want to sit together with us.” “Whether the US will meet us at a meeting room or encounter us at nuclear-to-nuclear showdown is entirely dependent upon the decision and behavior of the United States.”

In response to Kim Kye-gwan’s statement, Trump used the “Trump formula” to play down the “Libya model”, saying that the US commits to provide security assurances for North Korea, if it reaches a denuclearization agreement with the US. Yet the divide between the two sides on the process and approach of denuclearization is visible. It was after Choe Son Hu’s outspoken statement that Trump cancelled the Singapore meeting on May 24th. While Trump has restarted preparations for the negotiation with Kim Jung-un, questions remain as to what kind of an agreement will be reached in Singapore, especially how the officials of the two sides at the working level will maintain cooperation and trust in implementing the roadmap going forward.

4. China supports the easing of tensions and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

Over the past years when tensions escalated on the Korean Peninsula and the denuclearization process stalled, China has upheld its own principles and based its policy toward North Korea on facts. First, China is opposed to North Korea developing nuclear weapons in defiance of the trend of the times and the rules and norms of the international community; Second, after the Six-
Party talks were suspended, China and the US maintained thorough cooperation in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. China has engaged in close communication and cooperation with the US and Russia during UN Security Council consultations and the adoption of resolutions to sanction North Korea; Third, the Chinese government has faithfully implemented UN resolutions; Fourth, China has been emphasizing that the US must fully accommodate North Korea’s security concerns in the hope to use it as an opportunity to steer North Korea toward denuclearization.

To break the standoff, China has proposed on many occasions the “suspension for suspension” and “dual track” approaches. Even though neither North Korea nor the US accepted China’s proposal for various reasons, China has never ceased in its diplomatic efforts. As inter-Korean relations improve, North Korea and the US started to explore direct talks, of which China is supportive. China believes that the key to resolving the Korean nuclear issue is negotiation between the US and North Korea, as the US still has 28,000 troops and mass aggressive weapons on the Peninsula. The US and North Korea have no diplomatic relations, and the armistice is maintained by the US and the two Koreas. The US is also the key country which can determine whether North Korea can be fully integrated into the international community and enjoy all the rights thereof.

China also welcomes and supports North and South Korea in acting in the spirit of dialogue, reconciliation and cooperation enshrined in the Panmunjom Declaration to implement the consensus of the two meetings of their leaders, promote reconciliation and cooperation, build trust through dialogue and consultation, and improve their relations. This way, they will play
a positive role in sustaining and consolidating the momentum in easing tensions on the Peninsula.

China and North Korea maintain traditional friendship. The China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is still valid. During Kim Jung-un’s two visits to China, the two sides had full consultations on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime. In the future, China and North Korea need to communicate and have strategic coordination on North Korea-US negotiation on denuclearization and the peace regime, as well as inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. This will, to some extent, ensure North Korea maintains a balanced position when negotiating with the US.

As the two largest countries in Northeast Asia, China and the US were involved in the Korean War and signed the armistice agreement. The two sides have the obligation to consult on the approach to denuclearization, the sharing of its responsibility and cost, and its oversight and management. As the US and North Korea are divided on how to settle the nuclear issue: a packaged solution or a synchronized approach, China may well be a participant and mediator to assist the US and North Korea in finding a solution that is fair, effective and with a timeline.

When it comes to the establishment of a peace regime in the future, China is a direct party both historically and in terms of international law. It is also an external supporter for the peaceful co-existence of the North and the South and an important neighbor of the Peninsula. It is reasonable and natural for China to be part of the process of establishing the peace regime. China hopes that the US and North Korea and North Korea and South Korea could
sign a treaty of non-aggression respectively. On that basis, China, the US and Russia, the three big countries, should provide political assurances for permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. The six Northeast Asian countries should also build a regional security cooperation mechanism, so as to put in place complementary structures for the security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and rid the region of the Cold War pattern.
After 17 years of development, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional cooperative organization, has become of a large scale and across multiple fields, yielding influence far beyond the region. With India and Pakistan’s formal induction, the SCO has ushered in a new stage of development. A larger membership has resulted in more diverse interests, a broader range of concerns, and more coordination efforts to reach consensus, yet the SCO remains a key venue where members get to develop themselves through mutual support, and thus stands out as a new model of international relations featuring cooperation and win-win outcome.

I. Security, economic and people-to-people cooperation have become pillars in the SCO’s development

Having emerged from severe tests posed by

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international turbulences, particularly the global financial crisis since its founding in 2001, the SCO witnesses deeper political mutual trust, stronger awareness of solidarity and self-reliance, and closer cooperation on issues relating to key interests such as security and development. Security, economic and trade, and people-to-people cooperation have become the cornerstones of the SCO’s continued development.

1. Continuous expansion in security cooperation

The SCO was the first of its kind oriented towards crackdown on terrorism, separatism and extremism, and has built up over time a well-established legal system and long-acting mechanism for security cooperation. Upon the SCO’s establishment, the six heads of state signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which is to be followed by the Agreement on Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement on RATS Databank, Concept of Cooperation among the SCO Member States in the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substances and Precursors between the Member States of the SCO, Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism, Agreement between the Governments of SCO Member States on Cooperation in Ensuring IIS, Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crime between the Governments of the Member States of the SCO, Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crime between the Governments of the Member States of the SCO, Agreement on the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Joint Anti-Terrorist Exercises within Territories of Member States of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement between SCO Member States on Holding Joint Military Drills, Cooperation Agreement in the sphere of identifying and cutting off the channels used by the individuals involved in terrorist, separatist and extremist activities to enter the SCO member states, Regulation on Political and Diplomatic Measures and Mechanisms of SCO Response to Situations Threatening Peace, Security and Stability in the Region, Agreement on Cooperation and Interaction of the SCO Member States on Border Matters, SCO Convention on Countering Extremism. These documents have laid a solid legal basis for combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

At the same time, the SCO has successively set up a mechanism for National Security Council Secretaries, Prosecutors-General, Chief Justices of the Supreme Courts, Defense Ministers, and Interior Ministers to meet regularly, an anti-terrorism platform for emergency consultation between public security, judicial departments and other law enforcement authorities, and has identified safeguarding the transportation safety of oil and gas pipelines as a new field for cooperation. Since the first joint anti-terrorist military drill between China and Kyrgyzstan, bilateral and multilateral anti-terrorist military drills, such as “Coalition”, “Coordination”, and “Peace Mission”, and regular anti-terrorist joint military exercises for law enforcement authorities, including “East-2014”, “Norak Anti-terror”, “Solidarity” and “Tianshan”, have become an important part of the security cooperation among member states.

By 2018, 13 bilateral and multilateral anti-terrorism military drills and 15 such law enforcement drills and crackdown actions
have been held under the SCO framework. As a result, member states are better equipped for maneuver warfare, coordination, joint command and joint crackdown on violent terrorist activities while dealing with non-conventional security challenges; the rampant “three evils” have been deterred; drug trafficking and transnational organized crimes have been effectively contained; and social security and stability of the region and member states have been safeguarded.

The SCO has continuously delivered new outcomes in jointly combating terrorism, extraditing criminals, and exchanging information. Member states have enjoyed more smooth law enforcement cooperation on border control, information-sharing, and the security of civil aviation, faster repatriation of criminals, improved security measures for all sorts of events, and a more efficient multilateral mechanism for law enforcement and security cooperation. This has helped guarantee the success of large-scale international conferences and competitions, including the SCO Summits for Heads of State and Heads of Government, Almaty Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Beijing Olympics, Moscow celebrations of the 65th Anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, Shanghai World Expo, Guangzhou Asia Games, Astana & Almaty Asian Winter Games, Vladivostok APEC Summit, Sochi Winter Olympics, and the Almaty Winter Universiade. The SCO’s objective of maintaining and safeguarding the security and stability of the region and member states is thus met.

2. Steady advances in economic cooperation

Right after the SCO’s founding, member states signed
the Memorandum between the Governments of Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Basic Goals and Directions of Regional Economic Cooperation and Launching the Trade and Investment Facilitation Process, and the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which identified basic objectives and directions for near-term, mid- and long-term economic cooperation.

In 2004, at the Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting of the SCO Member States, the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation among the SCO Member States, which covers as many as 127 projects in 11 areas was formulated, which paved the way for economic cooperation among the SCO countries. Since then, multiple documents were signed and adopted by the SCO member states, including the Agreement on Interbank Cooperation (Association), Minutes of the First Meeting of the Board of the SCO Business Council, Resolution of the Conference for the Establishment of the SCO Business Council, Agreement between the SCO Governments on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Affairs, and the Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture between the Governments of the Member States of the SCO.

Since 2010, most SCO member states were among the first to have overcome the Financial Crisis when the world was troubled by economic downturn and Europe and the U.S. were confronted with sluggish economic recovery. Up until the end of 2011, the gold and foreign exchange reserve of the six SCO member states had exceeded 3.6 trillion USD; their trade volume reached 4.7 trillion USD, up by 25.1 % year-on-year; collectively, SCO states
made up over 13% of the world economy. In the post-crisis era, the SCO Economic Circle became the most active region with the fastest growth.

In 2016, the SCO Heads of Government Council approved the 2017-2021 List of Measures to Continue Developing SCO Project Activities, a guiding document for the SCO’s economic cooperation in the five years, which further identified 38 measures and projects for cooperation in seven areas including trade and investment, finance, customs, agriculture, science, technology and information, environment protection, and transportation infrastructure. The document is a major landmark in the SCO’s multilateral economic cooperation.

3. Cultural cooperation rolled out

Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Orthodox, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism coexist within the SCO, which offers a platform of equal exchange and cooperation for the peaceful coexistence and mutual-learning of different ethnicities, faiths, civilizations and cultures of the member states. Cultural cooperation has also become a key pillar of the SCO’s sustainable development.

Since 2005, member states have signed documents including Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Disaster-relief and Mutual Assistance, Agreement on Cooperation in Education between the Governments of the SCO Member States, Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Health, SCO scientific and technological partnership program, and Program of Tourism.
Cooperation of the SCO Member States. Meeting mechanisms for ministers of culture, health, education, transportation, emergency disaster-relief (civil affairs) and technology have been set up.

Since the official launching of the SCO Network University in 2010, over 60 top-notch universities have become its members. In 2011, delegates of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the Charter of the SCO University, and 70 partner universities were later identified in those five countries, with an aim to turn out competent talents in the priority cooperation areas (regional studies, ecology, energy science, nanotechnology, information technology) of economics, science, culture and education. Member states also had in-depth discussion on potential cooperation in global warming, eco-environment protection, disaster relief, science and technology, innovation, information, telecommunications industry and the rational use of natural resources.

In 2012, the SCO Meeting of the Council of Heads of State reiterated that, attention should be directed towards strengthening cooperation in culture, science and technology, innovation, tourism, and health, notably ensuring sound health and epidemic situation in the SCO region. In the past 17 years, member states, under the framework of the SCO, have conducted cultural exchange activities of various forms, including over 100 bilateral and multilateral art festivals, music festivals, youth festivals, education weeks, film weeks, TV cooperation fora, exhibitions, sports games, marathon competitions, “friendship years”, winter (summer) camps, and training sessions. The cultural festivals, week of education “Education without Borders” and Kunming Marathon have become regular events, and have greatly enhanced the mutual
understanding and traditional friendship among people of the
SCO region. The SCO member states are also looking forward
to cooperation regarding the preservation of intangible cultural
heritages and traditional ethnic cultures, so as to cement the public
support and social basis for the development of the SCO.

II. Challenges for the SCO’s future development

During the past 17 years, the SCO has grown into an
influential regional organization of various sectors at an unexpected
rate, and it enjoys larger potential for further growth. However, the
SCO is indeed a young regional organization. Aside from existing
bottlenecks, some new problems and challenges have emerged
along with an increased membership.

Firstly, the conservative forces of the West will barely change
its prejudices against the SCO. The moment after its establishment,
the SCO declared that it is not a military group but an open-
ended regional cooperative organization that doesn’t target any
country and group. But undeniably, the multipolar, equitable
and reasonable world order that the SCO pursues, is opposite to
the U.S. strategy of maintaining the original world order that it
will dominate chronically. The new security concept based on
“mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation” and the
concept of “an indivisible security space with due regard to the
interests of all states without exception” that the SCO adheres to in
international relations are incompatible with the cold-war mindset
of the conservative forces of the West. The SCO’s advocacy of
the UN’s leading and coordinative role in addressing international
hotspot issues runs counter to the U.S. and NATO’s practice of
bypassing the UN. The spirit of peace, friendship, and mutually-
beneficial cooperation that the SCO upholds is also opposite to the “Groupthink” and power politics of the U.S. and other countries in the West. Besides, the SCO calls on the international community to respect countries’ sovereignty, independence and the diversity in their political and social systems—another challenge to Western values.

The SCO’s 2005 declaration that urged the U.S. to establish a timetable for withdrawing troops from Central Asia convinced the West that the SCO is not an organization they would like to see. After the 2012 SCO Summit, some Western media again hyped up the antagonism between the SCO and the West, and branded the SCO as a forum no longer limited to resolving border disputes. Some Western politicians deem that, the SCO is keen to build up a multilateral mechanism against the U.S., thus the West, notably the U.S. would have to get ready for across-the-board challenges including political, economic and security challenges launched by the SCO, considering that the Declaration of the SCO Heads of State backs Tehran and is clearly against interfering with Syria’s internal affairs, forcing regime changes in any state, and resorting to the use of force on the Iran nuclear issue.

**Secondly, the U.S. and Europe spare no effort in dividing and driving wedges between SCO members.** After taking office, President Obama waived sanctions on Uzbekistan that started from 2005, and planned to allocate to Tashkent a portion of the suspended $800 million aid to Pakistan in the hope that President Karimov could be won back to accept U.S. troops again. In 2012, prompted by the U.S., NATO, for the first time ever, invited the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to its summit in Chicago, so as to foster relations with Central
Asian states.

The U.S. and Europe also attempt to turn India into a key “defense partner” and a pawn to counterbalance China. In the past decade, the U.S. has sold India $15 billion’ worth of arms. In 2016, defense ministries of the U.S. and India signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Logistics Support, which allows sharing military bases for military logistics operations. The U.S. also sold India P-8I maritime patrol aircrafts. The deal would be the first such purchase by a non-NATO country. In 2017, bipartisan consensus in the U.S. approved sales of 22 Guardian drones to India at a worth of $2 billion for strengthened surveillance of the Indian Ocean waters. While giving a speech titled “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century” at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Rex Tillerson, the then Secretary of State of the U.S., projected India as a “pivotal state” in the U.S.’ future regional strategies and expressed the hope that India could play a bigger role in the security of the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, France and India inked an agreement on reciprocal logistics support, which will enable their naval ships to use each other’s navy bases.

Thirdly, other regional and international organizations exert influences on the SCO’s Central Asian members. After the Cold War ended, although the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc that were respectively led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union dissolved, a range of geopolitical forces have staged increasingly intense games in Central Asia. Organizations and mechanisms at play include the NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue of foreign ministers, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, the
Eurasian Economic Union, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in
Asia, the Four Central Asian States, the Economic Cooperation
Organization, and the Turkic Council. They are intertwined and
have different geopolitical roles to play.

Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan joined NATO’s Partnership for
Peace programme; in 2002, Tajikistan followed suit. Since 2007,
the EU has fully involved in Central Asian affairs by launching
the EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia and a
Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2014-2020, and infiltrating
the Central Asia through the European Union-Central Asia Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting. At the same time, Japan leverages the “Central
Asia plus Japan” Dialogue to expand channels for cooperation with
Central Asian states, notably energy cooperation.

In view of such developments, Putin indicated right after
the 2006 SCO Summit that, Russia is against establishing other
organizations with similar mandates in the SCO region, or
replicating and setting up any “exclusive club” to create barriers
and demarcation lines. The U.S., together with some NATO
countries, financed the establishment of the Central Asian Regional
Information Coordination Center in Kazakhstan in 2009, and
proposed the Central Asia Counter-narcotics Initiative in 2012.
The moves represent an attempt to build a “Central Asian Anti-
Narcotics Force”, and turn the Center into a new channel whereby
the U.S. could get around the SCO security cooperation mechanism
and infiltrate Central Asia’s law enforcement authorities, thus the
existing counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics mechanism of
the SCO risks being split and neutralized. To split and disintegrate the SCO, some external forces have been extending the Turkic Council’s influence in Central Asia in recent years, providing a wider range of options and more flexible diplomatic orientation for Central Asian members.

Needless to say, apart from those external challenges, there are some complex factors within the SCO that need to be worked on. For example, some elites of the SCO members are concerned that, the SCO might result in Central Asia’s further dependence on China and Russia hasn’t benefited as much as China has, thus a sense of loss. That explains why the enthusiasm of some Russian government authorities towards multilateral economic and trade cooperation under the SCO has been to some extent affected. Moreover, the historical disputes and ongoing tension between India and China, and India and Pakistan may bring along complex influences to the previously harmonious atmosphere within the SCO. Looking ahead, giving full play to the Shanghai Spirit that features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and pursuit of common development, cementing the strategic mutual trust between the SCO members, and actively resolving or reducing disruptions resulting from internal and external negative factors would be critical to the SCO if it is to have more solidarity, higher level of cooperation, and a larger role in international and regional affairs.

**III. Prospects of the SCO**

In the past 17 years, the SCO has made great headway guided by the Shanghai Spirit of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and pursuit
of common development”. The accession of India and Pakistan have brought new opportunities: more diverse political systems, economic models, and cultural elements, higher international standing, and predictably a bigger role in regional and international affairs.

1. The SCO’s strategic position and influence will be on the rise.

After expansion, the SCO has extended from China, Russia and Central Asia to South Asia, right to the core area that is conveniently connected to both the Indian Ocean and the Eurasian Continent. The expansion also brings about a larger share of the world’s population, up from 25% to 44%, and a combined GDP of over $14.5 trillion, nearly 1/3 of the world’s total, thus the birth of the most populous regional organization with the largest area. More importantly, the SCO’s circle of friends has enlarged and the Shanghai Spirit it upholds has gained wider recognition. With two permanent members of the UN Security Council, three BRICS countries, and four “nuclear-armed states”, the SCO will have a much greater say and stronger influence on major issues such as improving the global governance system and promoting the reform of the international economic order.

The entry of India and Pakistan enables the SCO to join forces in combating the “three evils” in Central Asia, and terrorist organizations in South Asia and the Middle East, and has enlarged the SCO’s security cooperation zone. The SCO has become a multilateral regional organization unseen on the Eurasian Continent since World War II, an organization that even some European countries are keen to join and a force not to be neglected on the international arena.
2. The multilateral economic and trade cooperation of the SCO is to enjoy steady growth.

Through over 10 years of joint efforts, the SCO Members, in 2014, signed the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on International Road Transportation Facilitation and its annexes, which removed enduring barriers to further integration of regional economy. In 2016, Members approved documents on cooperation in trade, investment, and finance, etc, such as the 2017-2021 SCO List of Measures to Further Project Cooperation and Next Steps for Establishing the SCO Development Bank and the SCO Development Fund (Special Account), and underlined that more efforts on establishing the SCO Development Bank and the SCO Development Fund will be critical to promoting regional economic, trade and investment cooperation.

In 2017, the Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government reiterated that, a primary task of the SCO is to improve people’s well-being and livelihood, so the Parties should step up cooperation in trade, production capacity, energy, transport (including railway), investment, finance, agriculture, customs, telecommunications and other sectors of mutual interest; deepen multilateral cooperation in transportation, including building new international road and railway transportation corridors and updating existing ones, planning high-speed artery routes, building multi-function logistics centers and implementing other infrastructure cooperation projects; advocate for consistent strengthening of an open, inclusive, transparent, non-discriminating and rule-based multilateral trade system, guard against the fragmentation of international trade relations and oppose all forms of trade protectionism; continue consultations and develop common approaches at the expert level on the establishment of the SCO
Development Bank and the SCO Development Fund, and promote economic cooperation in priority areas including investment, so as to strengthen the bond of interests between member states. Within such a context, the long-delayed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project has had progress following the completion and putting into operation of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan road.

3. The effects of the “SCO Economic Circle” will be clearer.

In 2012, the SCO accounted for 13% of the world’s trade volume and GDP, up from 8% and 4.8% in 2001. In 2016, China’s trade volume with other SCO members reached $93.7 billion, up from $12 billion in 2001. Ever since India and Pakistan were granted full membership, South Asia has been included in the “SCO Economic Circle”, offering a larger room for multilateral economic cooperation between member states. In 2017, China’s trade with other members scored a record high of $217.6 billion, up by 19% year-on-year. Bilateral trade between China and India also hit an all-time high of $84.4 billion, up by 20.3% compared with that of last year. China’s actual investment in India has reached an accumulative total of $8 billion, cementing China’s position as India’s largest trading partner. As major emerging economies, China, Russia and India have added up the momentum of regional economic cooperation, and will surely drive fast economic and trade growth of the “SCO Economic Circle”, thereby making a bigger contribution to regional and world economy.

4. Conditions will allow for further communication on China-India relations and India-Pakistan disputes.

By joining the SCO, India intends to leverage the SCO’s influence to improve its own status, and to seize opportunities
for a number of business projects of the “SCO Economic Circle” and for stepping up counter-terrorism and trade cooperation with SCO member states, particularly Central Asian states. Despite differences and disputes with China on some issues, there are many examples of successful cooperation between India and China on multilateral stages. Be it the Bali Climate Change Conference, or the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, India has been working closely with China and BASIC countries, demonstrating that developing countries are firmly determined to safeguard common interests by “voicing concerns as a group” and “uniting with each other”. India has been cooperating smoothly with China, Russia and Central Asian states under multilateral mechanisms, including the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, BRICS, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Besides, India has a strong desire to improve relations with China. Ajai Malhotra, India’s former ambassador to Russia, once made it clear that, India joined the SCO with an open mind and a positive attitude, and without prejudice, and will “constructively” engage in all cooperation realms within the SCO framework. In March 2018, Prime Minister Modi made a congratulatory phone call to Xi Jinping right after his re-election as President of China, and expressed India’s readiness to have closer high-level ties, deepen bilateral relations, strengthen coordination and collaboration on international affairs, and promote further progress in India-China relations. During his visit to China, India’s foreign minister Swaraj said that, India will fully support China in hosting a successful SCO Summit in Qingdao, and together with other members, help the SCO to play a more constructive role in achieving regional security, stability, growth and prosperity.
From April 27-28, 2018, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi had an informal meeting in Wuhan, which enhanced their mutual understanding on the two countries’ development path and reform measures. Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed that, frequent high-level engagement and communication on strategies will help promote mutual understanding and in-depth cooperation, and serves the common interests of both countries and the region in their pursuit for development and prosperity. He also said that, India is ready to join hands with China and make efforts to address international and regional issues and challenges.

On the other hand, full membership is better than observer status for India and Pakistan in that the latter only allows for limited participation in relevant cooperation endeavors. Accession into the SCO provides another key platform to address or control the differences and disputes between India and Pakistan, and collaboration within the SCO will help the two countries identify new convergence of interests.

In a word, the SCO has become an example of peace and development. Its influence has gone far beyond the scope of the region, and the SCO has become a prestigious multilateral organization with comprehensive mandates. The SCO’s concept of “Peace and Cooperation” has become a guideline for member states when they carry out long-term mutually-beneficial cooperation through tapping their respective advantages, and has won recognition from an increasing number of countries. Such an influential regional organization may have existed or are still existing on the Eurasian Continent, but few of them are favored by countries with different ideologies and systems. Looking into the future, the SCO will be as vigorous as before and embrace better prospects.
The New Economic and Trade Policy of Trump Administration Toward China: Origin and Response

By Wang Ruibin*

For nearly one year and a half into Trump’s presidency, China-US economic and trade relations have gone through twists and turns and entered a period of drastic adjustment. In spite of the important agreement reached by the two sides after three rounds of trade negotiations, the US suddenly announced on June 15th additional tariffs on US$50 billion Chinese goods. In the next few hours, China made a swift response, stating that it would immediately adopt tariff measures of corresponding scale and intensity and that all the results of previous trade talks became invalid simultaneously. In the face of China’s reciprocal retaliatory measures, the US threatened to draw up a tariff list of $200 billion Chinese goods on June 18th. Without any doubt, China will adopt reciprocal measures to defend its interests. Once a massive trade war starts down the road, it will cause panic on the market, pose a grave threat to the fragile world economic recovery, and may even lead to a new global economic crisis. It can be seen that

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the Trump administration has set the tone and established the framework for its tough economic and trade policy toward China. This will have a major impact on the economic, trade and political relations between the two countries for a long time to come.

1. The Trump Administration’s New Tough Economic and Trade Policy toward China

1.1 The Making and Adoption of the Policy

Trump made statements on China-US economic and trade relations during the election campaign, calling China a currency manipulator and intending to raise tariffs on Chinese exports to the US. After assuming presidency, he focused on America’s massive deficits with China in trade in goods. His new offensive economic and trade policy toward China fast took shape. And there are two phases for the policy to be adopted:

1.1.1 The Phase of Probing and Preparation (January 2017 to March 2018)

During this phase, Trump completed two jobs: making legal preparations necessary for adjusting the economic and trade policy toward China, and putting together teams for negotiation and decision making. In April 2017, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) published the Special 301 Report, accusing China of stealing US commercial secrets and engaging in rampant online copyright infringement, and putting China on the “priority watch list”. In August, Trump signed the executive memorandum, authorizing the US TR to review “China’s trade practices”, including forcing US companies to transfer technology
and stealing US intellectual property. After a period of adjustment, the Trump administration established a team of conservatives for its economic and trade policy toward China, the core members of which include USTR Robert Lighthize, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, and White House Trade Advisor Peter Navarro.

1.1.2 The Phase of Shaping Up (March to June 2018)

Two important events marked the shaping up of the new US economic and trade policy toward China. First, Trump signed the presidential memorandum on March 23rd, announcing restrictions on China’s investment in the US and planning to impose steep tariffs on US$60 billion imported Chinese goods. The Trump administration ditched the all-encompassing model of consultation and communication that had been used for over 10 years, which featured the “China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue” and the “China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue”. It has switched to a results-oriented model of technical negotiation that focuses on specific topics with a clear agenda. Second, ZTE reached an initial reconciliation agreement with the US Department of Commerce. The ZTE case traced its origin back to 2012. Its temporary solution was adopted in the context of intensifying China-US trade frictions. And ZTE has been used by the Trump administration as a bargaining chip in trade talks with China.

The content and mode of Trump’s new economic and trade policy toward China are still in a process of dynamic development and will be adjusted as the two countries negotiate and interact, and regional political and economic landscape evolves.
1.2 The Nature and Objectives of the Policy

1.2.1 This policy is, in nature, an important component of America’s comprehensive strategy to contain China. The policy actions adopted by Trump since coming to power speak to his intention to take China as an adversary and contain China in all areas, from politics and economy to military and culture. In the National Security Strategy Report and the 2018 Defense Strategy Report, the Trump Administration identified China a “strategic adversary” or “strategic competitor”. The new offensive economic and trade policy is the first one to take shape in the US strategy to contain China, targeting the economic foundation on which a country’s development and rejuvenation depends. It is more than about reducing US trade deficits with China and adjusting bilateral economic relations, but will be in synergy with containment policies in other fields. The Cold War mentality behind it will dominate the tone of America’s China policy for a fairly long time to come.

1.2.2 The Trump administration goes all out on the offensive. In a high profile, it plays tough to pressure China into talks with a view to following objectives:

First, containing and even reversing the momentum of China’s economic rise. Since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, China has been the only country that is on a fast track to catch up with the US. Between 2007 and 2016, China’s GDP rose from US$3.55 trillion to US$11.2 trillion, with its share in global GDP expanding from 6.15% to 14.84%. The US GDP increased from US$14.48 trillion to US$18.57 trillion, and its share in global GDP dropped slightly from 25.05% to 24.58%. In 2007 and 2010, China
surpassed Germany and Japan respectively to become the second largest economy in the world. China’s GDP grew from less than 80% to more than 2.5 times that of Japan. Its gap with the US also shrank from 4.07 times to 1.64 times.

Second, maintaining America’s international competitiveness in middle to high-end manufacturing. In the memorandum signed on March 23rd, Trump intended to impose additional tariffs on Chinese goods in technology-intensive industries, such as IT, new energy vehicle, artificial intelligence, bio-medicine, high-speed rail, and aerospace. All these goods account for about one-eighth of China’s exports to the US. The US also intends to restrict investments in China that involve joint venture and technology transfer in areas where China leads the world or has gained stronger international competitiveness thanks to progress in recent years, or in areas where Chinese investment in the US or American investment in China are concentrated.

Third, dominating future international economic and trade order and rules. In TPP and TTIP negotiations, the US hopes to introduce high-standard new rules in a wide range of areas such as trade, investment, intellectual property, labor, environmental protection, and dispute settlement mechanism, to ensure its dominant position in making the future global economic and trade order. The Trump administration, however, thinks and acts differently. It brushes aside the existing global multilateral system and applies pressure through bilateral negotiations with the support of regional multilateral tactics. It tackles trading partners one by one to promote trade rules it endorses. Trump shares the same goal as his predecessor to reverse the weakening of US leadership in global economic order.
1.3 The Features of the Policy

1.3.1 Aiming for quick action and victory. Trump has acted swiftly and in high profile. Three months after taking office, the USTR Office released the Special 301 Report, putting China on the priority watch list. Shortly afterwards, he authorized the USTR to start the review process. Within half a year, he used the memorandum to single out the categories of goods subject to substantial additional tariffs and went a step further to produce a specific list with the amount of goods.

1.3.2 Using a mixture of measures. Under the principle of “trade is politics”, the Trump administration focused on economic and trade issues. He is keen to play geopolitical cards to exert pressure, as evidenced by successive actions on the South China Sea, Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, regional economic cooperation, and cybersecurity. He hopes to use these issues to achieve his goals in trade negotiations.

1.3.3 Getting support from the Congress. As Trump keeps provoking trade disputes globally, important figures and forces in both the Senate and the House voiced strong opposition in principle. However, when it comes to adjusting economic and trade relations with China, there has been muted opposition in the Congress. To contain China, the Congress is even reluctant to use its constitutional power to constrain the trade policy authorization enjoyed by the Trump administration.

2. Structural Changes in China-US Economic and Trade Relations

Since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, major changes have
taken place in a range of fundamental factors that underpin China-US economic and trade relations. As such, bilateral economic and trade relations will go through serious adjustments. Frictions and conflicts will persist for a long time to come.

2.1 The changing positions of China and the US in the global value chain. The two countries take up important positions in the global value chain. After its accession to the WTO, China has been more deeply involved and its position elevated in the global value chain. In 2007, China’s manufacturing output accounted for 13.2% of the global total, ranking number two in the world. That figure rose to 19.8% in 2010, 1.6% higher than the US, making China the largest manufacturing nation. For eight consecutive years, China has been the world’s largest exporter of goods. Industrial products dominate China’s exports and account for nearly 20% of the global total, 1.7 times those of Germany which came next after China.

According to the UN Comtrade database and OECD estimation, China remains at the lower end of the global value chain, processing, manufacturing and exporting final products. It is yet to move up from the low-added value end of the global chain. China is still the world’s largest producer, and the US the largest consumer. That said, China is already one of the core countries in the three manufacturing centers, namely North America, Europe, and Asia, on the global value chain, and it is moving up to the high end of the value chain. The share of Chinese exports’ domestic added value increased steadily, from 65.83% in 2007 to 70.65% in 2014. This is mainly because China’s manufacturing sector has significantly improved its capacity to undertake high-level and professionalized tasks, and has been more deeply involved in producing intermediate goods with higher added value or on the
high end of the value chain. In the same period, the US saw its share declined slightly, from 85.98% in 2007 to 84.72% in 2014.

2.2 The growing asymmetry in two-way investment. China-US investment relations are going through notable changes. Chinese investment in the US, instead of being dragged down by the financial crisis, has been on the increase, skyrocketing from US$356 million in 2007 to US$46.2 billion in 2016, at an annual pace of 71%. Since 2000, China has invested a total of US$136.5 billion in 1,510 projects. The pattern of Chinese investment in the US is changing, too. First, merger and acquisition is no longer the main form of investment. Greenfield investment accounts for 56%. Second, the share of state capital is dropping among the investors. Private capital has reached 75%.

The US direct investment in China has reversed since the financial crisis. Despite the rebound at some point, it is on a downward trajectory. American investment reached US$21 billion in 2008, the highest record, and has since stayed at an annual amount of US$13 billion. In 2015, China’s direct investment in the US amounted to US$15.3 billion, for the first time exceeding American investment in China during the same period. The stock of American investment in China is about US$240 billion. According to the annual report of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 81% of the surveyed American companies in China believed that their business in the country was not welcomed, and 25% of the surveyed considered or have already moved all or some of their business outside China.

The two sides are in intensive debates on issues such as asymmetric capital flows, market access, and volatility in
the business environment, which stand in the way of bilateral investment and economic relations. In recent years, the CFIUS has blocked a number of M&A deals by Chinese companies such as SANY and Financial Ant in the US on the grounds of national security. The US Congress also plans to pass the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act to turn the foreign investment review mechanism into a technical control mechanism.

2.3 New features in the volume, product structure and pattern of China-US trade. Since the financial crisis, the share of China’s exports to the US in its total exports has been in the range of 16.71%-19.11%. The US is China’s largest export destination. In the same period, China has become the third largest export market for the US, taking over 5% of America’s global exports. China-US trade has increased more than 1.9 times. In addition, the high-growth momentum in bilateral trade registered since the financial crisis has moderated. China has started to restructure its industries and foreign trade, which triggers a dramatic transformation of its export model. Processing trade used to account for over 50% of China’s foreign trade, but has dropped to the current level of one third or so. General trade now dominates China-US trade, with a share of more than 55%.

From the perspective of product structure in bilateral trade, the categories of China’s exported goods to the US and their shares have remained largely unchanged since the financial crisis. This shows that the traditional exported goods from China are still competitive internationally and that the American market has sustained stable demand for Chinese products. In the meanwhile, there have been notable changes in the structure of American exports to China. China’s import of American soy beans has
been increasing year on year. Over the past five years, the US exported soy beans with the value in the range of US$17.8 to 25.9 billion, among which 60% were sold to China. China is the largest importer of Boeing aircraft, leading to increasing American export of aerospace products and components to China. Currently, Boeing sells one quarter of its jets to China. While the growth of trade in goods shifts speed, China-US trade in services has increased fast and enriched bilateral trade. All these changes testify to China’s economic and industrial restructuring and the increasing role of consumption in driving its economic growth since the financial crisis.

2.4 America’s changing strategic perception of China’s development. The US has seen China as a “strategic competitor”, “stakeholder” as well as “partner and competitor”. The rising tensions between the two sides can be seen in their wrestling on issues like the South China Sea, Korean Peninsula, regional economic integration, and cybersecurity. The Belt and Road Initiative and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have made the US more suspicious of China’s global strategic intentions. Soon after taking office, the Trump administration explicitly labeled China as an “adversary” and considered the imbalances in bilateral economic relations and China’s economic and trade policies as a challenge to American interests and America-dominated international economic order, which was criticized as “economic aggression”. On one hand, he used summit diplomacy, “Twitter” diplomacy, and time-bound high-level negotiation to directly apply pressure. On the other hand, he expressed positive support to Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy to limit China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region and the Belt and Road Initiative. At the 2017 APEC meeting, Trump once again
made a statement on a “free and open Indo-Pacific region”, asking all parties to abide by the rule of game, saying the US no longer tolerates “cheating in trade”, and forcing countries in the region to pick sides.

3. A Proper Response: Firmly Defending China’s Development Interests While Seeking Common Ground, Putting aside Differences and Prioritizing Negotiation

Over the years, economic and trade relations have been recognized as the “ballast stone” and “stabilizer” of China-US relations. As Trump adopts new economic and trade policy toward China, the political and economic relations between the two countries are set to go through major adjustment. Therefore, we “cannot afford to solely rely on economic interdependence”, “but have to consider connecting economic and security topics in foreign policy.”

3.1 Making a comprehensive plan to properly handle trade disputes. It is important to plan bilateral trade negotiations from a global strategic perspective and with a view to the larger interests of China-US relations. Maximum efforts should be made to move China-US trade relations on a track of positive, healthy and stable growth. First, China has been consistent in further opening-up. Reform and opening-up is what is needed for China’s development and won’t change just because of an occasional single incident from the outside. Second, China is committed to focusing on cooperation and managing differences on the basis of mutual respect, resolving trade frictions and disputes in a constructive way, seeking the biggest denominator, and reaching consensus and
agreement both sides are satisfied with. **Third**, China-US trade negotiations should be carried out under the precondition that the two sides meet each other half way and refrain from engaging in a trade war. Throughout the negotiations, if the US adopts and implements measures to impose additional tariffs on Chinese products, China will certainly take reciprocal measures to defend its interests. At the same time, the agreement and results reached by the two sides will be invalid.

3.2 Maintaining strategic focus and confidence. On one hand, we should understand that the fundamental purpose of Trump’s trade war against China is to contain the rise of a big emerging country and defend US global dominance. China-US trade frictions have gone beyond the scope of trade. They are long-term and severe. On the other hand, China’s manufacturing sector has risen. China has enormous market potential and a huge capacity for making investment. As long as China stays committed to innovative development, developing advanced manufacturing, and pursuing opening-up as a state policy, China will embrace a bright future for technological advance and economic development. Whatever changes there may be in the world, China will remain focused on the strategy to developing itself.

3.3 Working hard to increase political trust between China and the US. As things stand now, the fundamentals of China-US relations are experiencing unprecedented changes. It is imperative to set a clear direction for and reposition the relations. The two sides are in a critical period of coordinating each other’s strategic perceptions. As the world’s top two economies, China and the US have forged deep interdependence in economic and trade fields. Interdependence, however, does not necessarily bring
about mutual trust. The American realists believe that the growing interdependence has mostly come at the expense of American interests and should be redressed. As China becomes stronger, its national security strategy and philosophy on global governance have triggered suspicions and worries in the US. Trump pursues the “America First” advantage in global competition, refuses to be constrained by existing international treaties, organizations and institutions, and takes actions to intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs, though not under the name “pivot to the Asia-Pacific”. As structural adjustments are underway in China-US economic and trade relations, neither retaliations nor concessions for the time being are sustainable. A high degree of political trust is always the stabilizer for the sound growth of economic and trade relations. The two sides can continue to use the diplomatic and security dialogue and other mechanisms and channels to strengthen communication on the philosophies, objectives, policies and actions of national security strategies. It is important for the two sides to respect each other, focus on cooperation and manage differences, so as to steadily increase political trust.

3.4 The two sides may renegotiate the BIT at an appropriate time and make attempts at free trade negotiations. Since the financial crisis, China and the US have interacted and coordinated on economic and trade rules at a pace slower than the fast growth of their economic ties. As a result, many problems have occurred.

Since the normalization of relations, the two countries only signed the 1979 China-US Trade Agreement and the 1999 China-US Bilateral WTO Agreement, which played an important role in promoting the two countries’ relations during special periods. The 1979 agreement was signed shortly after the two countries
established diplomatic relations. By giving each other the most-favored nation treatment, the two countries fast started and brought their economic relations on a sound track. The 1999 agreement was critical for China’s accession to the WTO. Since China became a WTO member in 2001, the two countries have been developing their economic relations under the multilateral trading regime with the WTO as the main pillar.

The Doha Round negotiations led by the WTO to reach a global trade agreement on reducing trade barriers had stalled since 2008 and ended up in failure in 2015. The global multilateral trading regime has been widely criticized for its inefficiency. In this context, it is both realistic and reasonable to discuss bilateral or regional trading arrangements as alternatives. For China and the US, the world’s most influential economies with close trade links, it is all the more imperative to build a new trade framework to solve increasing and complicated differences and problems.

That said, the two sides will have greater difficulties in negotiating a comprehensive trade deal. It is more difficult to make breakthroughs in areas where the two sides have been long divided, such as market access, IP protection, and cybersecurity. But this is an issue that the two sides cannot bypass if they want to shape a healthier and more balanced economic and trade relationship. Therefore, a practical way is to start in a step-by-step manner from areas with a good cooperation foundation that are easier to make progress. For example, continuing the BIT negotiations that were close to completion under the Obama administration. Trump also expressed his intent to carry on the negotiations. After all, a balanced agreement that accommodates the realities and interests of the two sides will be conducive to reducing investment barriers.
and leveling the playing field for companies of the two countries. As Chinese investment in the US has been increasing fast in recent years, such an agreement will provide opportunities for Chinese companies to access the American market, ensure they are treated equally as American businesses in all stages of investment, constrain or prevent the US congress and government from making or implementing discriminatory laws, rules or industrial policies against Chinese companies. Companies can also resort to the dispute settlement mechanism established by the agreement to effectively protect their lawful rights and interests. The BIT will anchor investors’ market expectations on both sides, bolster capital flows, and coordinate the long-term economic interests of China and the US.

On that basis, the two sides may explore solutions to the concerns that have been on their mind for a long time, for instance, transparency, market access, and technology transfer. When conditions are ripe, China and the US may expand their negotiations to trade in goods and services, and reach a China-US Bilateral Investment and Trade Agreement or a Free Trade Agreement. This will not only put in place an institutional framework for bilateral economic and trade relations, but also contribute to global investment and trade liberalization and facilitation and economic development and prosperity.

The two sides need to add more substances to bilateral trade talks and upgrade the trade structure. The communication mechanism on bilateral economic and trade relations should be reformed, and professional negotiation teams established. It’s difficult for the dialogue mechanism to either make visible progress on strategic goals, or facilitate in-depth discussions on
technical and specific topics or topics on which the two sides are deeply divided. Currently, the two countries need to make breakthroughs on both political and economic relations. The dialogue mechanism cannot replace technical negotiations to make technical breakthroughs.

In terms of the content, the highlights and new growth points in bilateral economic relations should be encouraged. First, trade in services. In recent years, the growth of bilateral trade in services has hit new highs, with China becoming America’s fourth largest trading partner, third largest export market, and 11th largest import source in trade in services. At present, the US has an absolute advantage in service sectors that have enormous market needs and high added value in China. For example, tourism, education, intellectual property use and franchise service, financial services, transport, and other commercial services are the fastest growing sectors in China-US trade in services. The US is the top destination for Chinese students studying abroad. In 2016, Chinese students spent about US$45,000 in per capita terms, contributing an income of around US$15.9 billion for the US. Second, infrastructure. America’s infrastructure is aging and in urgent need of massive investment for modernization. After taking office, Trump prioritized infrastructure in his economic revitalization policy, and has pushed for a US$1 trillion investment plan. It is estimated that by 2040, the US will invest US$8.5 trillion in infrastructure, compared with the real need of US$12.4 trillion. This means a shortage of US$3.8 trillion. In recent years, Chinese investors have entered the US infrastructure sector. CRRC has invested in factories in Massachusetts and Illinois, and won procurement contracts for urban rail projects in Chicago and Boston. Third, agriculture. China and the US started very
early in agricultural cooperation, which now has a solid basis. The two countries are important trading partners in agricultural products. China is America’s largest market for agricultural exports. The US is China’s largest source of imported agricultural products and fourth largest export market. Agriculture has been a vibrant sector in China-US economic cooperation and trade. In particular, there is a strong momentum of Chinese investment in American agriculture. In 2013, China’s Shuanghui Group acquired Smithfield Foods, the largest pig and pork producer in the US. As China transforms its industries and upgrades consumption, it will have a growing need for American agricultural products, food, and agricultural production and management technologies. With advanced agricultural technologies and high productivity, the US has deep influence on global agricultural production and trade. Over the past five years, America exported to China US$25 billion worth of agricultural products annually. In 2017, the two sides made breakthroughs on beef and rice trade. Expanding agricultural production as appropriate will be instrumental for the development of America’s agriculture and related sectors, and contribute to China’s food security.

All in all, the structural changes in China-US economic and trade relations are the result of political, economic and cultural interactions between the two countries over the past years. They have taken place in the broader context of economic globalization and free trade. These changes have been accelerated by the 2008 global financial crisis. As the Trump administration has adopted a new economic and trade policy toward China, how the two sides respond will determine the direction of the changes. It will take both a long time and a spirit of collaboration to adjust and rebalance China-US economic and trade relations. The two sides
must take into full account the correlation of each other’s domestic political and economic situation, stay committed to win-win cooperation, and refrain from confrontation that will only result in losers. A pragmatic, inclusive, balanced and incremental approach should be adopted to remove barriers, improve the level of trade liberalization and investment facilitation, unlock the tremendous potential in economic and trade relations, and establish an effective mechanism for management and cooperation that is grounded in the reality of the bilateral economic and trade relations. This will lead to mutually beneficial, balanced and sustainable China-US economic relations.
**I. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Japan for the first time to promote the continuous improvement of Sino-Japanese relations.**

On May 8-11, 2018, Premier Li Keqiang visited Tokyo to attend the 7th China-Japan-ROK Leaders' Meeting and paid an official visit to Japan at the invitation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. This is the first visit to Japan by a Chinese Premier in eight years (the last official visit was that of then Premier Wen Jiabao in May 2010). It is also the first time that a Chinese leader set foot on Japan's territory since the bilateral relationship fell to a historic low due to the Diaoyu Islands disputes during the period of 2010-2013.

During Premier Li Keqiang’s visit, he held talks with his counterpart Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
called on Emperor Akihito, and met with heads of the Japanese Parliament (known as the “Diet”) and opposition parties. Premier Li also delivered a speech at the reception commemorating the 40th anniversary of the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty. Besides Tokyo, he visited Hokkaido and attended the "China-Japan Governors Forum" held in Sapporo, capital city of Hokkaido together with Prime Minister Abe.

During the meetings, Premier Li Keqiang and Japanese leaders exchanged views on enhancing mutual strategic and political trust, strengthening practical exchanges and cooperation, properly managing differences, and pushing the China-Japan relations back to the normal track. They reached broad consensus on promoting bilateral economic cooperation and exchanges in the cultural, media and youth fields and at local levels, and agreed to launch cooperation in third-party markets.

The restoration of contacts, dialogues, and mutual visits between leaders of the two countries is a key step in improving the bilateral relations. Since 2014, Chinese leaders have made tremendous efforts to lift the Sino-Japanese relationship out of its lowest point in decades. President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe several times on the sidelines of multilateral events. They exchanged views on ways to jointly stabilize and improve Sino-Japanese relations, and reached broad political consensus including the "Four-point Principle Consensus" of 2014. The official visit by Premier Li to Japan injected new impetus to the improvement of China-Japan relations and set clear directions for its future development.
II. The current improvement in Sino-Japanese relations is the result of the joint efforts of both sides and is in line with the expectations of regional countries and the international community.

Sino-Japanese relations have entered a process of continuous improvement. Despite some noises from time to time, improvement and development have been the main feature of bilateral relations over recent months, thanks to the joint efforts of both sides.

This improvement is not only inseparable from China’s own steady development and growth, leaders’ personal efforts, and the unremitting diplomatic efforts, but also has to do with the Abe administration’s new policy approach towards China in the face of internal and external pressures, as its previous containment and confrontational policies had failed. The improvement is also reflective of the profound foundation of Sino-Japanese relations and is in line with the common interests of the two peoples and those of regional countries and the international community at large.

From the perspective of China, its policy towards Japan is marked by consistency. China regards Japan as an important close neighbor and always attaches great importance to the development of its relations with Japan. China is committed to comprehensively advancing China-Japan strategic mutually beneficial relations by firmly upholding the general direction of peace, friendship and cooperation between the two countries. The Chinese side has repeatedly stressed to the Japanese side that this is an important established policy and will not change
as a result of momentary events. Even during the period when bilateral relations encountered the most serious situation since the normalization of diplomatic ties in the past few years, the Chinese side still insisted on maintaining the right direction for the development of Sino-Japanese relations. China has now entered a new era of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, facing an urgent task of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects; China needs to create a more favorable neighboring and international environment for further deepening reforms and opening up to the world. Therefore, it has the will and patience to actively bring Sino-Japanese relations back to the normal track.

On the Japanese side, its economic circles and the moderate and stable schools within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are the endogenous driving forces that prompted Abe’s government to improve relations with China. They believe that as China continues to grow and rise, a China policy of blind containment will not only be ineffective, but also run against Japan’s fundamental interests in that failure to improve Sino-Japanese relations will cause Japan to miss out on the huge economic opportunities brought by China’s higher quality development and the Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, in the context of the US Trump administration’s adjustment of its Asia-Pacific strategy coupled with its strong protectionist tendencies, and drastic changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Japan’s neighborhood diplomacy is facing many challenges and its anxiety has increased. In order to provide better options for Japan’s national security strategy, altering the confronting-China policy and improving relations with China thus became the inevitable policy choice of the Abe government.
Judging from the fundamentals of China-Japan relations, China and Japan are each other's most important partners in economic and trade cooperation. The bilateral trade volume has been maintained at around US$300 billion in recent years. Japan is China's largest source of foreign investment, and China is Japan's major overseas market. The two countries have set up a direct settlement system of their respective currencies. There were frequent people-to-people and cultural exchanges. In 2017, more than 10 million people traveled between the two countries. The number of sister cities between the two countries reached 345 pairs. There are more than 1,000 flights per week flying between more than 60 cities in the two countries. In short, the interests of China and Japan have become increasingly intertwined, and their interdependence has deepened, which naturally requires the improvement of bilateral relations as soon as possible.

Judging from the regional and international impact of Sino-Japanese relations, the significance and externality of the relations have increasingly exceeded the bilateral scope. As the world's second and third largest economies, the two countries share common interests and responsibilities in promoting East Asian economic integration, maintaining a free and open international trade system, promoting an open world economy, and improving global governance. Regional countries and the international community are very much looking forward to fast improving relations between China and Japan so that the two countries could work together to meet common global challenges and provide public goods for Asia and the world at large.
III. The Crux of the Sino-Japanese relationship lies not only in long-running sores but also in new structural tensions arising from changes in the international situation.

The ups and downs in Sino-Japanese relations over the past eight years or so is but a new cycle in the process of Sino-Japanese relations marked by multiple challenges since the end of the Cold War. After the normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan in 1972, the relationship experienced a rapid development of a honeymoon period of about twenty years. By 1992 when Emperor Akihito visited China, it reached its peak. However, since the end of the Cold War, the Sino-Japanese relationship has entered a period of frequent twists and turns, and it has seen a cycle of “deterioration-improvement” every six or seven years.

The root cause lies in the inherent problems between China and Japan, such as understanding of history during World War II, the Diaoyu Islands disputes, and the Taiwan issue. Moreover, new structural imbalances formed as a result of the changing international situation after the mid-1990s.

Specifically, there are four structural imbalances: First, due to the decline of common security interests of jointly resisting the Soviet Union’s threat, there has been a so-called “security dilemma”, with increasing mutual suspicion between China and Japan. Second, there is a certain degree of conflict between the two countries' national strategic goals with both attempting to become regional and global leaders. Third, As China’s economic strength approaching and finally surpassing that of Japan, an
unprecedented situation in which two powers co-exist in the Asian region has emerged. Last, the sentiments and feelings of the general public towards each other deteriorated due to the combined factors of political and social conditions in the two countries as well as influence of predominantly negative media coverage.

In the face of the above structural imbalances, almost all the problems between the two countries will be magnified as major issues on which it would be difficult for both countries to make compromises. The words and deeds of one country will be interpreted as being directed against the other. Under such circumstances, the old problems of history, the Diaoyu Islands disputes, and the Taiwan issue have become extremely difficult for both sides to compromise on, although such problems have always been there and never became major issues hindering the development of bilateral relations during the Cold War era.

IV. The fundamental issue behind the structural imbalances between China and Japan is a matter of perception and mutual characterization.

After the Cold War, structural tensions in Sino-Japanese relations started to emerge, and challenges such as history, territory, and maritime issues have cropped up. Behind these structural problems is the lack of mutual trust in political and security spheres. Its roots lie largely in the fact that Japan's perception of China has lagged behind changes in the internal and external situation.

As far as the Japanese side is concerned, how to deal with the rise of China has always been the most important topic of
Japan’s foreign policy strategy after the Cold War. In particular, after China’s total economic output surpassed Japan for the first time in 2010; the impact on Japan was so enormous that the “China threat theory” ran rampant. In recent years, as China’s strength continue to grow; the "China threat theory" morphed into theories depicting China as a hegemonic and arrogant power. In fact, Japan misunderstood the direction and goals of China's development. Although the Japanese government under Abe is seeking to adjust its China policy, some political elites and some mainstream media in Japan are still treating China with the old Cold War mentality and pondering all the time on how to constrain China. Such irrational emotions and Cold-War mentality still lingers in Japan’s strategic assessment on China to this day. This state of affairs is neither in line with the trend of the times, nor accords with the original spirit of the normalization of ties between the two countries 46 years ago. It is even less in line with Japan’s own long-term and fundamental interests.

Whether Japan can change its thinking as soon as possible, properly perceive and position China in its foreign policy, regard China as a cooperation partner rather than an opponent or even adversary, and treat China’s development as an opportunity rather than a challenge or even threat, will largely determine the future development of bilateral relations.

On the Chinese side, it is also an important issue as to how to view Japan’s accelerating efforts to become a “normal state” and achieve political power status after the Cold War. It should be noted that after World War II, Japan’s low profile in international affairs was mainly a result of self-discipline and US restrictions under the US-Japan Alliance. However, after the bursting of
Japan's bubble economy in the 1990s and the loss of its title of a leading economic power, the aspirations of Japan to be freed from the post-WWII system as a defeated state and to become a "normal state" were very strong. As a result, the Japanese society tends to be conservative in general. At the same time, pacifism is deeply rooted in Japan. How to deal with a relatively conservative and generally right-leaning Japan and guide it into a responsible political power is a strategic issue that China should seriously consider and actively respond to in its interactions with Japan in the future.

In fact, on the perception issue, as early as in 2008, the two governments signed the fourth political document "Joint Statement on All-round Promotion of Strategic Relationship of Mutual Benefit", which set the tone for the bilateral relations in the new century. In the Joint Statement the two sides reaffirmed that “the two countries are cooperation partners and not threats to each other”, and "support each other's peaceful development." However, it is not difficult to see from the development of Sino-Japanese relations in recent years that this important consensus has not been effectively implemented. In particular, the Japanese side has not been able to solve the fundamental issue of how to correctly perceive China's development.

V. The improvement of Sino-Japanese relations requires that the two countries truly implement the political understanding of being “cooperative partners and not threats to each other” and build a future-oriented strategic partnership.

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which presents an important
opportunity for improvement and development of the bilateral relationship. Whether China-Japan relations can eventually embark on the track of healthy and sound development depends on whether the two sides can increase political mutual trust and grasp the right direction from a strategic and long-term perspective.

Under the new situation, what is needed between China and Japan is trust and cooperation, instead of suspicion and confrontation. The two sides should work hard to develop positive interactions in political, security areas and quickly identify a new mutual characterization that is consistent with the trend of the times and their respective national interests.

The author believes that as Sino-Japanese relations have taken a new starting point, bilateral relations should be upgraded from the “Strategic Relationship of Mutual Benefit” established ten years ago, which is simply based on interests exchange, to a more positive direction and a higher level. In short, a future-oriented "Strategic Cooperation Partnership" based on the notion of a community with a shared future should be built in the future.

To this end, the two sides should focus on improving and developing Sino-Japanese relations in four priority areas, lay a solid foundation and foster the right atmosphere for building a "Strategic Cooperation Partnership."

**The First is to strengthen strategic communication between the two sides and continuously increase political mutual trust.** The ups and downs of Sino-Japanese relations in the past several years has largely been the result of the misperception of Japanese
political leaders on China. In the future, the Japanese side should conscientiously think through it, view China's development in a rational way, and eliminate Cold War and zero-sum mentality.

The damage of political mutual trust between the two sides needs to be repaired through various levels of exchanges. High-level contacts have important leading roles to play in improving the bilateral relations. At the end of this year or the first half of next year, China will host the eighth China-Japan-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Meeting. Japanese Prime Minister Abe is expected to attend the meeting and possibly make his first official visit to China. In June 2019, Japan will hold a G-20 summit meeting, and Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the meeting. The two sides should strengthen high-level strategic communications and enhance the top-level design of the bilateral relations by seizing the important opportunity of this year and next year.

At the same time, exchanges between governments, political parties, and parliaments should be maintained. In particular, the two countries should step up political and security dialogue and exchanges. They should communicate in a timely and candid manner and enhance dialogue on major issues in bilateral relations, domestic and foreign policies and development objectives to deepen trust, dispel misperception and prevent strategic misjudgment. Only through such endeavors could the two sides get closer, instead of drifting away.

The second is to effectively control differences and tensions and handle sensitive issues properly. The fundamental issues, such as the historical issue and territory disputes, are problems
that cannot be completely solved in the short to medium term. This requires the two parties to maintain patience and strive to find effective ways to control and manage the differences, so that these conflicts will not be intensified and will not affect the overall development of bilateral relations.

The history issue and the Taiwan issue are the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese side should abide by the spirit of the four political documents signed by China and Japan and its own commitments, carefully and properly handle potential risks and challenges on the history issue, the East China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands.

Both parties should earnestly abide by the spirit of the "Four-point Principle Consensus" reached in 2014 and better use the "High-level Consultation on Maritime Affairs" and the "Air and Sea Liaison Mechanism" signed during the visit to establish a good crisis management mechanism to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the East China Sea.

The third is to deepen economic and practical cooperation to achieve mutual benefits. Economic and trade cooperation has always been the "ballast stone" of China-Japan relations. In the new situation, it should also play its role as a "propeller". The two sides should actively carry out cooperation in areas such as energy conservation, environmental protection and advanced manufacturing, emerging service industries and innovation fields, and promote the deep integration of the industrial chain between China and Japan to achieve common prosperity.

At the same time, Asian economic integration cannot be
achieved without the leading role of China and Japan as the two largest economies in the region. The two sides should join hands in promoting the China-Japan-ROK Free Trade Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, and utilize the Belt and Road Initiative as a new platform to carry out third-party market cooperation and promote regional economic development and integration. During Premier Li’s recent visit, the two countries signed a "MOU on Developing Third-Party Market Cooperation," which provided institutional guarantees for China-Japan cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative.

The fourth is to strengthen people-to-people friendly exchanges and increase the positive sentiments between the two peoples. The key to sound relations between states lies in the affinity between their peoples, which largely stems from mutual understanding. The foundation of Sino-Japanese friendship lies in the people, and its future is also in the hands of the two peoples.

On the one hand, the people-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and Japan have a very broad foundation with a long history. People-to-people friendship is a fine tradition of Sino-Japanese relations and has played an important role in the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, friendship groups and people with vision from all walks of life of the two countries have vigorously carried out friendly exchanges and actively participated in the promotion of exchanges and cooperation in various fields, which played a crucial role in promoting the overall bilateral relations.
On the other hand, it must be noted that due to the deterioration of political relations in recent years, misperception, lack of understanding between the general public of both countries and mutual resentment have even reached worrying levels. The two governments must attach great importance to this issue and actively create conditions to further release the great potential of the people-to-people exchanges, promote exchanges between young people, grassroots groups, and enrich the contents of exchanges that resonate with the people. The campaign will lead more people to care about and support Sino-Japanese relations and thus improve the social foundation for the improvement of China-Japan relations. 🙏
On May 23, Ambassador Wu Hailong, President of CPIFA, met Mr. François Hollande, the former President of France, who visited China at the invitation of CPIFA. The two sides exchanged views on China-France relations, Korean nuclear issue, Iranian nuclear issue as well as other issues of common interest. Mr. Liang Jianquan, Vice President of CPIFA, Mr. Zhu Jing, Deputy Director-General of the Department of European Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Mr. Jean-Maurice Ripert, French Ambassador to China joined the meeting.

HRH Earl of Wessex,
British Prince Edward Visits China

At the invitation of CPIFA, HRH Earl of Wessex, British Prince Edward, visited Beijing and Shanghai from 5th to 7th June. During the stay in China, Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan met with Prince Edward. Mr. Xu Kunlin, Deputy Mayor of the Shanghai Municipal Government met with Prince Edward. Prince Edward also attended the Queen’s Birthday Reception hosted by the British Embassy in China and the awarding ceremonies of the Duke of Edinburgh Award in Beijing and Shanghai.

President Wu Hailong Meets with HRH the Duke of York

On May 29, President Wu Hailong met with HRH the Duke of York. The two sides exchanged views on China-UK relations,
bilateral cooperation on technology and innovation as well as other issues of common interest.

President Wu Hailong Meets with Former Myanmar President U Thein Sein

On April 20, Amb. Wu Hailong, President of CPIFA met with former Myanmar President U Thein Sein. The two sides exchanged views on China-Myanmar relations and other issues of common interest. Amb. Ou Boqian, Vice President of CPIFA was present at the meeting.

H.E. U Thein Sein visited Yunnan, Shaanxi, Beijing and Tianjin from April 17th to 22nd at the invitation of CPIFA. In Beijing, H.E. U Thein Sein met with Wang Yi, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister, Song Tao, Minister of the International Department of CPC, Lin Yi, Vice President of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries respectively. In Yunnan and Shaanxi, H.E. U Thein Sein also met with Zhang Guohua, Vice Governor of Yunnan Province, and Wei Zengjun, Vice Governor of Shaanxi Province.
Vice President Wei Wei Meets with Former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

At the invitation of CPIFA, H.E. Mr. Tariq Fatemi, Former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, visited Beijing, Shaanxi and Sichuan from May 13 to 20. During their stay in China, Mr. Kong Xuanyou, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Wei Wei, Vice President of CPIFA and Mr. Qi Zhenhong, President of China Institute of International Studies met with the delegation. The delegation also visited Xi’an International Studies University. The two sides exchanged views on the China-Pakistan relations, domestic politics of Pakistan, as well as international hotspot issues of common interest.

Vice President Liang Jianquan Meets with Vice Chairman of Portuguese Social Democratic Party

On May 22, Mr. Liang Jianquan, Vice President of CPIFA, met with Mr. Jose David Justino, Vice Chairman of Portuguese
Social Democratic Party. The two sides exchanged views on China-Portugal as well as China-EU relations.

“CPIFA Working Group for Think Tank Exchanges” Visited the United States

From May 14 to 17, the “CPIFA Working Group for Think Tank Exchanges” led by Vice President Zhao Weiping visited New York and Washington D.C. of the United States. The members of the working group include Prof. Jia Qingguo, Dean of School of International Studies, Peking University, and Prof. Zhang Jianping, Director General of Center for Regional Economic Cooperation, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce. During the visit, the working group met respectively with former senior U.S. government officials and renowned scholars including Dr. Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of States, Dr. Haass, President of Council
on Foreign Relations, Mr. Richard Bush, Co-Director of Center for East Asia Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution, and Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project of Center for Strategic and International Studies, and held round table discussions with famous think tanks such as Asia Society, Heritage Foundation and Center for American Progress. The two sides had a series of in-depth exchanges of views on China-U.S. relationship, trade and Korea Peninsula Nuclear issue, etc. The working group also attended a welcoming reception organized by US-Asia Institute and, on that occasion, had a good chat with U.S. Congressional staffers on issues of mutual interests.

**Vice President Liang Jianquan Meets Vice President of the French National Assembly**

On May 16, Mr. Liang Jianquan, Vice President of CPIFA, met Ms. Carole Bureau-Bonnard, the Vice President of the National Assembly of France, who visited China at the invitation
of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs. The two sides exchanged views on Sino-French relations, the current domestic situation in France, China-European relations and other issues of common interest.

**President Wu Hailong Meets with Samdech Norodom Buppha Devi**

On April 26, H.E. Amb. Wu Hailong, President of CPIFA met with H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Buppha Devi of the Kingdom of Cambodia. The two sides exchanged views on China-Cambodia relations and other issues of common interest. Amb. Ou Boqian, Vice President of CPIFA and Madam Khek M Caimealy, Cambodian Ambassador to China were present at the meeting.

Samdech Norodom Buppha Devi visited Beijing at the invitation of CPIFA from April 26 to 29 to attend the 18th “Meet in Beijing” Art Festival, and hold the Cultural Show of the Royal Ballet of Cambodian Troupe for the celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
P.R. China and the Kingdom of Cambodia. During the visit, Shen Yueyue, Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress met with Samdech Norodom Buppha Devi.

**Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Co-host Successfully the 15th Young Leaders Forum**

From May 11th to 15th, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR) co-hosted the 15th Young Leaders Forum successfully in Detroit, United States of America. Amb. Zhao Weiping, Vice President of CPIFA, headed the Chinese youth delegation to attend the forum and co-chaired the discussion on China-US relations with Mr. Stephen Orlins, President of the NCUSCR.

Thirty-seven youth representatives from various circles of China and the US attended the Forum, where they keenly
shared with each other what they experienced in their life and professional career as well as their successful stories and personal reflection around the theme of “Roots to Routs”, and they also had a good discussion on China-US relations. During the Forum, the participants were given informative briefings by Detroit Police Chief James Craig, Dr. Huei Peng, Director of MCity in University of Michigan and W. Kim Heron, Senior Communications Officer at the Kresge Foundation respectively on relevant topics, and paid visits to Henry Ford Museum of Innovation, Quick Loans Company and Detroit Institute of Arts. This Forum has enhanced friendship between the youths of China and the US and deepened their understanding on each other’s country.

**Young Members’ Delegation from the Japanese Party of Hope Visits China**

The young members’ delegation from the Japanese Party of Hope headed by H.E. Mr. Seiji Maehara, former Foreign Minister of Japan visited Xi’an, Shenzhen and Beijing from April
29 to May 4 at the invitation of CPIFA. In Beijing, Amb. Wu Hailong, President of CPIFA, Mr. Liu Hongcai, Vice President of Chinese Association for International Understanding, Mr. Han Zhiqiang, Director-General of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Mr. Wu Jianghao, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs of MFA, met with or hosted banquets in honor of the delegation. The delegation also had a panel discussion with the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The two sides exchanged views on Sino-Japanese relations, the situation in the Korean Peninsula, and other issues of common interest. In Shenzhen, Ms. Liu En, Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People’s Congress met with the delegation.
中国的对外开放进入了一个全新阶段

赵晋平  中国人民外交学会理事、国务院发展研究中心对外经济研究部原部长、研究员

　　2018年4月10日，习近平主席在博鳌亚洲论坛2018年年会开幕式主旨演讲中强调，中国开放的大门不会关闭，只会越开越大。过去40年中国经济的发展是在开放条件下取得的，未来中国经济实现高质量发展也必须在更加开放的条件下进行，这是中国基于发展需要作出的战略抉择，同时也是在以实际行动推动经济全球化造福世界各国人民。

　　正是站在这样的战略高度上，在这次会议上，习近平主席宣布了中国进一步扩大开放的四项重大举措。目前，这些重大举措正在不断得到全面深入贯彻和落实，中国的对外开放进入了一个全新阶段。

　　一、对外开放是中国发展的必然要求，也将为世界各国带来新机遇

　　2018年正值中国改革开放40周年。过去的四十年中，中国的对外开放取得了举世瞩目的重大成就，对于促进改革和发展发挥了十分重要的作用。但是，我们必须清醒地认识到，中国目前的对外开放和适应错综复杂外部环境变化、培育参与和引领国际竞争合作新优势、助力中国经济高质量发展的需要相比，还存在一定差距；对外开放的广度、深度和力度不充分、不平衡仍然是当前的主要矛盾。因此，进一步扩大开放，首先是促进中国自身发展的战略需要。其次，从国际环境来看，美国大搞单边主义和贸易保护主义行动，随意践踏世贸组织规则打压贸易伙伴国家，严重损害了经济全球化的发展环境和合作基础。中国不断扩大开放的实际行动，将彰显中
国参与和推动经济全球化进程的坚强决心与信心，为促进开放、包容、普惠、平衡、共赢的新型全球化发展创造新动能，这是更好应对国际形势变化、改善全球发展环境的迫切要求。第三，实现习近平主席提出的推动构建人类命运共同体目标，离不开建立在互利共赢基础上的国际合作关系。作为全球第二大经济体和数一数二的贸易投资大国，中国全面提升对外开放水平，将为世界各国通过扩大对华贸易投资合作、分享中国发展红利创造更多机遇。这是中国主动承担新兴大国责任的重要体现。

二、大幅度放开金融、汽车等重要领域的市场准入
将成为中国开放领域的新亮点

落实十九大报告关于推动形成全面开放新格局的重大部署，关键在全面，重在新格局，尤其是如何实现现代服务业、一般制造业等重要领域的准入开放备受关注和期待。习近平主席在博鳌亚洲论坛2018年年会开幕式主旨演讲中，作为四项重大开放举措之一，首先宣布了大幅度放宽市场准入的重要内容，其中两个方面最为引人关注。一是关于金融业开放；二是关于汽车等一般制造业开放。长期以来，我国银行、证券、保险等金融行业投资准入限制多、市场开放水平低等是导致金融市场竞争不足、金融机构服务能力和国际竞争力偏弱的重要原因之一。随着放宽银行、证券、保险行业外资股比和机构设立限制、扩大外资金融机构在华营业范围等重大措施落地实施，对内将为外资金融机构进入中国金融市场创造更加宽松和有利的条件，有助于促进国内金融市场竞争，提升金融商品开发创新能力和服务效率，满足消费者不断增强的对多样化、个性化金融服务的需求，缓解企业面临的融资难融资贵压力。对外，有利于建立与跨国金融企业的合作关系和全球性金融服务网络、增强中国金融机构国际化经营和要素资源整合能力，提升金融产业在全球价值链中的地位。当然，市场准入开放将对防范风险提出更高要求，金融监管能力需要在金融行业的有序开放中逐步提升。汽车产业开放有利于促进市场竞争和技术创新，降低成本，为消费者提供更多选择。为了防止市场垄断行为，需要加强和完善竞争政策体系，维护正常市场竞争秩序。

为落实习近平主席关于大幅度放宽市场准入的新举措，中国政府正在抓紧修订最新版的市场准入负面清单。5月31日，中国商务部发布消息说，新的全国版负面清单和自贸试验区版负面清单将于6月30日前正式公布，拟大幅度放宽市场准入的领域，除了已宣布的金融、汽车行业之外，还将包括能源、基础设施、交通运输、商贸物流等领域。行业准入开放将进入亮点纷呈的新阶段。
三、中国正在致力于打造更具吸引力的投资环境

投资环境包括了税收安排、劳动力资源和成本、产业竞争政策，市场交易规则、投资管理制度等诸多内容，是影响外商投资吸引力的重要因素。过去40年来，中国不断推出改革开放举措，利用外资已由曾经主要靠税收优惠政策转变为主要靠劳动力资源优势和市场增长潜力，投资环境建设取得了明显成效。这也是中国长期以来在吸引国际投资规模上始终位居全球前列的重要原因之一。但是，随着经济增速持续放缓和传统劳动力资源优势逐步减弱，来自新兴市场国家的竞争和发达经济体制造业回流形成的双侧挤压压力明显加大，以国际通行经贸规则、公平的市场竞争政策、透明且稳定的投资管理制度为主要特征的投资环境建设成为培育投资环境竞争新优势的关键因素。

立足于建设更具吸引力投资环境的战略需要，习近平主席强调，中国将加强同国际经贸规则对接，增强透明度，强化产权保护，坚持依法办事，鼓励竞争、反对垄断。为市场在资源配置中起决定作用，政府更好发挥作用提供制度性保障。这些举措的实施将显著提升中国市场对外国投资者的吸引力。

2013年起不断深化和拓展的自贸试验区建设，始终把打造国际化、规范化、市场化投资环境作为制度创新试验的重要内容，并取得了大批成功经验，在更大范围内复制推广，对中国更具吸引力的投资环境建设发挥了重要引领和示范作用。在博鳌亚洲论坛开幕式结束后的第三天，习近平主席宣布了中央和国务院支持海南建设全岛自贸试验区和探索建设中国特色自由贸易港的重大决定。一个具有3.5万平方公里的海南自贸试验区即将进入全面建设阶段，开放水平更高的海南自贸港制度体系也将在不断探索中逐步形成。这对于中国更具吸引力的投资环境建设具有长期和深远意义。

5月30日，国务院常务会议确定了取消或放宽汽车、船舶、飞机制造、金融、大宗能源交易等领域外资准入限制、简化外国人才来华工作许可程序、在中国境内注册企业选聘符合条件的外国人才可在2个工作日内获发签证等一系列举措，在全面落实习近平主席宣布的更具吸引力投资环境建设方面取得了实质性进展。

四、加强知识产权保护对提升中国经济竞争力产生了巨大激励

知识产权是市场主体持有产权的重要组成部分，加强知识产权保护首先是保护投资者产权安全，保护企业合法权益的需要；同时知识产权又是创新创意成果的体现，保护知识产权不仅有利于产权所有者尽享创新收益，而且有利于其他企
业以合理的方式分享创新成果；更为重要的是还可以对新的创新活动产生巨大激励效果。当今世界的市场竞争主要是创新能力的竞争，创新是企业国际竞争优势的源泉所在。因此，保护知识产权就是保护创新，不仅外资企业有这样的要求，中国企业更有要求。

习近平主席在博鳌亚洲论坛演讲中强调，中国将重新组建国家知识产权局，完善加大执法力度。通过这些措施把违法成本显著提上去，把法律威慑作用充分发挥出来。这将使中国的知识产权保护提升到一个更高的水平，有力促进中外企业开展正常技术交流合作。另一方面，随着中国企业国际化经营和走出去投资活动的不断扩大，对其他国家加强对中国企业知识产权保护的要求必然明显增加。美国的301调查无端指责中国侵犯美国企业的知识产权，把矛头直指一些通过企业之间正常技术合作实现技术进步的战略性新兴产业，实际上是无视中国企业再创新知识产权合法性的不当行为。由此可见，加强知识产权保护的国际合作和多边争端解决机制建设的重要性日趋凸显。

目前，中国正在采取措施、抓紧落实习近平主席宣布的重大举措。5月30日，国务院常务会议作出决定，要大幅度提高知识产权侵权法定赔偿上限，展示了中国通过加大知识产权执法力度，加强知识产权保护法治环境建设的决心和行动力。

五、中国将坚持通过扩大进口促进国际收支基本平衡的政策导向

习近平主席在主旨演讲中强调指出，中国不以追求贸易顺差为目标，真诚希望扩大进口，促进经常项目收支平衡。这充分展示了中国主动扩大进口的开放态度和政策导向。中国在总体上保持了对外贸易的逐步平衡趋势，在部分双边贸易上表现出的失衡，主要是全球化背景下各国相对比较优势作用的结果，符合市场规律和产业分工的要求，参与分工各方都是这种经济互补关系的受益者。因此，在存在较大双边贸易逆差（顺差）的情况下，单方面限制进口（出口）的方式会严重损害双方利益，对总体贸易平衡产生不利影响。中国压缩对其他国家贸易顺差最有效方式是进一步扩大进口。这不仅有利于保护出口企业合法权益，促进贸易平衡，还能够全面提升市场开放水平，满足国内消费升级和内需增长的需要，为贸易伙伴国带来更多经济和就业增长机会。

习近平主席宣布的每年举办进口博览会和进一步降低汽车等商品进口关税举措，受到外国政府和企业的广泛欢迎，也符合国内企业和消费者的期待，目前正在加快落实和推进。5月22日，国务院关税税则委员会发布公告，宣布从2018年7月1日起，降低汽车整车及零部件进口关税。其中汽车整车税率由25%、20%降至
15%，汽车零部件税率由8%—25%降至6%。在此基础上，5月30日，国务院决定从7月1日起，较大范围下调日用消费品进口关税，其中服装鞋帽、厨房和体育健身用品等进口关税平均税率由15.9%降至7.1%，洗衣机、冰箱等家用电器进口关税平均税率由20.5%降至8%。这些措施必将对促进中国和主要贸易伙伴国之间的互利共赢合作产生积极影响。
中非友好交往历史源远流长。中国始终与非洲国家风雨同舟、休戚与共，建立了深厚的传统友谊。习近平主席说，中国与非洲国家是患难之交，患难之交不能忘。无论国际风云如何变幻，加强同非洲国家的团结合作始终是中国外交政策的重要基石，这是中国长期、坚定的战略选择，绝不会因为一时一事而改变。

一、党的十八大以来对非外交重要成就

（一）对非外交思想理念不断丰富，合作框架更加完善。习近平主席高度重视发展对非关系，2013年就任国家主席后首次出访就访问非洲，提出正确义利观和真实亲诚理念，并在2015年举行的中非合作论坛约翰内斯堡峰会上宣布将中非关系提升为政治上平等互信、经济上合作共赢、文明上交流互鉴、安全上守望相助、国际事务中团结协作的全面战略合作伙伴关系，为中非关系未来发展指明了方向。中国还在峰会期间发布新版《中国对非洲政策文件》，进一步明确了中国对非外交的指导思想、基本原则及主要领域。2016年，中国倡议中非合作秉持共同发展、集约发展、绿色发展、安全发展、开放发展五大理念，成为中非实现合作共赢、共同发展的新共识。这一系列新思想、新理念、新举措构建起中国对非政策“四梁八柱”，中国总体对非关系的顶层设计和战略规划逐渐成熟，思想体系和理论框架日臻完善。

（二）战略互信不断深化，高层交往空前频繁。党的十八大以来，习近平主席等中国党和国家领导人30多人次访非，非洲国家元首或政府首脑等60多人次来华访问或出席国际会议。中国在非洲伙
伙伴关系网络建设深入推进，已同20余个非洲国家建立了战略伙伴或全面合作伙伴关系。非洲52国和非盟委员会的政党领导人共180多人次向十九大胜利召开和习近平主席连任中共中央总书记致电祝贺。中非政党、立法机构和地方等各层级对话与交往全面扩大，省部级以上官员、政党团组互访分别达数百起，国家双边委员会会议、战略对话、外交部磋商及经贸联(混)委会会议等各类对话机制运行顺畅，中非在治国理政和发展经验领域的交流走向深入。2017年6月，中国与非盟举办中非减贫发展高端对话会，就中非共同应对贫困挑战进行深入讨论，习近平主席著作《摆脱贫困》在非洲各界引起强烈共鸣。

（三）务实合作持续扩大，合作共赢再创新功。2017年，中非贸易额达1700亿美元，中国连续九年成为非洲第一大贸易伙伴国。中国在非各类投资超1000亿美元，较2000年增长上百倍。中国在非企业超3200家，成为推动当地经济社会发展的重要力量。中非合作论坛约翰内斯堡峰会成果落实进展顺利，亚的斯亚贝巴至吉布提铁路、肯尼亚蒙巴萨至内罗毕铁路、海信南非工业园等一大批基础设施、工业园区、经济特区和产业产能项目竣工投入运营或加紧推进。其中蒙内铁路作为肯独立以来最大的基础设施建设工程，累计创造近5万个工作岗位，带动肯GDP增长1.5%，并将本地区物流成本降低14%至40%。

中国始终在力所能及的范围内支持非洲改善民生的努力。在非洲埃博拉疫情肆虐时，中国率先驰援，提供了总计7.5亿元人民币的援助。中国累计向非洲派遣医疗队员逾2.5万人次，医治患者逾3亿人次，开展的“光明行”活动为7000余名非洲白内障患者带来光明，还派医疗团组赴一些非洲国家帮助防控鼠疫、霍乱疫情。2016年以来，中国共向18个非洲国家提供紧急粮食援助，帮助遭受旱涝灾害的非洲国家渡过难关。

（四）和安合作持续发展，中国为非洲和平贡献力量。中国一贯坚持和平性、正当性和建设性原则，积极参与非洲和安事务，支持非洲国家自主解决非洲问题。2015年9月，习近平主席在联合国维和峰会上宣布今后5年向非盟提供1亿美元无偿军事援助，支持非洲加强集体安全机制和自主维和能力建设。中国积极参与南苏丹、索马里、布隆迪等热点问题斡旋调解，为和平解决非洲冲突提供“中国智慧”。中国是安理会五常中向非洲派遣维和人员数量最多的国家，也是2016—2018年度联合国维和摊款第二多的国家，现有2000多名维和人员在5个非洲任务区执行联合国维和任务。中国护航军舰自2009年起在亚丁湾、索马里海域开展行动，迄今派出29批护航编队，为6000余艘中外船舶护航。2017年，中国海军医院船“和平方舟”号先后访问非洲7国，成功完成首次环非访问，为到访国群众提供了高水平的医疗服务。
（五）人文交流日趋活跃，中非人民情感纽带更加紧密。党的十八大以来，中国已向非洲国家提供6万余个来华培训名额和4万余个政府奖学金名额，并为非洲培训20余万名各类职业技术人员。中非举办了百余场人文交流活动，实施200多个人文合作项目。中国和南非成功互办“国家年”活动，中非高级别人文交流机制成为首个中非人文定期交流机制。非洲人民学习汉语和中国文化的热情高涨，目前非洲41个国家共设有54所孔子学院和27所孔子课堂。《媳妇的美好时代》、《杜拉拉升职记》、《金太郎的幸福生活》等国产影视剧在非洲多国热播。中非人员往来快速增长，近年来每年赴非旅游的中国游客均过百万，非洲每年来华旅游人数超过60万。

（六）国际事务中密切配合，重大问题上相互支持。中方坚持在多边场合特别是安理会审议非洲问题时为非洲仗义执言，非洲国家则在台湾、南海等涉及中国核心利益和重大关切问题上予中方坚定支持。中非双方在联合国改革、气候变化、2030年可持续发展议程等重大国际问题上密切配合。中方还在二十国集团杭州峰会、“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛及金砖国家领导人厦门会晤等主场重大国际会议上，邀请非洲国家与会，呼吁国际社会支持非洲发展。

党的十八大以来中国对非外交取得的一系列重要成果，进一步巩固了中非传统友谊，增进了中非战略互信，促进了各领域务实合作快速发展，丰富了中非全面战略合作伙伴关系的内涵，有力推动构建更加紧密的中非命运共同体。中非关系深入发展夯实了中非合作在国际对非合作中的引领地位，使中非合作始终走在国际对非合作的最前列。

首先，中国对非合作的理念具有优越性和生命力。正确义利观和真实亲诚理念不同于弱肉强食的丛林法则和非输即赢的零和逻辑，它建立在真诚平等、相互尊重、互利共赢、开放包容的原则之上，充分体现了中非合作共赢、共同发展的历史任务和共同目标，受到包括非方在内的国际社会广泛认可。

第二，中国始终秉持言出必行、有诺必践的态度，无论在何种场合作出支持非洲发展的承诺，都能如期保质地落实到位，致力于让中非人民从中非合作中分享到实实在在的红利。第三，中非合作论坛自2000年成立以来，坚持共商共建共享原则，坚持务实高效特色，为中非合作全面发展提供了坚实的机制保障，现已成为中非开展集体对话的有效机制、务实合作的重要平台和国际对非合作的一面旗帜。

二、中非关系迎来新的大好发展机遇

当今世界正处于大发展大变革大调整时期，国际格局发生深刻变化，发展中国家整体实力持续上升，全球治理体系正朝着有利于新兴市场和发展中国家的方
向发展。这为中非关系发展提供了宝贵机遇和更大空间。同时，国际形势不确定性上升和国际经济金融危机持续发酵，中非各自发展面临不少挑战，中非自主探索符合国情的发展道路的外部压力有所增加。包括中国和非洲国家在内的广大发展中国家都迫切希望推动建设相互尊重、公平正义、合作共赢的新型国际关系，构建人类命运共同体，也更加凸显出中非加强团结合作的重要性和必要性。

（一）中非关系大发展契合中国特色大国外交发展方向。十九大明确了中国特色大国外交的总体目标，即推动建设新型国际关系和构建人类命运共同体。在这一征程上，非洲是不可或缺的重要伙伴。十九大将秉持正确义利观和真实亲诚理念提升为加强同发展中国家团结合作的总体指导原则，充分表明中非关系是中国与发展中国家团结合作的典范、南南合作的样板。非洲是中国和平发展溢出效应最为明显的地区，是推进中国特色大国外交的重要方向。深化同非洲的战略互信和务实合作，是中国坚持发展中国家基本属性的客观要求，也是中国推动建设新型国际关系和构建人类命运共同体的应有之义。

（二）中非关系大发展符合非洲发展的迫切需求。进入新世纪以来，非洲经济经历了较长的快速增长期，正处于发展腾飞的关键阶段。非洲国家普遍希望探索出适合自身国情的发展道路，破解基础设施、资金、人力资源等方面的瓶颈，加快工业化和经济多元化进程。中国经过40年改革开放，在资金、技术、装备、人才等方面积累起相对优势，也愿意同非洲分享自身发展经验。中非加强合作共嬴，将充分发挥双方优势互补的积极效应，推动非洲将自然资源、人口红利、市场潜力等优势转化为发展动力，尽快实现经济独立和自主可持续发展。

（三）中非关系大发展获得“一带一路”的强大助力。“一带一路”倡议为推动经济全球化向开放、包容、普惠、平衡、共赢方向发展发挥了积极作用。非洲国家热切希望参与“一带一路”建设，肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚领导人来华出席“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛，中国已同5个非洲国家签署“一带一路”合作协议。埃及、埃塞俄比亚等6个非洲国家加入了亚洲基础设施投资银行。共建“一带一路”为中非合作发展提供了更宽广的视野和更强劲的动力，为推动中非政策沟通、设施联通、贸易畅通、资金融通和民心相通带来了新的历史机遇。

三、中非合作论坛北京峰会展望

在中非双方的共同倡议下，中非合作论坛北京峰会将于今年9月举行。中非领导人时隔12年后将再次齐聚北京，共叙传统友谊，共商新时代合作大计。这次峰会将是中非关系发展史上又一具有里程碑意义的盛事，为进一步深化中非全面战
略合作伙伴关系，夯实中非命运共同体发挥积极重要作用。

（一）释放中非永续团结友好的积极信号。中非历来都是好朋友、好伙伴、好兄弟，中非传统友谊经历了时代的洗礼和国际风云变化的考验，历久弥坚、历久弥新。中非友好是双方人民的共同财富，值得我们精心呵护、代代相传。论坛北京峰会将进一步凝聚起中非传承友谊、共创未来的共识，向世界发出中非人民大团结、大合作的最强音，并为中非命运共同体赋予更加丰富的时代内涵和更加鲜明的时代特征。此次峰会必将成为中非友好的“接力站”和中非合作的“加油站”，推动中非在合作共赢、共同发展的道路上携手同行、行稳致远。

（二）推动中非发展战略的全面对接。此次论坛峰会将致力于打造更加紧密的中非命运共同体，推动“一带一路”倡议与联合国2030年可持续发展议程对接，与非盟《2063年议程》对接，与非洲各国发展战略对接。中国将同非洲各国积极探讨未来中非合作的优先领域、重点方向及具体途径，聚焦非洲国家最为关心的基础设施、工业化、农业、民生、和平安全等合作，寻求双方需求、优势和利益的最大公约数，使中非合作更多造福双方人民。

（三）助力中非合作转型升级。当前，中非合作正处于从量的积累向质的飞跃转变的关键阶段，并呈现出由政府主导逐渐向市场运作转型、由商品贸易逐渐向产能合作升级、由工程承包逐渐向投资运营迈进的良好势头。论坛北京峰会将着力加强对中非合作转型升级的政策引领，在投融资、新经济、人文交流等领域培育中非合作新的增长点和亮点，推动中非合作向更高层次、更高水平、更广领域迈进。

（四）促进国际关系民主化发展。中国同非洲国家在促进国际关系民主化方面有很多共同语言和共同利益。中非双方将通过举办论坛峰会，深化中非在国际事务中团结协作，增强南南合作发展势头，维护好发展中国家的共同利益。事实证明，中国发展好了，将为非洲发展提供更多机遇。非洲发展好了，将为中国和世界发展提供更多动力。中国和非洲都发展好了，将使我们生活的世界更加公平、合理。中非将携手为建设新型国际关系和构建人类命运共同体作出更大的贡献。
推动中拉关系不断迈上新台阶

赵本堂 外交部拉美司司长

一、拉美和加勒比国家是一支处于上升期的新兴力量，发展前景为各方看好

当今世界正处于大发展大变革大调整时期，国际格局和力量对比处在发展演变的重要关头，各种不稳定不确定因素增多，诸多新问题新挑战层出不穷。在纷繁复杂的全球性变局中，发展中国家和新兴市场国家发展壮大的趋势没有改变，拉美和加勒比国家保持总体稳定和有序发展，积极应对外部环境变化带来的挑战，发展潜力不断释放，整体实力稳步提升，对国际体系变革发挥着越来越大的建设性作用。

（一）政治社会稳定发展。拉美和加勒比地区政治体制相对巩固，经济社会平衡发展的理念深入人心。今年10多个地区国家迎来总统或国会选举，古巴、委内瑞拉等6国已顺利结束大选，古平稳完成革命胜利以来首次代际权力交替，巴西、墨西哥等国大选已拉开序幕，地区政治格局将继续调整。总的看，拉美政治生态和力量格局发生的变化都是在现行体制和法律框架下进行的，有关国家政府都在顺应时势变迁，推动改革，改善民生，谋求发展振兴。

（二）经济实现企稳增长。拉美和加勒比地区油气、矿产、水利、农林等战略性资源富集，自然条件得天独厚，具有雄厚的发展基础。2017年，拉美和加勒比地区经济止跌回升，实现1.2%的增长。各方普遍预测，地区经济有望延续温和复苏势头，今明两年预计增长2.2%和2.8%。但也要看到，拉美经济复苏仍面临一些结构性因素制约，近期阿根廷经济金融形势发生剧烈波动。总的看，未来一段时间，拉美和加勒比地区经济将继续保持一定速度的增长，为
各国现代化进程和民生改善提供物质基础。

（三）对外交往多元务实。拉美和加勒比国家在国际和地区事务中发挥着越来越大的作用，积极维护本国和发展中国家共同利益。美国特朗普政府执政后，拉美和加勒比国家对美方修筑同墨西哥边境隔离墙、威胁对委内瑞拉动武、特朗普总统缺席美洲国家首脑会议等感到失望和不满，美拉关系发展中不确定因素增多。拉美和加勒比国家积极开展多元外交，重视发展同欧盟以及中国、俄罗斯、印度等新兴大国和其他发展中国家关系。

（四）一体化进程曲折前行。拉美是全球最早开启一体化的地区之一，各国联合自强意愿强烈。2011年，拉美和加勒比国家共同体正式成立，标志着地区一体化建设取得新的重要进展。由于各国发展水平和诉求不同，以及在威内瑞拉问题上立场分歧较大，地区一体化进程受到一定影响。南美国家联盟、玻利瓦尔联盟等偏重政治安全的一体化组织发展势头放缓，太平洋联盟、南方共同市场等偏重经济一体化的地区组织续有发展。

二、中拉友好交往与互利合作全方位推进

拉美和加勒比是重要发展中地区，对拉外交工作是中国外交的重要组成部分。习近平总书记在党的十九大报告中，明确提出我们要推动构建新型国际关系、推动构建人类命运共同体，要秉持正确义利观和真实亲诚理念加强同发展中国家团结合作。这为新形势下深化中拉关系明确了新目标，开辟了新前景。

（一）高层交往引领中拉关系迈上新台阶。习近平主席已3次访拉，足迹遍布10个拉美和加勒比国家，并在双多边场合同所有的拉美和加勒比建交国领导人会面，创中拉关系发展史先河。2013年访拉期间，习近平主席推动中国同加勒比建交国领导人会面，创中拉关系发展史先河。2014年在首次中拉领导人会晤上，习近平主席提出构建中拉关系“五位一体”新格局和务实合作“1+3+6”新框架。会晤后，习近平主席同拉方领导人发表《巴西利亚联合声明》，正式确立平等互利、共同发展的中拉全面合作伙伴关系这一新定位。2016年访拉期间，习近平主席在秘鲁国会面向拉美地区发表重要演讲，倡议共同打造中拉命运共同体。

中拉在涉及各自核心和重大利益问题上继续相互理解、相互支持。中国积极支持拉美和加勒比国家探索适合本国国情的发展道路以及为维护国家主权和领土完整所作努力。一个中国原则得到拉美和加勒比绝大多数国家遵循。2017年6月、2018年5月，巴拿马、多米尼加先后同中国建交，中国在拉美和加勒比建交国数量
增至23个。党的十九大胜利召开后，拉美和加勒比建交国和多个未建交国党政领导人、地区组织和多边机构代表发来130多份贺电贺信。今年全国两会召开后，拉美和加勒比国家领导人和地区多边机构代表向我新一届国家领导人发来近60份贺电贺信。中拉双方在联合国、亚太经合组织、二十国集团、金砖国家等国际组织和多边机制框架下，围绕联合国改革、可持续发展、应对气候变化等全球性议题以及朝核、网络安全等热点问题加强协作，有力维护了发展中国家的共同利益。

（二）中拉整体合作取得历史性突破并全面推进。2014年首次中拉领导人会晤后，双方共同宣布建立中国—拉美和加勒比国家共同体论坛。2015年初，论坛首届部长级会议在北京成功举行，历史上第一次形成了涵盖中国同拉美和加勒比地区所有国家的合作平台。3年来，中拉论坛的“四梁八柱”搭建起来，步入良好运行轨道。中国和拉共体成员国举行了2次“四驾马车”外长对话会，每年召开国家协调员会议，创设了涵盖政党、基础设施、农业、企业、科技创新、青年、智库、法律、环境、地方政府合作、民间友好等10多个领域的对话合作平台，为落实双方政治共识和合作规划提供了机制保障。

今年1月，中拉论坛第二届部长级会议在智利首都圣地亚哥成功举行，开启了中拉整体合作的新篇章。习近平主席向会议发函致贺，高度肯定3年来中拉论坛的发展，提出以共建“一带一路”引领中拉关系的重要倡议。中拉双方一致认为共建“一带一路”将为中拉全面合作伙伴关系提供新的理念，注入新的活力，开辟新的前景。中方就如何深化并提出中拉“1+3+6”合作框架，从建设联通一体的大联通、培育开放互利的大市场、打造自主先进的大产业、抓住创新增长的大机遇、开展平等互信的大交流这五个方面提出合作建议，得到拉方积极响应。会议通过的《圣地亚哥宣言》、《中国与拉美和加勒比国家合作（优先领域）共同行动计划（2019–2021）》和《关于“一带一路”的特别声明》3份成果文件，集中反映了下一阶段中拉双方深化合作、同谋发展的明确意愿。截至目前，巴拿马、特立尼达和多巴哥、苏里南、安提瓜和巴布达已率先同中国签署了“一带一路”合作谅解备忘录，希望将本国长期发展战略同“一带一路”倡议紧密对接。

（三）中拉务实合作实现换挡加速。中国和拉美国家同为发展中国家，面临着相同的发展阶段和发展任务。中拉合作基于共同利益和相互需求，秉持的是平等互利、开放包容、合作共赢的理念，是南南合作的重要组成部分和成功典范。2017年，中拉贸易额达2578.5亿美元，同比增长18.8%。中拉贸易结构更加优化，越来越多的拉美和加勒比优质农产品进入中国市场，智利成为中国第一大鲜果进口来源地。中拉自贸区建设稳步推进，中国同智利完成自贸协定升级，同秘鲁启
动自贸协定升级谈判，同巴拿马和哥伦比亚启动自贸协定联合可行性研究，同乌拉圭就商签自贸协定进行磋商。

中国企业看好拉美长期发展前景，在拉美和加勒比地区设立的境外企业超过2000家，2016年流向拉美和加勒比地区的中国直接投资为272.3亿美元，同比增长115.9%，累计直接投资存量达2071.5亿美元，占中国对外投资总量的15.3%。拉美和加勒比已成为仅次于亚洲的中国海外投资第二大目的地。近年来电子商务、数字经济的兴起，又为中拉经贸往来推开了新的大门。中拉还开展了形式多样的金融合作，其中350亿美元对拉一揽子融资安排已经安排落实170多亿美元，300亿美元中拉产能合作专项基金也已经启动，并成立了为此运行的基金有限责任公司。

事实证明，中拉合作契合了拉美国家谋发展中对资金、技术、基础设施等方面的需求，为拉美人民带来了实实在在的好处，有力促进了拉美国家经济社会发展。中国企业不仅参与拉美资源能源开发，而且投资炼油、化工、冶金、海运等中下游产业，提高了拉美资源类产品附加值。所谓“中国攫取拉美资源”是站不住脚的。中国企业还在拉美承建了一大批公路、铁路、机场、桥梁和电站等基础设施项目，积极开展产能和装备制造领域的合作，累计为当地创造了180多万个就业机会。

（四）中拉人文交流持续走热。习近平主席访问拉美和加勒比国家时多次强调“国之交在于民相亲”，中拉虽然相距遥远，但双方立法机构、地方、媒体、智库交流频繁，教育、文化、旅游等领域合作蓬勃开展。中国在拉美和加勒比16个国家开设了36所孔子学院和11个孔子课堂，在墨西哥城设立了首个中国文化中心。中国航空企业开通了到巴西、墨西哥、古巴、巴拿马等国多条直航航线，越来越多的中国游客到拉美观光旅游。国际权威研究机构民调显示，2017年拉美和加勒比地区民众对华好感度2003年以来首次超过对美国好感度。

三、中拉关系发展面临新的重要机遇

随着国际地区形势持续发生复杂深刻变化，中拉关系的战略影响和全球意义不断上升，扩大互利合作、实现共同发展成为中拉之间的共同愿望。党的十九大为中国同包括拉美和加勒比在内的世界各国深化友好关系带来了新的重大机遇。中拉双方应认真履行双方领导人共识，把握机遇，乘势而上，不断开创中拉关系新局面，更好造福双方人民。

（一）中拉应坚持从战略高度和长远角度发展双方关系，充分发挥高层交
往对中拉关系的引领作用，完善现有对话和磋商机制，加强对中拉关系的统筹规划。坚持平等相待，继续在涉及各自核心利益和重大关切的问题上相互理解、相互支持，更好地维护中拉双方和广大发展中国家的共同利益。中国积极支持阿根廷主办2018年二十国集团领导人峰会、智利主办2019年亚太经合组织领导人非正式会晤、巴西主办2019年金砖国家领导人会议，愿意同拉美和加勒比国家在国际和地区事务中密切沟通协调，提升中拉关系的全球影响，共同推动构建更加公正合理的国际政治经济新秩序，共同为促进世界的和平、稳定与发展作出更大贡献。

（二）中拉应坚持互利共赢、共同发展的理念，在推进“一带一路”过程中实现中拉合作优化升级、创新发展，打造领域更宽、结构更优、动力更强、质量更好的中拉合作新局。中方愿积极参与拉美地区交通运输、基础设施、能源等硬件建设和互联互通，开辟更多中拉海洋通道、直航航线，不断提升中拉联通网络的密度和容量。中方将促进同拉美和加勒比各国贸易和投资便利化，欢迎拉方参与将于今年11月举办的首届中国国际进口博览会。中方有条件有能力向拉美提供各国需要的装备、技术、资金和相应培训，双方可加快产能合作，帮助拉美尽快建成自主、多元的工业体系。中方愿将“一带一路”科技创新行动计划对接拉美，搭建中拉“网上丝绸之路”和“数字丝绸之路”，并通过“中拉科技伙伴计划”和“中拉青年科学家交流计划”培训更多拉美科研人才。中方也愿支持拉美和加勒比中小国家提升应对气候变化的能力。

（三）中拉应坚持交流互鉴，巩固世代友好，增加相互理解和认同，促进“中国梦”与“拉美梦”交相辉映。双方应继续扩大立法机构、政党、地方、新闻媒体、学术机构、民间团体、文体组织等各界友好往来，加强治国理政和内外政策对话交流，不断巩固中拉关系发展的社会基础。双方应充分利用中拉各自丰富的人文和旅游资源，为双方公民跨国旅游提供更多便利，为中拉人民创造更多相近相亲的机会。双方应通过互设更多文化中心、开设更多孔子学院、相互增派留学生等形式，为青少年创造更多相互接触、学习和广交朋友的机会，为中拉友谊传承打好基础。

（四）中拉应坚持整体合作与双边合作相互促进，不断构建全面均衡的合作网络。中方一如既往地支持拉美和加勒比国家联合自强和地区一体化进程，将坚持平等相待的合作原则、互利共赢的合作目标、灵活务实的合作方式、开放包容的合作精神，以中拉论坛为主要平台推进中拉整体合作。中方愿同拉方一道，以《圣地亚哥宣言》、《共同行动计划（2019–2021）》为指针和纲领，重点推动政治安全、贸易金融、能源资源、制造业、农业、高科技等领域合作，把中国产业、技术优势同拉方资源、人力优势相结合，让中拉合作成果更多惠及双方人
民。中方将落实好有关对拉政府奖学金、各类人员培训、智库和青年交流计划，增进双方人民相互了解和友好情谊。

从1960年新中国同古巴建交算起，中拉双方已携手走过近60个春秋，取得了丰硕的合作成果。当前，中国经济正在从高速增长转向高质量发展阶段，一个创新步伐加快、发展质量更优的中国，将产生更广泛、更强大的辐射效应，带来更多合作机会。中方愿同拉方一道，在中拉关系新征程中携手同行，团结协作，推动构建中拉命运共同体，为双方人民带来更多福祉，为世界和平、稳定、繁荣作出新的贡献。
朝鲜半岛无核化进程开端已启，美朝能否相互包容是取得进展的关键

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一、朝鲜半岛局势的缓和是多种积极因素叠加的结果

2017年应该是近年朝鲜半岛局势最令人难忘、最扣人心弦与跌宕起伏的一年。一方面，这源于白宫出现了一位美国历史上行事方式最强悍、直率，决策上最出其不意，令人难以捉摸的总统特朗普。特朗普在执政后第一阶段就开始对朝执行“极限施压”策略：先后两次派出两艘航母到朝鲜周边海域施压，频繁地派出B-1、B-2与B-52战略轰炸机飞越军事分界线上空，并不停地透露各种军事打击方案。另一方面，朝鲜的核导一体化的发展达到了新的高度，2017年9月3日，朝鲜进行第六次核试验。同年6月与9月，火星-10、火星-12先后试验成功。11月火星-15的成功发射标志着朝鲜拥有了射程可以覆盖美国全境的洲际弹道导弹。联合国安理会从2006年起总共通过了十次对朝制裁案，其中2356、2371、2375、2397号制裁朝鲜决议均发生在2017年。

正当国际社会忐忑不安地关注2018年朝鲜半岛紧张局势是否会崩盘之时，笼罩在朝鲜半岛上空的战争乌云突然闪现了一线光明，呈现出重大转机，并随后进入了一个一般人难以想象的快速积极发展的轨道。这种变化首先来自于朝鲜自身判断与政策的变化：其次是韩国新总统文在寅持续的对朝发出和解的信号，搭建了平昌冬奥会这个平台，为朝鲜展示其新政策、新形象创造了条件；其三是特朗普总统审时度势，抓住了金正恩投来的和平绣球；其四是中国领导人由衷支持朝鲜决定走无核化道路的战略决策，以真诚与热情的态度欢迎朝鲜领导人两次访华，就无核化推进方案、朝鲜半岛和平机制的建设、两党与两国的友好交往交换意见，为朝鲜下一步与美国开展无核化谈判奠定了外部的政治基础。
二、《板门店宣言》标志朝韩关系进入了一个新阶段

朝鲜半岛形势转机的最初端倪是在2017年11月29日，金正恩宣布实现了导弹强国目标，并完成了国家核武历史大业。虽然他还表示要强化核武器的质量，但随着其在形式上实现了与中美俄等核大国等同的核地位的战略目标，国家的战略重心势必将进入一个调整、发展的新阶段。毋庸置疑，美国的极限施压战略也导致了朝鲜的资金链（金融）、输油管（能源）和海上贸易等支撑体制的三大生命线岌岌可危，这也是朝鲜不得不调整政策的外因。

而为这个战略重心调整平稳落地和提供天时地利人和契机的是延续“阳光政策”的韩国领导人文在寅，他执政后就提议韩朝联合组队参加平昌冬奥会，再提议缓和朝韩局势的“柏林构想”。2018年元旦，金正恩在新年贺词中正式表示，确保民族大事隆重举行，彰显民族气概和尊严，参加平昌冬奥会，打破冻结的韩朝关系现状。

在朝韩联队参加冬奥会之后，4月27日朝鲜最高领导人金正恩与韩国总统文在寅在朝韩边境板门店举行了历史性会谈，会后发表了《促进朝鲜半岛和平、繁荣、统一的板门店宣言》。该宣言就改善朝韩关系提出了6条具体的措施：举行高级别会谈等各领域的对话和谈判；在开城地区设立双方官员常驻的韩朝共同联络事务所；举行韩朝红十字会会谈协商离散亲人团聚等问题，举行离散亲人团聚活动；连接并升级改造东海线及京义线铁路和公路；全面停止引发军事紧张和冲突的一切敌对行为，在军事分界线一带停止包括扩音喊话、散布传单在内的一切敌对行为，撤走其工具；将经常举行防长会谈等军事部门会谈。

这个宣言总体上是象征性大于实质性，其内容并没有超出金大中2000年访朝发表的《北南共同宣言》与卢武铉和朝鲜领导人金正日2007年10月发表的《北南关系发展及和平繁荣宣言》。其核心内容是双方同意在《停战协定》签署65周年的今年宣布结束战争状态，推进停和机制转换，为建立牢固的永久性和平机制，努力促成韩朝美三方会谈或韩朝美中四方会谈。韩朝确认通过完全弃核实现半岛无核化的目标。

但它的重要性可能远远超出2000年《6·15共同宣言》和2007年《10·4宣言》，因为它与朝鲜七届三中全会通过《关于宣布核经并进路线的伟大胜利》、《关于顺应革命发展新阶段要求，集中全力进行社会主义经济建设》的决议精神是吻合的。同时，金正恩对于与特朗普举行会谈所表现出异乎寻常的热情，也从另外一个角度印证了他对解决核问题与建立美朝正常关系的真诚信意。

在特朗普5月24日宣布取消新加坡会谈9个小时后，朝鲜第一副相金桂冠就发
表了语气极其温和的谈话：“我们将愿意始终抱着宽容开放的态度给美方更多的时间和机会”，“我们希望美方知道，我们愿意在任何时候、以任何方式坐下来与美方商讨解决问题”，“我们也默默期待所谓的特朗普方式能够真正解决问题，成为一个英明的解决方案”。25日下午，青瓦台就接到了金正恩要求进行韩朝首脑会谈的提议，这是距4月27日文在寅与金正恩板门店第一次会晤后不到一个月的再次会晤，这种急迫的见面首先表明朝鲜最高领导人高度重视与特朗普的会谈，他已经决心使朝美峰会终结“对抗历史”。其次也认可文在寅是让美朝首脑会谈起死回生的不可或缺的“中介人”。虽然朝鲜5月16日借韩美进行大规模联合军演为由，取消了原定当天举行的韩朝高层会谈，也给韩国记者赴丰溪里参加核试验场的关闭仪式设置了一定障碍，但朝鲜对韩国的局部不满并不能降低韩国在实现朝美峰会过程中重要价值。

在近四个月的朝鲜半岛局势转圜的过程中，朝鲜深知韩国作为主要推手的重大作用，也完全了解要确保朝美在核问题上的谈判的进展，仍然需要借助韩国调和之手，其实现把国家重心转移到经济建设上的目标更需要韩国的力挺。因此，既是作为回报，也是为了稳定关系，金正恩同意6月1日召开北南高级别会谈，并就快速推进双方军方会谈、红十字会会谈等达成一致。同时，还给予韩方最需要的礼物——为建立朝鲜半岛和平机制进行积极合作的保证。

三、特朗普—金正恩会谈计划的反复显示无核化进程的艰难

在韩国领导人的幕后运作与文在寅同金正恩的促膝谈心下，美朝关系已经呈现出积极靠拢的迹象，美国总统特朗普对朝鲜领导人的态度也发生了微妙的变化，他两次派遣国务卿蓬佩奥访问平壤与金正恩会谈，就显示他真诚希望定于6月12日的新加坡峰会取得实质性的成果。

然而，5月24—25日间特朗普宣布取消会谈，59个小时后又宣布会谈按原计划进行的这一幕，在国际政治中也是罕见的，它不仅使期望中的会谈与成果笼罩在一层阴影中，也强烈反映了美朝在无核化的问题上存在着严重分歧。虽然特朗普与金正恩都对会谈的成果抱有很大的期望，但双方在过去20多年在解决核问题上积累的不信任是如此的根深蒂固，美朝双方都试图以强硬的方式主导无核化的方式与进程。

博尔顿5月13日接受采访时所提出的无核化方式，就是“利比亚模式”，或超越了“利比亚模式”。这种全面、一揽子的无核化不仅包括朝鲜放弃钚和高浓缩铀等核材料，废弃核与导弹设施，更重要的是要将所有废弃的核武器、弹道导弹
运到美国田纳西州橡树岭国家实验室销毁。同时，让核研究人员转业、放弃可以用于核的开发项目、交出生化武器。在全部完成这些无核化工作后，美国才给以安全保障与经济援助。

显然，朝鲜作为一个已经完成核武器发展与核运载工具试验的国家，一个在东亚地区具有军事实力的国家，它不可能屈辱地按照“利比亚模式”来弃核，因为这个模式等同于一种向强权国家投降。朝鲜希望通过对等的谈判方式来实施有尊严的弃核，同时以分阶段的方式来换取美国的补偿。朝鲜也不可能接受类似当年对伊拉克的侵入式的核查与验证，更不愿因为无限制延长的核查与验证而导致美国补偿迟迟不到位。

博尔顿作为小布什政府的新保守派的强硬分子，他的这次谈话所定下的基调远远超出蓬佩奥访问平壤时，向金正恩所作出的承诺。蓬佩奥的表述相对比较正面与灵活：即“如果朝鲜迈出大胆一步，迅速实现无核化，那么美国已准备好帮助朝鲜走向繁荣”。所以，朝鲜非常担心一旦会谈开始，博尔顿会以一种强硬的方式干预会谈，不停地对朝鲜意图提出质疑，干扰特朗普的决断，削弱蓬佩奥国务卿务实的谈判风格，最终使朝鲜在无核化过程中成为彻底的输家。

在这种背景下，5月16日，金桂冠发表了逐条驳斥博尔顿言论的谈话，“如果只是想强迫朝鲜单方面弃核，朝方对这样的对话将不再感兴趣，也不得不重新考虑是否对即将到来的美朝领导人会晤予以响应”。5月24日，朝鲜外务省副相崔善姬又发表了强硬谈话，对美国副总统彭斯的不当言论进行反击：“朝鲜从未向美国请求对话，若美国不愿同朝鲜进行对话，就不会挽留美国，”“要么美国在会谈场合上同朝鲜见面，要么在核对核的决战场上见面，这完全取决于美国的决心和做法。”

虽然特朗普针对金桂冠的谈话，提出了“特朗普模式”来淡化“利比亚模式”，承诺如果朝鲜与美国达成无核化协议，美国就会承诺为其体制安全提供保障。但双方对无核化进程、方式的裂痕已经凸显，也正是在崔善姬直言不讳的讲话后，特朗普才在5月24日宣布取消新加坡会谈的。现在，特朗普已经重启了同金正恩的谈判准备工作，但是双方在新加坡能够达成一个什么样的协议，特别是双方工作层的官员在下一步落实路线图中如何保持合作精神与相互信任，这是外界仍然存有疑虑的。

四、中国支持朝鲜半岛走向缓和与无核化

在这几年朝鲜半岛紧张局势升级，无核化进程陷入僵局的情况下，中国始
坚持自己的原则，按照是非曲直决定对朝政策。首先，中国反对朝鲜悖逆于时代潮流、国际社会文明与规范的要求强行发展核武器；其次，在六方会谈终止后，应对朝鲜核试验、导弹试验过程中，中国与美国保持了充分合作，在联合国安理会磋商、制裁决议形成过程中，中国与美国、俄罗斯等国维持了紧密的沟通合作关系；其三，对履行联合国制裁决议，中国政府始终如一严格执行；其四，中国一再强调，美国应该充分考虑朝鲜的安全关切，以此作为切入点，引导朝鲜走向无核化。

为化解朝核僵局，中国多次提出“双暂停”和“双轨并行”思路，虽然由于各种原因朝美均没有接受中国的倡议，但中国的外交努力从来没有停止过。随着朝韩关系的缓和，朝美开始探索进行直接会谈，中国方面也是积极支持的。中国始终认为，朝核问题的解决，核心、关键是需要由美朝两家来谈判解决，因为美国仍然在朝鲜半岛维持着2.8万驻军与大规模的进攻性武器，美国没有建立外交关系，朝鲜半岛的停战机制是由美韩与朝鲜共同维持着。美国也是一个可以决定朝鲜能否完全进入国际社会，享受国际社会的各种权利的关键国家。

中国也欢迎并支持朝韩双方按照《板门店宣言》所体现的对话、和解与合作精神，落实好南北领导人两次会晤的共识，持续推进和解与合作，不断通过对话协商建立相互信任，改善彼此关系，为延续和巩固半岛缓和势头发挥积极促进作用。

中国与朝鲜维持着传统友好关系，双边的《中朝友好互助条约》仍然有效，随着金正恩两次访问中国，双方对于朝鲜半岛无核化与和平机制的建立进行了充分磋商。今后无论是朝鲜半岛无核化与和平机制的谈判，还是朝韩的交流与合作，中朝两家均需要进行沟通与战略协调，这在一定程度上也保证了朝鲜与美国谈判过程中的平衡地位。

同样，中美作为东北亚最大的两个大国，也是朝鲜战争的参战方、停战协定的签字方，双方有义务就无核化的推进方式、责任与成本的分担、监督与管理进行协商。中国支持分阶段、同步行动与一揽子的解决方案，由于美朝对如何分解这种方式有分歧，中国完全可以作为参与方、协调人协助美朝共同制定一个公平、有效、有时间节点的方案。

未来的和平机制的构建，中国作为历史上、国际法上的直接当事方、朝韩和平共存的外部支持方、半岛的重要邻邦，理所当然应该参与这种机制的构建过程。中国希望美朝与朝韩能够分别签订《互不侵犯条约》。在此基础上，中美俄三个大国也应该为朝鲜半岛的永久和平提供政治上的保障，东北亚六个国家也应该共同构建一个地区安全合作机制，使朝鲜半岛与东北亚的安全形成互补性的结构，最终使这个地区摆脱冷战格局。
上海合作组织：新阶段、新挑战、新征程

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经过17年发展，上海合作组织已成为一个颇具规模的综合性区域合作组织，其影响远远超出地区范围。随着印度和巴基斯坦成为正式成员国，上合进入一个全新的发展阶段。尽管成员国的数量增加导致上合内部利益诉求更加多样化，议题更加广泛，“协商一致”需要更多的协调，但上合仍是成员国相互依托、促进自身发展的重要平台，不啻为国际上发展合作共赢的新型国家关系典范。

一、安全、经济和人文合作成为上合发展的重要支柱

自2001年成立以来，上合历经了国际风云变幻特别是国际金融危机的严峻考验，成员国间的政治互信持续加深、同舟共济、联合自强意识不断增强，在涉及各自安全与发展等核心利益问题上愈加紧密配合，安全、经贸和人文合作成为上合持续发展的三大基石。

（一）安全合作不断扩大

上合在世界上最早提出打击恐怖主义、分裂主义、极端主义的目标，并逐渐形成一套完整的安全合作法律体系和长效运行机制。上合成立当天，六国元首即签署《打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义上海公约》。而后，成员国又陆续签署和出台《关于地区反恐怖机构的协定》、《地区反恐怖机构资料库协议》、《成员国合作打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义构想》、《成员国关于合作打击非法贩运麻醉药品、精神药物及其前体的协议》、《反恐怖主义公约》、《成员国政府间保障国际信息安全合作协定》、《成员国关于举行联合军事演习的协定》、《成员国关于举行联合反恐行动的程序协定》、《成员国关于举行联合军事演习的协定》、《成员国关于举行联合反恐行动的程序协定》。
《关于查明和切断在成员国境内参与恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义活动人员渗透渠道的协定》、《关于应对威胁本地区和平、安全与稳定事态的政治外交措施及机制条例》、《成员国边防合作协定》、《反极端主义公约》等文件，为在上合框架下联合打击“三股势力”奠定了坚实的法律基础。同时，上合还相继建立起成员国间的安全会议秘书、总检察长、最高法院院长、国防和公安内务部长定期会晤机制及公安和司法等强力部门反恐应急磋商平台，开辟了保障油气管道运输安全合作新领域。自2002年中国与吉尔吉斯斯坦举行首次联合反恐军事演习以来，“联合”、“协作”、“和平使命”等双边和多边系列反恐联合军演和“东方反恐”、“诺拉克—反恐”、“团结”和“天山”等执行部门机制化反恐联合演习和训练已成为成员国安全领域合作的重要内容。截至2018年，在上合框架下共举行了13次双边和多边反恐军演和15次双边和多边执法部门演训和禁毒行动，有力地提高了成员国在应对非传统安全方面的机动作战、协同配合、联合指挥、共同打击暴力恐怖活动能力，极大地震慑了地区“三股势力”的嚣张气焰，有效地遏制了毒品走私、跨国组织犯罪，确保了地区和成员国的社会安全与稳定。上合在联合打击恐怖主义、引渡罪犯、交换情报等方面的合作不断取得新成果，成员国在边境管控、信息共享和民航安保等方面的合作更加顺畅，相互协助遣返犯罪嫌疑人等工作更加快捷，各类重大活动安保措施不断完善，多边执法安全合作机制更加高效，从而确保了上合历次元首和政府首脑峰会、国际会议和赛事的成功举行，实现了上合提出的维护和保障地区和成员国国家安全与稳定的目标。

（二）经济合作稳步推进

上合成立不久，各成员国即签署《上海合作组织成员国政府间关于区域经济合作的基本目标和方向及启动贸易和投资便利化进程的备忘录》和《上海合作组织成员国多边经贸合作纲要》，明确了上合近期、中期和远期经济合作基本目标和基本方向。2004年，上合成员国经贸部长会议制定了涉及11个领域、多达127个项目的《〈成员国多边经贸合作纲要〉落实措施计划》，为推进上合区域经济合作奠定了良好基础。此后，各成员国又签署和通过《上合组织银行业间合作（联合体）协议》、《上合组织实业家委员会理事会首次会议纪要》、《上合组织实业家委员会成立大会决议》、《成员国政府间海关合作与互助协定》和《成员国政府间农业合作协定》。2010年以来，在欧美经济复苏乏力和世界经济低迷大背
景下，上合成员国大多率先走出金融危机。截至2011年底，六国黄金外汇储备超过3.6万亿美元，进出口贸易总额达4.7万亿美元，同比增长25.1%，六国经济占世界比重超过13%，“上合经济圈”成为后危机全球最活跃、发展最快的地区。2016年，上合成员国政府首脑理事会批准《2017—2021年上合组织进一步推动项目合作的措施清单》，进一步确定了贸易和投资、金融、海关、农业、科技和信息、环保、交通基础设施等7个领域共计38项合作措施和项目，旨在指导上合未来五年的区域经济合作方向，标志着成员国的多边经济合作取得重大阶段性成果。

（三）人文合作有序展开

上合集儒教、道教、佛教、东正教、基督教、伊斯兰教和印度教等于一身，为成员国不同民族、宗教、文明与文化交流相处、相互借鉴搭建了平等交流与合作的平台，人文合作也成为上合可持续发展的重要支柱之一。自2005年以来，各成员国先后签署《成员国政府间救灾互助协定》、《成员国政府间教育合作协定》、《成员国政府间文化合作协定》、《成员国政府间卫生合作协定》、《上合组织科技伙伴计划》、《成员国旅游合作发展纲要》等文件，相继建立文化部长、卫生部长、教育部长、交通部长、紧急救（民）政部长和科技部长等会议机制。自2010年上海合作组织网络大学正式启动以来，成员国已有60多所顶尖高校加入其中。2011年，哈萨克斯坦、中国、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦五国代表签署《上海合作组织大学章程》，并相继在五国建立了70所院校，旨在为这些国家培养经济、科学、文化和教育等优先合作领域（区域学、生态学、能源学、纳米技术、IT技术）的高水平人才。各成员国还深入探讨在包括全球气候变暖、生态环境保护、救灾减灾、科技、创新、信息、电信产业以及合理利用自然资源等方面的合作。2012年，上合成员国元首理事会会议继续强调，应重视加强上合文化、科技、创新、旅游、卫生合作，特别是确保上合地区的卫生防疫状况良好。17年来，各成员国在上合框架下举行了百余场次的双边和多边艺术节、音乐节、青年节、教育周、电影周、电视合作论坛、展览会、运动会、马拉松赛、“睦邻友好年”、冬（夏）令营和培训班等形式多样的人文交流活动，“文化节”、“教育无国界”教育周和昆明马拉松赛等已成为定期举办的系列项目，极大地增进了上合区域内民众的相互了解和传统友谊。成员国还希望在非物质文化遗产和民族传统文化保护方面开展合作，不断夯实上合发展的民意和社会基础。

二、上合未来发展面临的挑战

17年来，虽然上合以出人意料的速度发展成为一个颇具影响力的综合性区域
国际组织，而且还有更大发展空间，但不可否认的是，该组织仍是一个较年轻的区域性组织。除了原有的某些待突破的发展瓶颈外，随着成员的增加，上合又面临着一些新的问题和挑战。

其一，西方保守势力难以改变对上合的固有偏见。从成立伊始上合就宣布，其不是军事集团，它的建立并不针对任何国家和集团，是一个开放的地区性合作组织，但不可否认，上合所寻求的构建多极、公平合理的世界秩序，与美国希保持其长期主导的原有世界秩序战略相悖；上合所秉持的在国际关系中坚持“互信、互利、平等、协作”安全观，及尊重所有国家利益和不可分割的世界安全空间理念，与西方保守势力的冷战思维格格不入；上合所提出的在处理国际热点问题应发挥联合国的主导和协调作用主张，与美国和北约绕开联合国单独行事背道而驰；上合所崇尚的和平友好、互利合作精神，与美国等西方国家的“集团思维”和强权政治也严重对立。而且，上合呼吁国际社会应尊重各国国家主权和独立、政治和社会制度多样性，客观上也对西方价值观构成挑战。2005年，上合以声明形式要求美国确认多国部队从中亚撤军时间表，更使西方人士确信，其并不是西方社会所愿意看到的组织。2012年上合成员国元首峰会后，一些西方媒体再次大肆渲染上合在与西方“分庭抗礼”，妄称上合不再是解决边境争端的论坛。某些西方政治家认为，上合成员国元首宣言明确反对干涉叙利亚内政，反对在任何国家强行推动政权更迭，反对在伊朗核问题上动武，这充分表明上合正热衷于在本地区打造一个排斥美国的多边机制。西方特别是美国将不得不作好应对上合在政治经济和安全方面全方位挑战的准备。

其二，美欧极力分化和离间上合。奥巴马总统上台后不断游说国会解除自2005年起对乌兹别克斯坦的制裁，还拟将对巴基斯坦冻结的8亿美元援助中的一部分转拨给塔什干，期冀卡里莫夫总统回心转意，重新接纳美国驻军。2012年，美国推动北约首次邀请哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦总统参加在芝加哥召开的北约峰会，以促进中亚国家与北约关系。美欧还试图将印度打造成印太地区的重要“防务伙伴”和制衡中国的棋子。近10年来，美国向印度出售了150亿美元的武器装备。2016年，美印两国国防部签署《后勤保障协议》，允许两国军队使用对方军事基地进行后勤作业。美国还向印度提供P-8I海上巡逻机，使其成为美国外销P-8系列首个国家。2017年，美国两党一致同意向印度出售价值20亿美元的22架“保卫者”无人机，用于印度加强在印度洋上的侦察。时任美国国务卿蒂勒森在华盛顿战略与国际问题研究中心发表题为《重新定义下一个百年美印关系》的讲话中将印度称为美国在未来地区战略的“支点
国家”，希望其在印太地区发挥更大的安全作用。2018年，法国与印度签署两国武装部队相互提供后勤支持的防务协议，两国将允许对方军舰使用自己的海军基地。


除上述外部挑战外，毋庸讳言，上合内部也存在一些需努力化解的复杂因素。如部分成员国精英担心上合使中亚国家加深对中国的依附，认为俄从上合“获益”不及中国，进而产生一定的失落感，这一心理一定程度上影响了俄罗斯某些政府部门对上合多边经贸合作的热情。另外，印巴加入上合后印与中巴的历史纠葛和现实矛盾也可能给上合原有和谐氛围带来新的复杂影响。未来，如何不断光大以“互信、互利、平等、协商、尊重多样文明、谋求联合发展”为基本内容的“上海精神”，不断夯实上合成员国间战略互信，积极化解或降低有关内外消极因素的干扰，将是上合增强凝聚力、提升合作层次、在国际和地区事务中进一步发挥好作用的关键。
三、上合发展前景

17年来，上合在互信、互利、平等、协商、尊重多样文明、谋求共同发展的“上海精神”指引下取得长足发展。印度和巴基斯坦的加入又给上合发展带来新的机遇，成员国的政治体制、经济模式和人文元素更加多样化，上合的国际地位进一步上升，在地区和国际事务中发挥的作用将更大。

（一）上合的战略地位和影响力将逐步提升

扩员后，上合所涵盖的幅员面积已从中国、俄罗斯和中亚延伸至南亚，直至印度洋海域欧亚大陆四通八达的核心地带，人口从占世界25%增加至44%，国内生产总值超过14.5万亿美元，占全球的近三分之一，成为国际上人口最多、幅员最大的区域性组织。最重要的是，上合“朋友圈”进一步扩大，所秉持的“上海精神”被更广泛认可。由于上合不但有三个联合国安理会常任理事国，还有五个“金砖国家”和四个“有核国家”，其在完善全球治理体系、推进国际经济秩序改革等重大问题上的话语权和影响力将大为增强。印巴的加入还使上合将打击中亚“三股势力”和南亚及中东恐怖组织结合起来，使其安全合作区域纵深进一步扩大。如今，上合已发展成为二战以来整个欧亚大陆从未有过的，甚至欧洲一些国家都趋之若鹜想加入的一个多边区域组织，成为国际舞台上一支不可忽视的变量。

（二）上合多边经贸合作呈现稳步发展前景

经过十多年共同努力，2014年，各成员国正式签署《成员国政府间国际道路运输便利化协定》及其附件，打破了长期以来制约上合深化区域经济一体化合作的瓶颈。2016年，各成员国又批准《2017年至2021年上海合作组织进一步推动项目合作的措施清单》和《关于成立上海合作组织开发银行和发展基金（专门账户）下一步工作》等涵盖贸易、投资、金融等合作文件，强调继续就建立上合开发银行和发展基金开展工作对促进地区经贸和投资合作十分重要。2017年，上合成员国政府首脑（总理）理事会会议重申，上合首要任务之一是提高民众福祉和生活水平，各方要继续落实2030年可持续发展目标，加强贸易、产能、能源、交通、铁路、投资、金融、农业、海关、电信等共同感兴趣领域的合作；深化多边交通运输领域合作，包括新建和升级现有公路和铁路运输走廊，规划高速干线、落实多功能物流中心以及其他基础设施合作项目；支持进一步巩固开放、包容、透明、非歧视和以规则为基础的多边贸易体系，防止国际贸易关系碎片化，反对任何形式的贸易保护主义；将在专家层面就建立上合开发银行和发展基金继续磋商，制定共同方案，不断推进投资等优先领域经济合作，进一步拉紧成员国
间的利益纽带。在此背景下，继中吉乌公路建成并正式运营以来，拖延已久的中吉乌铁路建设项目又取得积极进展。

（三）“上合经济圈”效应会进一步显现
2012年，上合成员国外贸总额和经济总量已从2001年占世界的8%和4.8%双双增加至13%。2016年，中国同其他成员国的贸易总额从2001年的120亿美元增加到937亿美元。印巴成为正式成员国后，上合经济实力和区域合作潜力进一步增强，原有的中国、俄罗斯和中亚“上合经济圈”扩大至南亚地区，为成员国开展多边经济合作开辟更广阔空间。2017年，中国与其他成员国的贸易总额达到创纪录的2176亿美元，同比增长19%。中印双边贸易额也创历史新高，为844亿美元，比上年增长20.3%，中国对印度实际投资累计超过80亿美元，中国继续保持印度最大贸易伙伴地位。作为新兴经济体的主要国家，中国、俄罗斯和印度给区域经济合作增添了新动能，必将促进“上合经济圈”经贸合作快速发展，为地区和世界经济发展发挥更大作用。

（四）中印关系和印巴矛盾将有进一步沟通的条件
印度加入上合除了寄望于借助上合影响来提高自身地位外，另一个目的就是不想失去参与“上合经济圈”诸多项目的商机以及与上合成员国尤其是中亚国家加强反恐和经贸合作的机会。虽然印度与中国在一些问题上存有分歧和矛盾，可印度与中国在多边舞台仍有过诸多成功合作先例。无论是巴厘岛气候大会，还是哥本哈根气候大会，印度都与中国及“基础四国”其他伙伴都一直在密切配合、相互协作，充分展示了发展中国家“集体发声”和“抱团”维护共同利益的坚定意志和决心。在亚洲相互协作与信任措施会议（亚信）和金砖国家，以及亚洲基础设施投资银行等多个合作机制中中俄和中亚成员国的合作也十分顺畅。何况，印方已有改善对华关系的强烈愿望。印度驻俄罗斯大使阿贾伊·马尔霍特拉曾明确表示，印度不抱成见地秉持开放和积极态度加入上合，将“建设性地”参与上合框架内的所有合作领域。2018年3月，莫迪总理在习近平再次当选国家主席后第一时间打电话祝贺，称印方愿同中方密切高层交往，深化双边关系，加强在国际事务中协调合作，推动中印关系取得更大进展。印度外长斯瓦拉吉在访华期间表示，印方将全力支持中方办好上合峰会，并将与其他成员国一道，推动上合为促进地区安全稳定和发展繁荣发挥更大的建设性作用。4月27日至28日，习近平主席和莫迪总理在武汉举行非正式会晤。两位领导人通过此次会晤，进一步加深了对各自发展战略和改革措施的理解。莫迪总理重申，印中保持频繁的高层交往和战略沟通有利于增进相互了解、深化合作，符合两国和本地区发展繁荣的共同利益。印方愿同中方携手共同努力应对全球性问题和挑战。同
样，印巴成为正式成员国总比两国以观察员国的松散身份有限参与上合有关合作要好得多。而且，加入上合也使印巴又多了一个解决或管控两国分歧和矛盾的重要平台，上合的相互协作将有助于两国找到新的利益共同点。

综上，经过17年的发展，上合已成为一面和平发展的旗帜，其影响大大超出地区范围，成为一个有着极高威望的多边综合性合作组织。上合组织“和平与合作”的理念已成为成员国发挥各自优势、开展长期互利合作的准则，并被越来越多的国家广泛认可。历史和现今的欧亚大陆或许有过，或目前依然存在着，这样或那样较有影响的地区性国际组织，但都很少有像上合这样，被更多不同意识形态和制度各异的国家青睐。展望未来，上合活力不减，发展前景越来越好。
美国总统特朗普就任近一年半来，中美经贸关系历经波折，进入剧烈调整期。6月15日，虽然双方经过三轮多轮贸易谈判并达成重要共识，美方仍突然宣布将对中国500亿美元出口商品提升关税。中方随后在几个小时内做出迅速回应，强调将立即采取同等规模、同等力度的征税措施，双方之前磋商达成的所有经贸成果将同时失效。面对中方对等报复措施，18日美方又威胁将制定2000亿美元征税清单。为维护自身权益中方必然对此采取对等措施。未来，一旦大规模的贸易战开打，必将引发市场恐慌，给世界经济的脆弱复苏带来巨大威胁，甚至不排除引发新的全球性经济危机的可能。可见，特朗普政府强硬的对华经贸新政策的政策基调、框架都已经确立、成型，这将在未来较长时期对两国经贸及政治关系的发展方向产生重大影响。

一、特朗普政府强硬的对华经贸新政策

（一）政策酝酿与出台

特朗普在总统竞选期间即不断就中美经贸关系发表言论，指责中国为“汇率操纵国”，并拟大幅提高中国输美货物关税等。就任后，其目标集中指向对华巨额货物贸易逆差，新的进攻性对华经贸政策迅速成型，其出台过程概略分为如下两个阶段：

1. 试探、准备阶段（2017年1月—2018年3月）。这一阶段，特朗普完成了调整对华经贸政策所必须的法理准备和谈判、决策团队组建两项工作。2017年4月，美国贸易代表办公室（Office of the United States Trade Representative，USTR）发布《301特
别报告》中，指控中国窃取美国商业秘密、网络盗版猖獗等，将中国列为“优先观察名单”。8月，特朗普签署行政备忘录，授权美国贸易代表审查“中国贸易行为”，包括中国强制美国企业转让技术及盗窃美国知识产权等问题。经过一段时间调整，特朗普政府组建了保守主义色彩浓厚的对华经贸政策团队，其核心人物包括美国贸易代表莱特希泽、商务部长罗斯、财政部长努钦、白宫贸易顾问纳瓦罗等。

2. 成型阶段（2018年3月-6月）。两大重要事件标志着美国对华经贸新政策基本成型。一是，3月23日，特朗普签署总统备忘录，宣布限制中国对美投资，拟对价值600亿美元的进口中国商品加收重税。特朗普政府完全放弃了十多年来以“中美战略经济对话”、“中美战略与经济对话”机制为代表的全领域磋商、沟通模式，而采用议题集中、议程明确、结果导向的技术谈判模式。二是，6月8日，中兴通讯与美国商务部达成初步和解协议。尽管中兴事件起于2012年，但其获得暂时解决却发生在当下中美贸易摩擦日益加剧的背景下，并成为特朗普政府推动对华贸易谈判的砝码。

特朗普对华经贸新政策的内容、形式仍处于动态发展过程中，将随中美双方谈判、互动及全球及地区政治、经济形势演变而调整。

（二）政策性质与目标

1. 从性质上看，该政策是美国对华全面遏制战略的重要组成部分。特朗普就任以来采取的一系列对华政策行动显示出其将中国作为对手，并从政治、经济、军事、文化等领域进行全面遏制的意图。此前特朗普政府发布的《国家安全战略报告》和《2018年美国国防战略报告》明确将中国定位为“战略竞争对手”或“战略竞争者”。进攻性特征明显的新经贸政策在美对华全面遏制战略中首先成型，直接针对国家发展复兴所依赖的经济基础，而非仅着眼于减少当下美国对华贸易逆差，调整双边经贸关系，而将与其他领域的遏制政策行动呼应联动，其所体现的冷战思维将主导未来较长时期美对华政策基调。

2. 特朗普政府采取进攻姿态，高举高打，以打促谈，意图达成如下基本目标：

第一，打压甚至逆转中国经济的赶超势头。2007-2008年金融危机以来，美国是全球唯一对美国形成赶超势头的国家。2007-2016年，中国GDP总量由3.55万亿美元升至近11.20万亿美元。在全球GDP总量中占比由6.15%扩张至14.84%。美国GDP由14.48万亿美元增至18.57万亿美元。在全球GDP总量中占比由25.05%微降至24.58%。特别是2007、2010年中国先后超过德国、日本成为世界第二大经济体，由不足日本GDP总量的80%反超为2.5倍多，与美国差距也由4.07倍缩减至1.64倍。
第二，维护美国中、高端制造业国际竞争力。特朗普3月23日备忘录中拟对中国加税商品集中于技术密集型行业，如信息技术、新能源汽车、人工智能、生物医药、高铁装备、航空航天等，约占中国对美出口总额的1/8。美还拟进一步限制相关领域涉及合资运营和技术转让的在华投资。这些行业具有某些共同特点，或是中国处于全球领先地位或近些年进步显著，国际竞争力增强，或是中国对美投资或吸引美资相对集中的领域。

第三，把握未来国际经贸秩序规则主导权。在跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement，简称TPP）、《跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定》（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership，简称TTIP）等谈判中，美国即拟从贸易、投资、知识产权、劳工、环保及争端解决机制等广泛领域设立高标准新规则，确保构建未来全球经贸新秩序的主导权。但特朗普政府的操作思路有所变化，其基本作法是搁置现有全球多边体系，以双边谈判直接施压，同时运用区域多边策略予以配合，对贸易伙伴逐个击破，以推动其认可的贸易规则。特朗普与其前任在扭转美国全球经济秩序领导权弱化趋势方面目标一致。

（三）政策特点

1. 力求速战。特朗普高举高打，行动迅速。就任三个月，美国贸易代表办公室就发布《301特别报告》，将中国列为“优先观察名单”。特朗普随即授权美国贸易代表启动审查程序。仅半年时间，即以备忘录形式明确列出拟大规模加税的商品行业类别，并进一步提出具体清单和货物金额。

2. 打组合拳。特朗普政府奉行“贸易即政治”原则，以经贸问题作为重点突破口，尤其擅长借用地缘政治牌等加大施压力度，在南海、朝鲜半岛、台湾、区域经济合作、网络安全等领域动作不断，与经贸谈判形成相互借重之势，以达成目的。

3. 国会支持。针对特朗普在全球范围频频挑起贸易战的行为，国会参众两院均有重要人物和力量在原则上表示强烈反对。但具体到调整对华经贸关系方面，国会的不同声音极其微弱，甚至因制华问题不愿采取行动运用宪法赋予国会的权力去限制特朗普政府享有的贸易政策授权。

二、中美经贸关系出现结构性变化

2007-2008年金融危机以来中美经贸关系的一系列基础性因素发生重大变化，决定了双方经贸关系调整形势严峻，摩擦、冲突将是长期现象。
（一）中美在全球价值链中相对地位变化。中美在全球价值链中占据重要地位。中国入世后，对全球价值链的参与水平和所处地位不断提升。2007年，中国制造业产值在全球占比为13.2%，居世界第二位；2010年即达19.8%，比美国高1.6%，成为世界第一制造业大国。中国连续数年保持全球货物贸易第一大出口国地位。工业制成品出口在其中占据主导地位，在全球占比也接近20%，是紧随其后的德国的1.7倍。

根据联合国商品贸易统计数据库（Comtrade）和经合组织测算，中国总体上仍处于全球价值链末端，加工、生产并出口最终产品，尚未脱离全球价值链的低附加值环节。中国仍是全球最大的生产者，美国是全球最大的消费者。但是，中国不仅已是全球价值链上北美、欧洲、亚洲三大生产中心的核心国家之一，而且正向价值链高端移动。中国出口产品的国内附加值占比稳步提高，从2007年的65.83%升至2014年的70.65%。其重要原因在于中国制造业承担高水平专业化分工能力大幅提升，更多地参与具有更高附加值或位于价值链上游的中间品生产活动。同期，美国则稳中有降，从2007年的85.98%降至2014年的84.72%。

（二）两国双边投资不对称性显著增强。中美相互直接投资关系正在发生显著变化，特别是中国对美投资并未因金融危机而受负面影响，连年跃升，由2007年的3.56亿美元激增至2016年的462亿美元，年均增长率超过71%。2000年至今，中国在美投资金额累积为1365亿美元，项目数累积为1510个。中国对美投资也出现新动向，一是投资方式不再以企业并购为主，绿地投资项目占比达56%。二是在投资主体中，国有资本比例下降，民营资本占比已达75%。

美国对华直接投资则在金融危机后出现逆转走势，虽间或出现反弹，但总体下滑。2008年，美国对华投资达到210亿美元高位，此后年均约为130亿美元。2015年，中国对美直接投资约153亿美元，历史上首次超过同期美国对华投资。目前，美国在华投资存量约为2400亿美元。据中国美国商会年度调查报告，81%参与调查的在华美资公司认为其在华经营活动不受欢迎，25%的受访企业表示考虑或将全部或部分产能迁离中国。

当前双方就资本流向不对称、投资市场准入、营商环境波动等问题辩论激烈，影响双边投资和经贸关系发展。近年来，“美国外国投资委员会”（CFIUS）以“国家安全”等为由，阻止三一重工、蚂蚁金服等多个中国在美国并购项目。美国国会两院也推动投资审查扩容法案，将这一投资审批机制转变为某种技术控制机制。

（三）双方贸易量？贸易商品结构？贸易模式等呈现新特征。金融危机以来，中国对美出口在其全球出口市场中占比在16.71%-19.11%之间波动，是第一
大出口目的地。同期，中国成为美国第三大货物出口市场，一直在占其全球出口市场份额的5%以上。同期中美双边贸易额增长1.9倍多。此外，金融危机后，双边贸易额高速增长的势头有所放缓、回落。中国产业转型和外贸结构开始调整，中国出口贸易模式发生了巨大转变。2006年，中国加工贸易出口长期占外贸比重50%以上。目前仅占三成左右。一般贸易已占中美双边贸易主体地位，份额超过55%。

从双边贸易商品结构上看，金融危机以来，中国对美出口额最高的货物类别及其占比变化不大，说明中国传统对美出口产品仍具有较强国际竞争力。美国市场对中国产品的需求持续、稳定。与此同时，美国对华出口货物结构变动明显。中国进口美国大豆等数量连年跃升。过去五年来，美国出口大豆货值在178-259亿美元之间波动，中国进口占比均在六成左右。中国成为美国波音飞机第一大进口国，带动美“航空、航天及部件”对华出口排名上升。目前，美国波音飞机1/4的市场在中国。此外，在中美货物贸易增长速度换挡调整的同时，双边服务贸易额增长迅猛，丰富了双边贸易内容。这些变化印证了金融危机后中国经济、产业结构正在转型，消费驱动经济增长模式逐步形成。

（四）美国对中国发展的战略认知改变。美国对华曾有“战略竞争对手”、“利益攸关方”、“合作伙伴兼竞争对手”等定位。近年来，在南海、朝鲜半岛、区域经济一体化、网络安全等问题领域的一系列博弈是双方矛盾上升的表现。中国提出“一带一路”倡议、设立亚投行等行动加剧了美国对中国全球战略意图的猜疑。特朗普政府就任不久就明确将中国定位为“对手”，将双边经贸关系失衡及中国的经贸政策视为对美国利益和由其主导的国际经济秩序的挑战，宣称其为“经济进攻”。一方面，通过首脑外交、“推特”外交、高级别限时谈判等手段直接施压。另一方面，积极支持日本提出的“印度-太平洋”战略，对中国在亚太地区的影响和推动共建“一带一路”倡议形成牵制。特朗普在2017年“亚太经济合作会议”（APEC）年会上再提“自由开放的印度-太平洋区”，要求各方都遵守游戏规则，不再容忍“贸易舞弊”，迫使区域内国家“选边”。

三、妥善应对：坚持求同存异、谈判优先同时坚决捍卫自身发展权益

长期以来，经贸关系被视为中美关系的“压舱石”和“稳定器”。但是，特朗普对华启动经贸新政策，使中美政治关系与经贸关系同时面临重大调整。所以，“不能仅依赖经济上的相互依存”，“……必须考虑，如何在当今的外交政策中让经济和安全议题相关联”。“

（一）通盘筹划，妥善处理分歧。要坚持从全球战略高度和中美关系全局筹
划双边经贸谈判，尽最大努力积极引导中美贸易关系朝积极健康稳定方向发展。首先，中国扩大开放的态度始终如一，改革开放是中国发展的需要，不会因外界一时一事因素而改变，其次，中方坚持在相互尊重的基础上，聚焦合作、管控分歧，与美方通过谈判，以建设性方式来处理贸易摩擦和分歧，形成最大公约数，达成双方都满意的共识与协议，第三，坚持中美经贸谈判以双方相向而行、不打贸易战为前提。在谈判过程中，如美方出台和执行对华商品加征关税的措施，中方必将采取对等措施维护自身权益，同时双方达成的协议与成果将不会生效。

(二) 保持战略定力，坚定战略自信。一方面要看到特朗普对华发起贸易战根本目的是遏制新兴大国崛起，维护自身全球主导权，中美贸易摩擦问题已超出贸易本身范畴，具有长期性和严峻性；另一方面，中国制造业已经开始崛起，同时中国市场潜力巨大，且具有巨大的投资能力，中国只要坚持创新发展思路，坚持不断发展战略性新兴产业，同时坚持对外开放的基本国策，坚持打开国门搞建设，假以时日，中国在技术经济发展方面必将拥有广阔的发展前景。无论外界环境如何变化，中国都将保持定力，坚定自身发展战略毫不动摇。

(三) 努力增进中美政治互信。目前看中美关系的基础正发生前所未有的变化。两国关系亟待寻求明确的发展方向和新的定位，双方已进入协调相互战略认知的关键时期。作为全球第一、第二大经济体，中美在经贸领域已形成紧密的相互依存关系。但是，相互依赖并不必然带来相互信任。在美国现实主义者看来，中美经贸关系相互依赖愈益加深大多是以损害美国利益为代价的，恰恰是需要纠正的。随着中国综合国力的增长，其国家安全战略、全球治理理念等也不断引发美国的质疑和忧虑。特朗普追求“美国第一”的全球竞争理念，拒绝受现行国际条约、国际组织、国际机制的约束，正在行动上实施没有“重返亚太战略”的亚太事务介入政策。在中美经贸关系结构化调整进程中，相互贸易报复和一时的让步恩惠都不可持续，建立高水平的政治互信终究是双方经贸关系良性发展的“定海神针”。双方可坚持利用外交安全对话等机制和渠道，加强在国家安全战略理念、目标、政策、行动等方面的沟通，坚持相互尊重、聚焦合作、管控分歧，稳定提升双方政治互信水平。

(四) 可考虑适时重议双边投资协定并尝试推动自由贸易谈判。金融危机以来，中美关于经贸规则方面互动协调的步伐落后于两国经贸快速发展的现实，由此引发诸多问题。

中美关系正常化以来，两国订立的全面经贸协议仅有1979年的《中美贸易协定》和1999年的《中美世界贸易组织双边协定》，分别对促进特定历史时期中美经贸关系的发展发挥了重要作用。1979年协定签订于中美建交后不久，通过相互
给予最惠国待遇，两国经贸关系迅速启动并步入正轨。1999年协议是中国加入世界贸易组织进程中极为关键的一步。2001年，中国正式加入世贸组织后，两国经贸关系主要在以世贸组织为支柱的多边贸易制度下展开。

但是，2008年以来，世贸组织在为全球范围内达成降低贸易壁垒的全面贸易协定而进行的多哈回合谈判长期陷于困顿，并于2015年宣告失败。全球多边贸易制度的效率遭遇广泛质疑。在此情形下，讨论双边或区域性贸易安排作为替代选项具有现实性与合理性。尤其是对中美这样经贸关系紧密、全球影响力大的经济体而言，构建一个新贸易框架并解决日益增多和复杂的分歧与矛盾更为迫切。

当然，双方就展开全面贸易协定谈判将面临更大阻力，特别是在市场准入、知识产权保护、网络安全等长期争执不下的领域取得突破更为困难。但是，这是双方建立更为良性、平衡的经贸关系无法回避的关口。所以，循序渐进从基础相对较好、更易于获得进展的领域寻求突破较为务实。如继续推进奥巴马时期接近完成的《中美双边投资协定》谈判。特朗普也曾表达继续谈判的意愿。毕竟达成一份兼顾双方实际和利益的平衡协定有助于削弱投资壁垒，为两国企业创造公平竞争的环境。在中国近年对美投资激增的情形下，协定将为中国企业创造进入美国市场的机会，保障企业在投资各阶段享有与美国企业的同等待遇，制约或避免美国国会、政府等对中国企业制定或执行歧视性法律、法规或产业政策。企业也可借助协定设立的争端解决机制，有效保护自身合法权益。双边投资协定还可使两国投资者相互形成稳定的市场预期，推动更强劲的资本流动，协调两国的长期经济利益。

在此基础上，双方还可就长期对立的重点诉求，如透明度、市场准入、技术转让等讨论解决方案。待条件成熟，中美可进一步将谈判扩展至货物贸易、服务贸易等领域，以缔结全面的《中美双边投资和贸易协定》或《中美自由贸易协定》，从而不仅为两国建立制度化的经贸关系框架，也有利于地区和世界投资、贸易自由化、便利化及经济发展与繁荣。

充实双边经贸谈判内容，促进经贸结构升级。改革关于双边经贸关系的沟通机制，组建专业谈判团队。对话机制模式难以在战略目标方面获得明确进展，也不便于对专业具体、立场差距较大的议题展开深入讨论。当前两国政治和经贸关系均面临突破转型，对话机制难以替代专业谈判以从技术层面获得突破。

从内容上，鼓励双方经贸关系发展过程中出现的亮点及新增长点。首先，服务贸易。近年来双边服务贸易增长连创新高，中国已成为美国第四大服务贸易伙伴、第三大服务贸易出口市场和第十大服务贸易进口来源国。目前，美国在中国市场需求较大的、具有高附加值的专业服务领域，如旅游、教育、专利使用和
特许服务、金融服务、运输和其他商业服务等均占有绝对优势，为两国服务贸易中增长最快的领域。美国成为中国学生海外留学第一大目的地。中国在美留学生2016年人均花费约4.5万美元，为美国贡献约159亿美元收入。其次，基建。美国基建设施状况老化情况严重，亟待大规模投资实现现代化。特朗普就任后，将改善基建作为经济振兴政策的优先项，积极推动总额1万亿美元的投资计划。据估算，到2040年，美国将在基建领域投资8.5万亿美元，而实际需要为12.4万亿美元，缺口达3.8万亿美元。近年中国资本成功进入美国基建领域。中国中车公司在美国马萨诸塞州、伊利诺伊州等地投资建厂，并赢得波士顿、芝加哥等城市的轨道车辆采购合同。第三，农业。中美农业合作起步早，基础坚实。两国互为农产品重要贸易伙伴。中国是美国农产品出口第一大市场。美国是中国农产品进口第一大来源国和第四大出口市场。农业是近年中美经贸合作的活跃领域。特别是，中国对美农业投资发展势头良好。2013年，双汇集团成功收购美国最大的生猪和猪肉生产商史密斯菲尔德食品公司。随着中国完成产业转型、消费升级，对美国农产品、食品、农业生产和管理技术等需求将有进一步增长。美国农业科技发达，生产效率高，对全球农业生产、贸易影响巨大。过去五年来，美国年均对华农产品出口高达250亿美元。2017年，双方更在牛肉、大米贸易安排方面取得突破。两国视情扩大农业合作既有利于美国农业及相关行业获得发展，也有助于中国实现粮食安全。

总体上，中美经贸关系的结构性变化是两国在政治、经济、文化等领域长期互动的结果，且离不开经济全球化和贸易自由化大发展的时代背景。2008年全球金融危机后这一变化加速。特朗普政府对华经贸出台新政策，未来双方如何应对将决定这一变化进程的走向。中美经贸关系调整、实现再平衡，需要较长时间和相互协作精神。两国须充分考虑其与各自国内政治、经济形势的联动效应，坚持合作共赢，避免对抗双赢，采取务实、包容、平衡、渐进的方式，消除障碍，切实提高双方贸易自由化、投资的便利化水平，挖掘和释放经贸关系的巨大潜力，建立反映双方经贸关系发展实际的有效管理和合作机制，不断增强双方经贸关系的互惠性、平衡性和可持续性。
中日关系迎来新起点，两国如何构建面向未来的战略伙伴关系？

严深春 国际问题观察员

一、李克强总理首次访问日本，推动中日关系持续改善。

2018年5月8日至11日，应日本首相安倍晋三邀请，中国国务院总理李克强赴日本出席第七次中日韩领导人会议，并进行正式访问。这是中国总理时隔八年首次访问日本（上次是2010年5月时任总理温家宝的正式访问），也是2010年至2013年期间由于钓鱼岛争端等问题导致双边关系跌至历史谷底以来，中国领导人首次踏上日本国土。

李克强总理访问期间，与安倍首相举行了会谈，拜会了日本天皇明仁，会见了日本国会及朝野政党负责人，出席纪念《中日友好和平条约》缔约40周年大型招待会并发表演讲，并赴北海道访问，与安倍首相一起出席“中日省长知事论坛”。

李克强总理同日方领导人就增进政治战略互信、加强务实交流合作、妥善管控矛盾分歧、实现中日关系回到正常发展轨道深入交换意见，就推动双方务实合作，开展第三方市场合作，加强两国文化、媒体、青少年、地方交流等达成共识。

两国领导人之间的接触、对话与互访的恢复是中日关系改善过程中的关键一环。2014年以来，中国领导人亲力亲为，为推动中日关系走出低谷付出了巨大努力。习近平主席和李克强总理多次在国际多边场合会见日本首相安倍晋三，就共同稳定、改善中日关系交换意见，达成了包括“四点原则共识”在内的许多政治共识。此次李克强总理访日，为中日关系改善发展注入了新的动力，为下一步中日关系发展明确方向。
二、当前中日关系的改善势头，是两国合力而为的结果，符合地区国家和国际社会的期待。

当前，中日关系正处在持续改善过程中，尽管此过程仍不时出现一些杂音，但双方相向而行的努力正在使改善与发展成为两国关系一个时期以来的基本特征。这种变化背后驱动的原因，既与中国自身稳定发展壮大、领导人亲力亲为、外交职能部门不懈努力密不可分，也是安倍政府此前实行对华围堵、对抗政策碰壁后在内外压力作用下做出的新政策选择，也显示出中日关系的深厚基础，符合两国人民、地区国家与国际社会的共同利益。

从中国角度看，中方重视中日关系的政策始终如一。中方视日本为重要近邻，一向高度重视发展对日关系，坚持牢牢把握两国和平、友好、合作的大方向，全面推进中日战略互惠关系向前发展。中方多次向日方强调，这是一项重要的既定政策，不因一时一事而改变。即使在前些年两国关系陷入邦交正常化以来最严峻局面的那段时期，中方依然坚持维护中日关系发展的正确方向。当前，中国特色社会主义进入新时代，在全面建成小康社会决胜阶段，中国需要为进一步深化改革和对外开放创造更为有利的周边和国际环境，因此有意愿和耐心积极推动中日关系“重回正轨”。

从日本方面看，日本经济界与执政党内部温和稳健派是促使安倍政府实行改善对华关系举措的内生动力。他们认为，中国持续发展壮大，一味围堵遏制中国不仅难以奏效，更不符合日本的根本利益，因为不改善中日关系将使日本错过中国高质量发展和“一带一路”建设的巨大机遇。同时，在美国特朗普政府调整亚太战略，强势推动贸易保护主义，朝鲜半岛局势发生重大变化等背景下，日本的周边外交面临诸多挑战，危机感增强，为增加日本国家安全战略的选项，改变一味与中国对抗的政策，改善对华关系成为安倍政府必然的政策选择。

从中日关系的基本面看，中日互为最重要的经贸合作伙伴，双方贸易额近年来保持在3000亿美元。日本是中国最大外资来源国，中国则是日本主要海外市场。两国已实现人民币和日元直接结算。双方民间交流频密，2017年人员往来超过一千万，两国友好城市达到345对。每周有1000多个航班往返两国60多个城市之间。中日双方利益联系日益紧密，相互依存不断加深，客观上要求两国关系尽快改善。

从中日关系的地区和国际影响层面看，中日关系的意义和影响力日益超过双边范畴。两国作为世界第二、第三大经济体，在推动东亚经济一体化、维护开放、自由的国际贸易体系、促进开放型世界经济和发展和改善全球治理等方面拥有共同利益和责任。地区国家和国际社会也十分期待中日尽快改善关系，携手合作应对共同全球性挑战，为亚洲和世界提供公共产品。
三、中日关系的症结既在于固有的老问题，也在于因国际形势变化产生的新的结构性矛盾。

过去八年多中日关系经历的跌宕起伏，只是中日关系自冷战结束后进入矛盾多发期过程中的一个新的循环。1972年中日实现邦交正常化后，两国关系曾经历二十年左右的快速发展“蜜月期”，至1992年明仁天皇访华达到顶点。自冷战结束后，中日关系就进入起起伏伏、时好时坏的矛盾多发期，几乎是每隔六、七年就要经历一个“恶化-改善-再恶化-再改善”的周期。

究其根本原因，既在于中日之间一直存在历史认知、钓鱼岛争端、台湾问题等固有的老问题，更在于20世纪90年代中期以后由于国际形势变化等因素导致两国关系进入了一种新的结构性的矛盾状态之中。

具体而言，一共有四方面的结构性矛盾：一是由于共同抵御苏联威胁的共同安全利益下降，出现了所谓的“安全困境”，彼此之间互不信任，互相猜疑。二是两国都试图成为地区和全球大国的发展战略目标之间存在一定的相互冲突。三是中日实力对比接近并逆转，出现了历史上从来没有过的东北亚地区两强并列的局面。四是由于两国政治、社会状况变化及媒体影响等复合因素而导致的双方国民感情恶化。

在上述结构性矛盾面前，两国间几乎所有的问题都会被放大为彼此难以妥协和让步的重大问题，甚至彼此的一言一行都会被解读为是针对对方。正因为如此，历史恩怨、钓鱼岛争端、台湾问题等一直是横隔在中日关系中的老问题，在冷战期间都没有成为阻碍双边关系发展的重大问题，冷战后就成了双方都难以妥协和克服的问题。

四、中日结构性矛盾背后的根本问题是相互认知与定位问题。

冷战后中日关系陷入了结构性矛盾之中，历史、领土、海洋问题等干扰因素此起彼伏。隐藏在这些问题背后的，正是彼此政治与安全互信的缺失，其根源在于日方对华认知和定位在内外形势变化面前没有及时调整到位。

就日方而言，如何应对中国的崛起始终是冷战后日本对外战略的最重要课题。特别是2010年中国经济总量首次超过日本后，对日本的冲击极其巨大，“中国威胁论”甚嚣尘上。最近几年，“中国威胁论”开始变种为“中国霸权论”和“中国傲慢论”。日本对中国发展的方向与目标存在误解。尽管日本安倍政府正寻求转变对华政策，但日本国内一些政治精英和部分主流媒体仍在以陈旧的冷战思维对待中国，整天在琢磨如何牵制防范中国。目前，日本的对华战略认知和心态中仍存在非理性情绪与冷战式思维。这种状态既不符合时代潮流，也不符合两
国在46年前恢复邦交的初心，更不符合日本自身长远和根本利益。

日方能否尽快转换思维，处理好对华认知和定位，将中国视为合作伙伴而非对手甚至敌手，将中国的发展视为机遇而非挑战甚至威胁，将是决定未来两国关系发展方向的一个关键。

就中方而言，如何看待日本在冷战后加速推动“正常国家”道路和实现政治大国的诉求，也是一项重要课题。应该看到，二战后，日本在国际事务中的低姿态主要源于其自我约束和美国的限制。上世纪90年代日本泡沫经济破灭后，失去了经济大国头衔的日本，要求摆脱战后体制，成为“正常国家”的呼声非常强烈，日本社会思潮总体趋向保守。同时，和平主义在日本深入人心。如何同一个相对保守和总体右倾的日本长期打交道，引导日本成为一个负责任的政治大国，是中国今后在与日本互动中要认真思考和主动应对的战略问题。

事实上，围绕中日的相互定位，早在2008年，中日两国政府就签署了第四个政治文件《中日关于全面推进战略互惠关系的联合声明》，对新世纪两国关系进行了明确定位，强调中日“互为合作伙伴，互不构成威胁”、“相互支持对方的和平发展”。然而，从最近几年的中日关系形势发展中不难看出，这个重要共识并未得到有效贯彻落实，特别是日方始终未能解决好如何正确看待中国发展这一根本性问题。

五、改善中日关系，需要两国把“互为合作伙伴，互不构成威胁”的定位真正落到实处，携手构筑面向未来、基于命运共同体意识的战略伙伴关系。

今年是《中日和平友好条约》缔结40周年，已逾不惑之年的中日关系面临改善和发展的重要契机。中日关系能否最终走上健康、稳定发展的轨道，关键要看双方能否增进政治互信，从战略的高度和长远的角度把握两国关系的发展方向。

新的形势下，中日之间需要的是信任与合作，而不是猜疑和对抗。双方应努力在政治安全领域开展正面互动，尽快找到符合时代潮流与两国各自利益的新的相互定位。

笔者认为，中日关系已站在了新的起点，两国关系的定位也要从十年前确定的基于利益交换的“战略互惠关系”向更为积极的方向推进，应该构筑面向未来、基于命运共同体意识的“战略伙伴关系”。

为此，今后一个时期，应该重点从四方面推进中日关系改善与发展，为构筑“战略伙伴关系”夯实基础和营造气氛。

一是加强双方战略沟通，不断增进政治互信。近几年中日关系经历多轮折腾，症结在于日本当政者的对华认知。未来日方应认真思考，想清楚透，正确看待中国的发展，杜绝冷战思维和零和心态。双方政治互信的受损，需要通过各层
级交往，不断修补。高层交往对两国关系改善发展具有重要引领作用。今年底或
明年上半年，中国将举办第八次中日韩领导人会议，安倍首相将出席并可能实现
首次正式访华。明年6月，日本将举办二十国集团领导人会议，习近平主席将出席
会议。双方应抓住今明两年重要契机，加强对中日关系的顶层设计和高层引领。
同时，保持政府、政党和议会交流，开展外交、安全领域对话，及时就双边关系
中的重大问题、各自内外政策和发展走向进行深入对话与沟通，化解彼此疑虑，
防止战略误判，通过实实在在的努力，让彼此走得更近，而不是渐行渐远。

二是切实管控分歧，稳妥处理敏感问题。中日关系中的历史纠葛和现实
分歧在中短期内难以彻底解决。这就需要双方保持耐心，努力寻找切实管控分歧
的有效之道，使这些矛盾不激化，不影响双边关系大局。历史和台湾问题事关中
日关系政治基础，日方应恪守中日四个政治文件精神和有关承诺，慎重妥善处理历
史、东海和钓鱼岛存在的潜在风险和挑战，双方应切实遵循2014年达成的“四点原
则共识”有关精神，利用“中日海洋事务高级别磋商”以及本次访问期间签署协
议并建立的“中日海空联络机制”等做好危机管控，共同维护东海和平稳定。

三是深化经贸务实合作，实现互利共赢和利益交融。经贸合作一直是中日
关系的“压舱石”，新形势下更应该发挥其“助推器”作用。双方应积极开展
节能环保和先进制造业合作，拓展新兴服务产业和创新领域务实合作，促进中日
产业链深度融合，实现中日共同繁荣。同时，亚洲经济一体化离不开中日两国的
引领，双方应携手推动中日韩自贸区、区域全面经济伙伴关系谈判进程，利用
“一带一路”新平台开展第三方市场合作，推动区域经济一体化。此次访问期
间，两国经济部门签署了“中日关于开展第三方市场合作的谅解备忘录”，为中
日在“一带一路”框架下开展合作提供了制度保障。

四是加强民间友好交流，增进两国国民之间感情。国之交在于民相亲，民相
亲在于心相交。中日友好的基础在民间，中日友好的未来也在民间。一方面，中
日之间的交往有着很广泛的民间基础，还有很长时间的历史积淀。民间友好是中
日关系优良传统。中日邦交正常化的实现，一个重要因素就是双方“民间先行，
以民促官”的不懈努力。中日建交后，两国各界友好团体和人士大力开展友好交
往，积极参与推动两国各领域交流合作，为增进两国人民相互理解和友谊、推动
两国关系改善发展发挥了重要作用。另一方面，也要看到，近几年由于中日政治
关系恶化，国民感情鸿沟因各种敏感问题的刺激在扩大。两国政府要高度重视这
一问题，积极创造条件，使两国民众双向往来的巨大潜力进一步释放，推动国民
大交流，特别是青少年、地方和草根阶层的交流，举办打动人心、引发共鸣的交
流活动，引导更多民众关心支持中日关系，为中日关系改善夯实社会基础。